Appeal from a conviction in a trial de novo in district court, wherein a $25 fine was levied and defendant, Kennon N. Harris, was required to pay part of the costs of prosecution pursuant to Minn. St. 633.23.
*396Harris was originally convicted in Ramsey County Municipal Court of violating St. Paul’s unreasonable acceleration ordinance, St. Paul Legislative Code, § 134.01 (5).1 He appealed, and a jury trial de novo was held pursuant to Minn. St. 488.20 and 488A.27, subd. 6, with the result stated above.2 In his appeal to this court, Harris challenges the constitutionality of both Minn. St. 633.23 and the St. Paul unreasonable acceleration ordinance.
Minn. St. 633.23 reads:
“The appellant shall not be required to advance any fees in claiming or prosecuting his appeal, but, if convicted in the district court, or if sentenced for failing to prosecute his appeal, may be required, as a part of the sentence, to pay the whole or any part of the costs of prosecution in both courts.”
Harris argues that this statute violates the equal protection clause because it permits the district court to assess costs against defendants who unsuccessfully appeal municipal court convictions, yet successful appellants are not allowed to recover costs from the state nor may the district court assess costs against indigent defendants even though they, too, unsuccessfully appeal. Harris also argues that this statute violates the due process clause in that it tends to deter the exercise of the right to trial de novo in district court by defendants convicted in municipal court. He argues additionally that the imposition of costs in this case was arbitrary and that its effect is to place a governmental price tag on the exercise of one’s rights. We find these arguments unavailing.
The equal protection test to be applied is the familiar “rational basis” standard. As was stated in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, *39749, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 2122, 40 L. ed. 2d 642, 652 (1974): “* * * * Our task is merely to determine whether there is ‘some rationality in the nature of the class singled out.’ ” Fuller involved equal protection challenge to an Oregon statute which goes further than the statute here in question.3 In upholding the Oregon statute, the court wrote:
“* * * This legislative decision reflects no more than an effort to achieve elemental fairness and is a far cry from the kind of invidious discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause condemns.” 417 U. S. 50, 94 S. Ct. 2123, 40 L. ed. 2d 652.
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion:
“[It is not] a denial of equal protection to assess costs only against those defendants who are convicted. The acquitted defendant has prevailed at trial in defending against the charge brought by the State. It is rational that the State not recover costs from such a defendant while recovering costs from a defendant who has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime that necessitated the trial.” 417 U. S. 57, 94 S. Ct. 2126, 40 L. ed. 2d 656.
Since the Oregon statute in Fuller survived equal protection attack, Minn. St. 633.23 must likewise be valid.4
As for defendant's due process arguments, no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court appears to have occurred here. The $25 fine was identical to that levied by the municipal *398court, and only $200 was assessed in. costs, even though the average cost of one day of trial in Ramsey County is $380. The facts do not indicate arbitrary action by the district .court, and absent such a showing this court will not interfere. State v. Johnson, 299 Minn. 143, 216 N. W. 2d 904 (1974).
To the extent that potential imposition of costs possibly deters trial de novo appeals in cases like this, the assessment of costs of prosecution is but one of many detriments which attach to being found guilty.5 Here, of course, Harris himself was undeterred, for he appealed his municipal court conviction. Moreover, our rejection of defendant’s deterrence argument is consistent with precedent such as United States v. Procario, 361 F. 2d 683 (2 Cir. 1966), a tax evasion case which rejected the contention that the assessment of costs violated due process by tending to coerce guilty pleas.
In sum, we hold that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause was violated on these facts by application of § 633.23.
Harris challenges St. Paul Legislative Code, § 134.01(5) on the grounds of impermissible presumption and vagueness.
The ordinance reads:
“No person shall start or accelerate any motor vehicle with an unnecessary exhibition of speed on any public or private way within the city limits. Prima-facie evidence of such unnecessary exhibition of speed shall be unreasonable squealing or screeching sounds emitted by the tires or the throwing of sand or gravel by the tires of said vehicle or both.”
Section 134.01(5) creates a prima facie presumption which passes constitutional muster if it is based upon a “* * * rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact which *399it purports to presume * * State v. Reps, 302 Minn. 38, 51, 223 N. W. 2d 780, 789 (1974). Here, unreasonable squealing of tires was proved; “unnecessary exhibition of speed” was the fact presumed. The pavement was dry; therefore the fact presumed was rationally connected to the fact proved. Because only unreasonable squealing of tires activates the statutory presumption, we find the ordinance unobjectionable on this ground.
Defendant’s vagueness argument fails to distinguish State v. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N. W. 892 (1920). We have held that a statute or ordinance will be found constitutionally defective on grounds of vagueness only if it “* * * is set out in terms so vague that people of common intelligence have to guess at what it means and if they differ as to its application.” State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 180, 52 N. W. 2d 409, 413 (1952). We find merit in the prosecution’s point that “unnecessary” speed here means speed greater than that needed to accelerate into the traffic flow. In our view, this ordinance is of a kind described in Colten v. Kentucky: “* * * [C]itizens who desire to obey the statute will have no difficulty in understanding it * * 407 U. S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L. ed. 2d 584, 590 (1972) quoting Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S. W. 2d 374, 378 (Ky. App. 1971). We therefore hold that the St. Paul unreasonable acceleration ordinance is not void for vagueness.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the action of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Harris was observed by a St. Paul police officer as he accelerated so rapidly from a parked position that his tires squealed as he entered the traffic flow. When Harris subsequently turned at a corner, his tires again squealed. The pavement on both streets was dry.
Trial de novo in district court is no longer available, except in cases where the lower court is presided over by a judge or judicial officer who is not learned in the law. Rule 28.01, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Oregon statute permitted the trial court to require repayment of costs of prosecution by indigent criminal defendants who subsequently become able to pay. Probation could be conditioned on such repayment. Defendants who were not convicted or whose convictions were overturned could not be required to pay costs.
State v. Johnson, 299 Minn. 143, 216 N. W. 2d 904 (1974), impliedly held as much: The convicted appellant causes the appeal to be taken; if he loses, it seems fair and rational that costs be imposed, for the state’s expenses in the second prosecution would not have been incurred but for the appeal; and if the municipal court conviction were appealable directly to the supreme court, an unsuccessful appellant would incur taxation of costs unless he were indigent.
Other detriments include: Reduced chances for probation because guilt is proved rather than admitted; more severe penalty, for same reason; restraint in jail and longer wait for disposition of case than individual who “pleads.” See, Note, 59 Geo. L. J. 991,1003.