dissenting:
Under the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 — 101 et seq. (West 2002)) (Act), a condemning party must first negotiate in good faith with a condemnee in an attempt to settle the case prior to initiating court action. 735 ILCS 5/7 — 102 (West 2002). Section 7 — 102.1 of the Act places additional negotiating responsibilities on state agencies, such as the plaintiff Department of Transportation (DOT). Among other things, state agencies must send a certified letter giving the property owners the “basis” for computing the compensation offered. 735 ILCS 5/7 — 102.1(d)(1) (West 2002).
The majority labors over a definition of “basis,” picks one that suits it, and decides that “basis” means “appraisal.” Although I will address this definitional wrangling in Section II, 1 believe that it sidesteps the critical approach to the issue.
I
We must examine statutory language as it is. See People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000). We do not need to apply rules of construction or dictionary definitions here. None are needed. This court should not read exceptions, limitations or conditions into an unambiguous statute. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75 (1970). The statute does not require a letter enclosing an appraisal; it requires the letter to give the property owner the basis for the compensation. A “basis” is simply that... a basis. “Basis” is not “appraisal.”
The leading case on this issue is Wise v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Ky. 1973). In Wise, the court analyzed the language of section 4651 of the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Eroperty Acquisition Folicies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 4651), which requires that “The head of the Federal agency *** shall provide the owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount he established as just compensation.”
Like the defendant in this case, the plaintiff in Wise argued that the word “basis” really means “appraisal.” The court dismissed Wise’s argument, saying that the statute was clear: “The plain wording of the statutes above is persuasive that the Corps of Engineers is not required to furnish to the real estate owner a full appraisal report. It is, however, required to furnish the owner with a written statement of the basis for the amount established as a just compensation and a summary of that basis.” (Emphasis added.) Wise, 369 E Supp. at 32. “The language of 42 U.S.C. § 4651 does not entitle [Wise] to a copy of the appraisal of his property.” Wise, 369 E Supp. at 32. The court looked at the statute, found the word “basis” and enforced the statute as written.
The language of the federal statute is substantially the same as Illinois’s. There is no reason not to follow Wise in its refusal to substitute another word for one already contained in the statute. A court should not restrict or enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1998).
When our legislature passed section 7 — 102.1, it had several examples of similar legislation to review. Different statutes have taken different approaches to the issue. The Model Eminent Domain Code requires that the “condemnor shall provide the owner of the property with a written appraisal, if one has been prepared, or if one has not been prepared, with a written statement and summary, showing the basis for the amount established as just compensation for the property.” Model Eminent Domain Code § 203(c), 13 U.L.A. 19 (2002). See also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 213.55(1) (West Supp. 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42A — 1—4 (Michie 2002).
Many states require that appraisals be given to landowners at the commencement of prefiling negotiations. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 73.015 (West Supp. 2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.04 (Anderson 2001); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.0111 (Vernon Supp. 2003); Va. Code Ann. § 25 — 46.5 (Michie Supp. 2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 32.05(2)(b), 32.06(2) (West Supp. 2002).
Some jurisdictions, like Illinois, require the condemnor to provide a basis for just compensation to a condemnee. For instance, the federal statute requires a prefiling appraisal of the property, but a condemning agency is only required to give a landowner “a written statement of and summary of the basis for the amount *** established as just compensation.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651(2), (3) (2000). Alabama, the only state to codify the Model Eminent Domain Code, modified this section of the Model Code to provide that a condemnor need only furnish a condemnee with a written statement and summary showing the basis for just compensation. See Ala. Code § 18 — 1A—22(d) (2003).
Colorado requires the state condemning agency to pay for a landowner’s appraisal and, upon its receipt, to turn over its own appraisals of the property. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38 — 1—121 (West Supp. 2002). New Jersey, on the other hand, requires a “reasonable disclosure of the manner” in which the offer has been calculated. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 20:3 — 6 (West Supp. 2003). Some states merely require good-faith negotiations. See Idaho Code § 7 — 707 (Michie Supp. 2002); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 70 — 30—111 (Smith 2001); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 76 — 704—.01 (Lexis Nexis 1995).
A wide array of options was available to the Illinois legislature. It chose a course for state agencies to follow (see 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 5, 1991, at 46; 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1991, at 88, 90) and determined that state agencies must provide a basis for just compensation. We are not permitted to add requirements that the legislature does not impose. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330 (1998); People ex rel. Callahan v. Marshall Field & Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 811 (1980). DOT did exactly what the statute required.
In a pointed legislative example of the distinctness and clarity of these words, the California legislature makes a simple segue from “basis” to “appraisal.” The California eminent domain statute requires that in every condemnation, “a summary of the basis of the amount *** established as just compensation” be provided to the landowner. Cal. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 7267.2(b) (Lexis Nexis 2003). The next paragraph provides that for owner-occupied residential property with no more than four residential units, “the homeowner shall, upon request, be allowed to review *** the appraisal upon which the offer is based.” Cal. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 7267.2(c) (Lexis Nexis 2003). Thus, all landowners receive the basis, while some also receive an appraisal.
When our legislature chooses language with authentic understandings, it does not have to report or describe them to the courts. A statute is not a legal dictionary and does not have to mimic one to identify the normal consequences of ordinary words. The use of the word “basis” appears to be a conscious one; we should not assume the legislature was sleepwalking when it drafted the statute. If the legislature had wished to require appraisals to be provided, it surely could have done so. It did not; nor should we.
II
I have stated that the statute’s meaning is clear. It requires no unessential or frivolous construction to understand. “Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, this court is not at liberty to read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express; nor should this court search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature.” People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (1998).
Though I believe defining “basis” is an unnecessaiy appendage to this dissent, I will respond to the majority’s struggle with the meaning of basis, i.e., is “basis” defined more or less stringently according to Black’s Law Dictionary?
Black’s defines “basis” either as “the foundation or groundwork,” or “the principle component parts” of the offer. 342 Ill. App. 3d at 595. Although I am uncertain about any qualitative difference between the two definitions offered, the majority has little hesitation and imposes a draconian approach.
Even under the majority’s definition of basis, the disclosure of an appraisal is not required. DOT’s offer contained the various findings that the land itself was worth $X, the costs of moving fixtures to another location are $Y, etc. DOT’s basis letter clearly disclosed its estimate of each individual factor that would have an impact on the price of the land. This is more than enough “foundation” or “groundwork.”
The majority’s rationale that providing the appraisal obtained by DOT will help avoid litigation does not ring true. Giving landowners an appraisal has little real effect. Property appraisal is not an exact science. In any appraisal, there will never be a precise value rendered; only a sale of the property can definitively determine value. A letter giving the landowner the same values based on the same reasoning derived from the appraisal gives a landowner sufficient foundation for just compensation.
Furthermore, an appraisal does not put the property owner on a better footing for negotiation. Nothing changes. Landowners would still need to obtain their own appraisal to determine whether the land may be worth more than the DOT appraisal reflects. It is difficult to imagine how negotiations will improve after this rule is introduced. Without more information, DOT would still not be interested in purchasing land for more than the fair market value established by its own appraisal. A state agency may be left "with few alternatives to the much-maligned “take it or leave it” approach to negotiations. Similarly, landowners approached by DOT will either be willing to accept the amount offered based on DOT’s appraisal or they will challenge the offer in the court.
Ill
One more matter needs discussion here. Section 7 — 102.1 does not require appraisals to be the basis for offers. Indeed, appraisals are not mentioned in section 7 — 102.1. State agencies are free to analyze value at the negotiation stage of the proceedings without obtaining appraisals, and they may. The majority’s opinion will undoubtedly discourage state agencies from getting any appraisals at all. That would be an unfortunate result of this new rule.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
In its petition for rehearing, the Department has requested that we apply our ruling in this case prospectively. “While, as a general rule, a decision will be applied retrospectively, a court has the inherent power to determine whether its decision should be prospectively or retroactively applied.” Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School District No. 40, 231 Ill. App. 3d 493, 499, 596 N.E.2d 176, 181 (1992); see Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 679 N.E.2d 1224 (1997); Contreras v. Industrial Comm’n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 715 N.E.2d 701 (1999). Our supreme court has established the following principles to guide the inquiry into whether a decision will be applied prospectively:
“[Wjhether a ruling will be applied prospectively will depend upon whether the decision to. be applied nonretroactively establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. If either of these criteria is met, the question of prospective or retroactive application will be answered by considering whether, given the purpose and prior history of the rule, its operation will be retarded or promoted by prospective or retroactive application and whether prospective application is mandated by a balance of equities.” Bogseth v. Emanuel, 166 Ill. 2d 507, 515, 655 N.E.2d 888, 892 (1995).
Our ruling that section 7 — 102.1(d) of the Act requires a state agency to disclose an appraisal, where one has been prepared, as part of its statutory obligation to provide the property owner with the “basis” for computing the amount of compensation offered, was an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. The rule’s purpose of encouraging voluntary acquisitions of property and discouraging litigation will be promoted by prospective application. Those cases already in litigation cannot benefit from the rule, and applying it retroactively to other cases would only promote litigation and defeat the rule’s purpose.
Accordingly, we hold that the requirement to supply an appraisal where one has been performed applies only to those eminent domain proceedings commencing after the date of our decision in this case. However, we reject the Department’s request not to apply our ruling to the instant case. “On those occasions when prospective application is warranted, the holding of the court still controls the case at bar; to not apply the rule would render it dictum and deprive the challenger [of] the fruits of his efforts in questioning the old, erroneous rule.” John Carey Oil Co. v. W.C.P. Investments, 126 Ill. 2d 139, 149, 533 N.E.2d 851, 855 (1988); see Carlson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 493, 596 N.E.2d 176. The petition for rehearing is denied.
McDADE, EJ., concurs.