¶ 45. (dissenting). Today's decision rests upon a reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 187.15, governing the disposal of Methodist church property. I agree with the majority opinion that the application of the statute represents neither an unconstitutional taking nor an impermissible preference for church hierarchy, the bases on which the Elo trustees ground their appeal. Nevertheless, I would remand the case for resolution of this property dispute on non-statutory grounds.
( — i
¶ 46. As the majority opinion concludes, the 1860 deed creates a trust in favor of the Methodist Episcopal *417Church.1 Whether the United Methodist Church (UMC) is the successor in interest to the trust in favor of the Methodist Episcopal Church appears to be a disputed question of fact at this summary judgment stage, contrary to the majority's conclusion.2
¶ 47. The Elo trustees rely on the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, which states as follows:
Nothing in the Plan of Union at any time after the union is to be construed so as to require any local church or any other property owner of the former The Evangelical United Brethren Church or the former The Methodist Church to alienate or in any way to change the title to property contained in its deed or deeds at the time of union.3
They further allege that the UMC requested, and was denied, a new deed following the 1968 merger. According to the Elo trustees, the UMC's conduct indicates that it did not have a beneficial interest in the property.
¶ 48. Because this case comes to us on review of the UMC's motion for summary judgment, this court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Elo trustees.4 I conclude that the Elo trustees have succeeded in raising a reasonable inference that the UMC did not automatically become the successor in interest to the Methodist Episcopal Church under the 1860 deed. The majority's reliance *418on the first paragraph of the Book of Discipline, the meaning and relevance of which have not been briefed, does not convince me otherwise.
¶ 49. Because a disputed issue of material fact exists regarding the UMC's right to property held in trust for the Methodist Episcopal Church, I would remand the case to the circuit court for resolution of this issue. If the case for resolution on trust principles is as strong as the majority contends, remand would impose but a small burden on the parties and the circuit court. Moreover, a resolution of this property dispute on the basis of trust principles involves no risk of entanglement in church doctrine.
¶ 50. I am concerned that Wis. Stat. § 187.15 may be unconstitutional. Admittedly, the Elo trustees never raised this argument, and their failure to challenge the existence (as opposed to the UMC's interpretation) of Wis. Stat. § 187.15 can be construed as waiver. Because the issue was not briefed, I do not write to decide this issue. I do, however, express a question about the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 187.15.
¶ 51. Chapter 187 is a patchwork of statutes governing religious property, some directed toward specific religious denominations, others directed toward religious societies generally. While Methodist church property is governed by Wis. Stat. § 187.15, the church property of religious societies that do not have the benefit of a specific statute is governed by other provisions of Chapter 187, including Wis. Stat. § 187.08.
¶ 52. The differences between Wis. Stat. §§ 187.15 and 187.08 should give this court pause about resolving this dispute by using a statute that *419applies specifically to Methodist church property, when other religious societies cannot avail themselves of a similar statutory remedy. I wonder whether Justice Brennan's call for "special statutes governing church property arrangements" envisioned a statutory scheme that singles out individual religions and leads to varied results in church property disputes.5
¶ 53. The majority opinion further suggests that Wis. Stat. § 187.15 "codifies the manner in which the UMC maintains control over local church property."6 This proposition may well be correct, but if the statute merely codifies the church's system of property management, this case can be resolved without resort to the statute.
¶ 54. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
See majority op. at ¶ 40.
See majority op. at ¶ 40.
Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, ¶ 6 (1996).
See Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶ 56, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142.
See majority op. at ¶ 22.
See majority op. at ¶ 32.