specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that James lacks standing to challenge the visitation orders. However, I write separately to point out that this court also lacks jurisdiction over those orders.
As the majority explained, James filed notices of appeal from three orders entered by the circuit court. First, he filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s May 14, 2007, order authorizing the Public Guardian to restrict his visitation with Janie. That order specifically provided that the circuit court would review the restriction on visitation on a later date. That order is the basis of appeal number 1 — 07— 1865. Second, James filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s June 25, 2007, order denying him visitation with Janie “at this time.” The circuit court specifically found the order immediately final and appealable. That order is the basis of appeal number 1 — 07—1916. Roughly one month later, on August 21, 2007, the circuit court entered an agreed order permitting James to have supervised visits with Janie. The third and final order from which James filed a notice of appeal was the circuit court’s January 18, 2008, order suspending visitation. The order indicated that the circuit court would revisit the issue six months later. That order is the basis of appeal number 1 — 08—0700. Each of these three orders from which James seeks to appeal indicates that the court would, and as the record shows did, revisit the issue of visitation at a later date.
Generally, appellate jurisdiction exists only to review final orders. Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 7, 694 N.E.2d 562, 563 (1998); Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 335 Ill. App. 3d 875, 880, 781 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (2002). An order is said to be final if it “ ‘ “disposes of the rights of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate part thereof,” ’ ” such as a claim in a civil case. In re Estate of French, 166 Ill. 2d 95, 101, 651 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (1995), quoting Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84, 39 Ill. 2d 136, 139, 233 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1968), quoting Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48, 147 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1958). The mere fact that an order resolves important issues does not render it final. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 59, 784 N.E.2d 219, 223 (2002). An order is final for purposes of appeal if it terminates the litigation between the parties so that, if affirmed, the trial court only has to proceed with the execution of the judgment. In re Guardianship of J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d 673, 676, 878 N.E.2d 141, 143 (2007). Thus, a final order finally determines, fixes, and disposes of the issues in the case as a matter of law. J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 878 N.E.2d at 143.
It is axiomatic that where a matter remains pending, it cannot be said to be final and appealable. See, e.g., Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680, 794 N.E.2d 843, 848 (2003) (matter not final where a claim remained pending). For example, in In re Guardianship of J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144, this court held that a temporary order entered in a guardianship proceeding was not a final appealable order. The court explained that because the order was only temporary and would be reviewed and reevaluated by the circuit court at a later date, there was no question that it did not “ ‘finally determine, fix and dispose of the parties’ rights.’ ” J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144, quoting Lubben v. Lubben, 135 Ill. App. 3d 302, 305, 481 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1985). Therefore, the temporary order removing the guardian was not final for purposes of appeal. J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144; see also Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 59-60, 784 N.E.2d at 223 (explaining that a permanency planning goal established in a child abuse and neglect proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 cannot be said to be final because it will be reevaluated by the circuit court every six months).
Here, as in J.D., the orders regarding visitation were only temporary. Each of the orders specified that it would be reviewed at a later time. Therefore, the visitation orders were not final and appealable. See J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144.
I must further note that the circuit court’s finding that the order was “final and appealable” was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). As this court also explained in J.D., the inclusion of a Rule 304(a) finding in an order does not transform a nonfinal order into a final and appealable one. J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144-45. Rule 304(a) language is only applicable to cases involving multiple claims and/or multiple parties, and in those cases, it can be used to sever a final claim as to one party from other nonfinal claims and/or other parties. 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); F.H. Prince & Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 982-83, 640 N.E.2d 1313, 1316-17 (1994). Rule 304(a) does not affect finality. See F.H. Prince, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 982, 640 N.E.2d at 1316.
The present case does not involve multiple claims or parties, and, as explained above, the visitation orders were not final. Therefore, the Rule 304(a) finding is completely superfluous. See J.D., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 878 N.E.2d at 144-45.
In summary, we lack jurisdiction to entertain James’ appeal from the visitation orders, and this appeal should be dismissed. Accordingly, I specially concur with the majority’s judgment.