I must respectfully dissent.
When Lomboy entered her pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) on the original charge of murder, she was advised that by entering the NGI plea “if ultimately found to be true [she] would spend a minimum of 90 days and a maximum of life in a *74state hospital.” She replied that she understood this.1 Under People v. Vanley (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 846, at page 856 [116 Cal.Rptr. 446], such an admonition is required by In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, at page 864 [112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 516], and because “a person who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity may figure that the plea is simply another way to ‘beat the rap’” when in fact long confinement is possible.2 The reasons for giving the admonition are different from those involved in the Boykin-Tahl situation where the admonition is required because constitutional rights are being waived when a guilty plea is entered. We here deal with a typical dual plea and trial situation involving a not guilty plea followed by a trial of the guilt issue where presumably Lomboy first desired to put the people to their burden of proof on the guilt issue and waived no constitutional rights; and by her NGI plea, when made, Lomboy also waived no constitutional rights and was herself put to the burden of proving her defense.
Having once been advised of the consequences of the not guilty by reason of insanity plea in the context of the murder charge, Lomboy was put on notice the NGI plea is not “another way to ‘beat the rap’” and that custody in the mental health facility could continue for life. The concern expressed by the court in Vanley thus was removed here. The fact the maximum term of possible confinement under the criminal charges might be shortened because the amended information sought only a lesser included offense is not so significant that the defendant must be readvised of the consequences before proceeding to the second phase. The common sense reason for the admonishment having been fulfilled and essential consequences of the plea having been explained, I suggest it is not reversible error to fail to repeat or detail with exactitude the maximum term an insanity plea might entail (see People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 322-323, fn. 2 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 *75P.2d 1308]). If, as the majority asserts, she must be readvised she faces a possible life commitment, I see no prejudice to her requiring reversal here since that was exactly what she was advised in the first instance.3 Since there were no constitutional rights involved, in the absence of prejudice there has been no miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see People v. Walker (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 159, 164-165 [338 P.2d 536]).
The maximum term commitment is applicable only if Lomboy continually fails her review process (Pen. Code, § 1026, subd. (e)), and is unable to establish that her sanity has been restored (Pen. Code, §§ 1026, subd. (b), 1026.1, 1026.2). Further, her commitment could continue for life only if she is subjected to extended commitment at the end of the maximum term for successive additional two-year periods (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)). In connection with these extended commitments for additional two-year periods beyond the maximum term, a full panoply of rights is accorded the committed person before any such extension may be ordered. Those rights include jury trial, discovery, appointed counsel and appointed psychologists or psychiatrists (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subds. (b)(3), (4) and (5)) and the burden is on the prosecuting attorney to prove the person is, among other things, one who by reason of mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others (In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 457, 467-468; Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subds. (b)(1) and (6)). The standard of proof in each such proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 467-468; People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 322 [121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352]). In light of these characteristics attending the possibility of a two-year extended commitment beyond the maximum term for the criminal offense, neither an extended commitment nor a lifetime commitment can be viewed as a direct consequence of the NGI plea. Rather, because such a commitment is merely a possibility, not a certainty, and depends upon new findings by an independent tribunal in a fresh proceeding based upon a set of facts then established, it is apparent both the extended commitment and the lifetime commitment possibilities are purely collateral consequences of the plea. Since they are collateral con*76sequences, it is unnecessary to admonish a defendant about them (People v. Flores (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 484, 487 [113 Cal.Rptr. 272]).
Aside from this fundamental divergence from the view expressed in the majority opinion, I am concerned about certain implications the majority’s rule raises for other cases:
First, it is not clear whether there must be a readmonition of the consequences of the NGI plea in cases where the accusatory pleading is not changed but the defendant is simply found guilty of a lesser included offense. While the Supreme Court has told us, in dictum, it does not impose a requirement a defendant be readvised of the consequences of his NGI plea after he has been found guilty of the offense charged (People v. Wetmore, supra, 22 Cal.3d 318, 322-323, fn. 2), the majority’s rule leads to the opposite conclusion where a lesser included offense is involved. There is no essential difference in the two situations.
Second, if, after the accusatory pleading is amended or the guilty verdict to the different offense is returned, the trial court carries out its duty under the majority’s rule by readvising the defendant he may have a lifetime hospital commitment, what is the effect on the defendant? Could not a defendant who is permitted to withdraw his NGI plea after such advice argue with force there was coercion in the advisement which included the parade of horribles and he was thus improperly deprived of needed hospital treatment which might have been resolved in 90 days? (See In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 457, 468; and see People v. Redmond (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 931, 938-939 [94 Cal.Rptr. 543].)
Third, I am concerned about the possible application of the majority’s rule retroactively to cases that have long since been otherwise final. The matter of retroactivity should be discussed and decided (see In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865 [112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 516]).
This important area of criminal procedure needs reassessment in light of the statutory changes since the decision in In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 457. I strongly urge such a response by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, in this case I would indulge in all intendments and presumptions in support of the judgment, and would conclude Lomboy, informed in a general manner of a life commitment possibility in connection with her personally entered NGI plea and failing to raise any *77question about the matter at any time after the information was amended to charge manslaughter, was not misinformed so as to be deprived of an opportunity to move the court to withdraw her NGI plea or otherwise plead anew to the amended charge. On the record, Lomboy was not prejudiced by the failure to rearraign her and advise her of the life commitment possibility on her NGI plea (see People v. Walker, supra, 170 Cal.App.2d 159, 164-165).
I would affirm the judgment and allow Lomboy to continue receiving the medical treatment she needs without interruption for further proceedings on the NGI plea.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied February 26 and March 11, 1981. Cologne, Acting P. J., was of the opinion that the respondent’s petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 29, 1981.
The transcript reads: “THE COURT: All right. Now, 1 want you to understand that by entering o — a not guilty by reason of insanity plea, that that issue could very well be decided by a judge or a jury, and if ultimately found to be true you would spend a minimum of 90 days and a maximum of life in a state hospital. Do you understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.’’
ll should be noted since Vanley, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 846, the maximum term of confinement for a successfully asserted plea of insanity under Penal Code section 1026 has been modified by Penal Code section 1026.5. No longer is the hospital commitment an indefinite one. Currently the maximum lime a person may be kept in custody may not exceed the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense of which the person was convicted (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a); see In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 467 [149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097]).
Lomboy’s counsel advised her some time before the restoration to sanity inquiry that her maximum commitment in state hospital would be six years. In my view, if there is a correct admonition for the maximum term of commitment for an NGI plea as it concerns a manslaughter charge, this is the technically correct advice of the direct consequences.