concurring in result.
I fully concur in the majority decision that summary judgment was appropriately entered for Cerestar USA, Inc.
I reach a different conclusion from the majority on whether the expert testimony was appropriately stricken. I believe that the tendered expert was sufficiently qualified as an expert by his knowledge, skill, experience, training and education, and the specialized knowledge which he possessed would have aided the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. I further believe that the proponent of the evidence demonstrated that the general methodology was based on sufficiently reliable scientific principles.
In Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind.2001), our supreme court noted that Evidence Rule 702 “reflected an intent to liberalize, rather than constrict, the admission of reliable scientific evidence” and that once the threshold is crossed, “the accuracy, consistency, and credibility of the expert’s opinions may be left to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, argument of counsel, and resolution by the trier of fact.” I believe the trial court abused its discretion in striking the testimony.
Because I believe the exclusion of the expert testimony was harmless on the question of whether Cerestar USA, Inc. owed a duty to the plaintiff, I concur in the decision affirming the summary judgment.