I respectfully dissent.
In my view the majority holding that the trial court judge abused his discretion by failing to dismiss this criminal action is not justified.
The trial court ruling must be considered in the light of the circumstances. The case against Boulas was strong, as admitted by Attorney S. Aware of his predicament and during the time he was represented by Attorney S., Boulas hired Investigator Harkness to try to arrange a deal whereby he would get *436lenient treatment in exchange for information about his sources of cocaine. Boulas and Harkness did not disclose these negotiations to Attorney S., the same person in whom Boulas now claims he had “great confidence.”
Boulas’s decision to foresake the assistance of counsel of his own choosing in his effort to obtain a plea bargain preceded any improper conduct by law enforcement personnel. When the negotiations terminated after the approximately two-week period Boulas was without counsel, he rehired Attorney S. to represent him. This representation continued for approximately two more months.
The able and experienced trial judge, acting as a trier of fact, correctly determined that although the conduct of the law enforcement officials was indefensible, Boulas was not prejudiced in any way in his ability to defend himself. As the trial judge sagely observed, “there is no evidence that the underlying case was discussed or affected in any way, other than there was a substitution of counsel.”
The conclusion by the majority that Boulas “lost his attorney of choice” because of the conduct of law enforcement officials seems tenuous. Boulas’s claim of once having had “great confidence” in Attorney S. is belied by his conduct. The trial court did not find that the conduct of law enforcement personnel led to the irremediable breakdown of the attomey/client relationship between Boulas and Attorney S.
The trial court properly concluded that the holding in United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361 [66 L.Ed.2d 564, 101 S.Ct. 665] was more closely in point to the circumstances of this case than Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818] and People v. Moore (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 437 [129 Cal.Rptr. 279].
In Morrison the United States Supreme Court held that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of [an] indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation [of the Sixth Amendment] may have been deliberate. [Fn. omitted.] . . . The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.” (United States v. Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. at pp. 365-366 [66 L.Ed.2d at p. 569].)
The motion of an accused to dismiss a criminal pending prosecution “in the furtherance of justice” under Penal Code section 1385 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 331, 333 [55 Cal.Rptr. 450].) An appellate tribunal may not *437substitute its judgment in the exercise of discretion for that of the trial court. (People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 59, 65 [215 Cal. Rptr. 716].)
The trial judge applied the correct rule of law to the facts of this case as he expressly or impliedly found them to be. He did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
I would deny the writ.
The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 18, 1987.