(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent and would reverse. In vacating the award of attorney fees, the district court, relying on Washington v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, 610 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Minn.App.2000), concluded that the disputed data were not accessi.ble by appellants absent a court order. The majority concurs with that holding, but I disagree.
*101I would reverse for either of two reasons. First, words and phrases are to be construed according to their plain meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2000). Interviewer’s notes and memoranda do not constitute “examination materials.” Therefore, Minn.Stat. § 13.34 (2000) is inapplicable to the present case. Second, the goal of all interpretation of statutory language is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” MinmStat. § 645.16 (2000). By including the word “solely” within Minn.Stat. § 13.34, the legislature intended this word to be given meaning. Even assuming that the requested data were examination data, they are not solely examination materials, and therefore fall outside the scope of Minn.Stat. § 13.34.
The plain language of Minn.Stat. § 13.34, requires that, in order to be considered “examination data,” the data must consist “solely of testing or examination materials, or scoring keys” (emphasis added). This requirement was construed by the commissioner and the district court to include only objective examination materials. Therefore, the court concluded that only the actual exams and/or scoring keys were wholly objective in nature, and appellants were entitled to subjective materials, including the interviewers’ notes and memo-randa. However, the court failed to specify which, if any, of the requested data were classified as examination data under Minn. Stat. § 13.34. But for the court’s qualifying language referencing future examinees, the court’s order does not reference Minn. Stat. § 13.34.
Examination materials consist of the questions posed to examinees, but would not include the interviewers’ impressions of the examinee’s oral responses. The interviewers’ notes and memoranda are not tests, examination materials, or scoring keys. Therefore, Minn.Stat. § 13.34 is inapplicable to the present case. Accordingly, the data sought by appellants would be private data, available for review by the examinee. “Private data on individuals” means data “which is made by statute or federal law applicable to the data: (a) not public; and (b) accessible to the individual subject of that data.” MinmStat. § 13.02, subd. 12 (2000).
The majority reasons that the interviewer’s notes and memoranda were examination materials. Even assuming that the majority is correct in classifying the notes and memoranda as such, the requested information was not “data consisting solely of testing or examination materials, or scoring keys.” The legislature included the phrase “solely” and this court must give effect to the plain language of the statute. The notes and memoranda are not data consisting solely of examination materials, because they include the interviewer’s impressions of the examinee. Even if the notes did contain the examinee’s verbatim responses, these responses likely do not constitute examination materials.
Furthermore, the disclosure of the interviewer’s impressions of the examinee would not compromise the “objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process.” By disclosing the disputed data, the city would reveal the examinee’s individual responses to oral questions. The exami-nee’s responses, correct or incorrect, may or may not lead one to determine the interviewer’s question. The interviewers’ notes would not disclose information that would compromise the integrity of the testing process. The notes and memoranda do not contain the favored or preferred response, but simply contain the individual interviewer’s impressions of the examinee.
All data compiled by the government is presumed to be accessible by the public unless specifically excluded by law or classification. Minn.Stat. § 13.01, subd. 3 (2000). The disputed data are categorically *102excluded from Minn.Stat. § 13.34. Because the data are private data on individuals, appellants are entitled to the data.
Unlike Washington, appellants’ right to access was not predicated on obtaining a court order. Appellants were entitled to access to the interviewers’ notes and mem-oranda without a court order. Because appellants were entitled to access to the data as a matter of right, they are “aggrieved persons” entitled to reasonable attorney fees under Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4 (2000). The common usage of “aggrieved” is “[t]reated wrongfully,” or “offended,” “as by denial of or infringement upon one’s legal rights.” Washington, 610 N.W.2d at 349 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 34 (3d ed. 1992)). Appellants fit the common usage of the term “aggrieved persons.”
Because appellants are entitled to attorney fees and costs under Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4, for compelling the city to comply with the data practices act, I would reverse.
Retired judges of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Milan. Const, art. VI, § 10.