I concur in the judgment because in the special circumstances of this case public policy concerns about lawsuits over extramarital relations, paternity and other intrafamily conduct outweigh by a slight margin the appellant’s right to recover compensation for the injuries he suffered. However, I write separately to register my disagreement with the principal grounds of the majority opinion. First, contrary to the majority, I consider what appellant has alleged as damages in his fraud cause of action are true injuries of a type compensable under the law. Secondly, I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 bars the plaintiff’s action for emotional distress. I also write separately to emphasize that, in a somewhat different factual situation, a lawsuit of *1272this nature might be maintainable despite the general public policy concerns.
I
The majority suggests appellant has not stated a valid claim for damages under his fraud cause of action. They argue the alleged fraud did not cause a compensable injury because all it did was lead appellant to develop a close relationship with a child and perform parental acts toward that child. Indeed the majority opinion implies plaintiff actually gained a benefit from his wife’s fraud—the “opportunity” to develop a close relationship with a child and to do “fatherly” things with that child. But appellant obviously was not alleging his damages were the “very close and intimate relationship” he had with this child or the fatherly acts he performed. Rather, what appellant alleged as damages is the loss of these investments he was fraudulently led to make—the investments of time and money and the investment of emotion. But for his wife’s fraudulent representations about the paternity of this child appellant would not have invested the many hours of time nor the thousands of dollars required to “perform all acts that a father would towards a son.” Nor would he have invested the deep emotion inherent in “a very close and intimate relationship” with a child one believes to be one’s own.
The clear thrust of appellant’s allegation is that he has lost those investments of time and emotion and will be deprived of the benefits of those investments in the future. The child was not his and is not his and will not be his in the future. Indeed the dissolution judgment permanently restrains appellant from even contacting or communicating with the child in which he allegedly made such an extensive time investment and such a deep emotional investment.
It is hard to imagine a more devestating emotional blow or one more calculated to cause serious emotional distress. That emotional distress is a “resulting damage” of the fraud in this case and is a compensable item of damages. (Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co. (1970) 11 Cal.3d 908, 912, 921 [114 Cal.Rptr. 622, 523 P.2d 662] [in case of fraudulent misrepresentation about authorization to transport household goods, plaintiff “is entitled to compensation for pain, suffering, and emotional distress”]; Sprague v. Frank J. Sanders Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 412, 417 [174 Cal.Rptr. 608] [in fraud case based on false representations about repairability of defective automobile which induced car owner to retain car beyond time when she could rescind purchase, plaintiff allowed to recover damages for emotional injuries since principle “[t]hat general damages for mental pain and suffering are recoverable in a tort action of deceit is estab*1273lished by the cases”]; Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 215 [163 Cal.Rptr. 445], Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 51 [147 Cal.Rptr. 565].)1 So is the harm suffered through the loss of appellant’s investment of time and money in the fathering of a child he was fraudulently led to believe was his own flesh and blood.
The majority concludes by characterizing this as an uncompensable “betrayal.” But appellant is not suing for the “betrayal”—his wife’s illicit sexual relationship with another man. He is suing her for out-and-out fraud—her continuing three-and-one-half year express misrepresentation that her child was his, too. “Betrayal” may not be a recognized cause of action; fraud is such an action.
Were this the only issue raised by appellant’s fraud cause of action I would be calling for reversal of the trial court’s decision sustaining the demurrer. However, even though all the elements of a fraud cause of action are present I am persuaded public policy militates against allowing such an action at least where, as here, the fraud occurs during the marriage. (See Richard P. v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1094 [249 Cal.Rptr. 246] [disallowing a similar lawsuit against the natural father who failed to disclose to the husband the true parentage of the children the husband was raising]; see also, Perry v. Atkinson (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 14, 18-19, 21 [240 Cal.Rptr. 402]; Stephen K. v. Roni L. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 640, 644-645 [164 Cal.Rptr. 618, 31 A.L.R.4th 383]; Inez M. v. Nathan G. (1982) 114 Mise.2d 282 [451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611] [“Anglo-American law has long muted its vigilance against fraud to vindicate its paramount concern for the family and the child”].)
I reach this conclusion reluctantly and express no opinion as to the viability of such a cause of action in different circumstances as, for instance, *1274where the fraudulent representation about paternity is used to induce a man to marry a woman who is carrying another man’s child. (Cf. Husband v. Wife (Del.Super.Ct. 1970) 262 A.2d 656, 657 [annulment would be allowed where woman falsely claimed child she was carrying at time marriage occurred was husband’s even though annulment not allowed where woman falsely claimed she was pregnant in order to induce marriage because “the essence of the marriage contract is wanting when a woman, at the time of its consummation, is bearing in her womb, the fruit of her illicit intercourse with a stranger”].)
I further note that while my research failed to uncover any cases from other jurisdictions discussing tort actions arising from misrepresentation of paternity, several have allowed litigation of this issue in the context of dissolution and divorce proceedings. (See, e.g., H.P.A. v. S.C.A. (Alaska 1985) 704 P.2d 205, 208 [in dissolution proceeding, husband permitted to argue wife’s fraud concerning paternity of child vitiated husband’s support obligations]; Dawkins v. Dawkins (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) 494 So.2d 282, 283-284 [husband permitted to set aside provisions of marital dissolution judgment based upon wife’s fraudulent representations concerning parentage of children]; accord Arndt v. Arndt (1948) 336 Ill.App. 65 [82 N.E.2d 908, 914]; Winner v. Winner (1920) 171 Wis. 413 [177 N.W. 680, 682] [“the concealment by the woman of the paternity of her child is a fault so grievous that there is no excuse or palliation for it”]; see also Evans v. Gunter (1988) 294 S.C. 525 [366 S.E.2d 44, 46-47] [upon showing of extrinsic fraud, husband permitted to collaterally challenge support obligations based upon ex-wife’s misrepresentations concerning child’s parentage].)
II
The majority concludes the plaintiff’s action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred under Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 (hereafter section 47) because he learned he was not the natural father of his son during a judicial proceeding. I believe this conclusion fails to distinguish between conduct occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding which is necessarily protected by section 47’s absolute privilege, and conduct which occurs outside of a judicial proceeding but is revealed to the plaintiff during a judicial proceeding.
The distinction between these two situations lies in section 47’s requirement that conduct is only privileged if it has “some connection or logical or reasonable relation to the proceeding and that the publication be made to achieve the object of the litigation.” (O’Neil v. Cunningham (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 466, 475 [173 Cal.Rptr. 422]; see McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 972-973 [234 Cal.Rptr. 702].) *1275Absent such a relationship, the privilege will not apply even if the conduct or publication is made during a judicial proceeding. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 776 [234 Cal.Rptr. 653] [“A document is not privileged merely because it has been filed with a court or in an action. The privileged status of a particular statement therein depends on its relationship to an actual or potential issue in an underlying action”].)
Thus, in Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 [212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637, 49 A.L.R.4th 417], the Supreme Court held conduct which occurred “prior to and not in the context of, any judicial proceeding” was not protected by section 47’s judicial immunity even though the plaintiff learned of the conduct during a judicial proceeding. (Id., at p. 365.)
The conduct here is not, as the majority finds, the wife’s statement during the deposition that the plaintiff is not the natural father of her son. Instead, the outrageous conduct upon which the action is based is the wife’s initial infidelity resulting in her impregnation coupled with her repeated representations throughout the marriage concerning her son’s parentage. This clearly is not reasonably related to the divorce proceeding for purposes of section 47, subdivision 2’s application.
The distinction between privileged and nonprivileged judicial statements was highlighted recently in Durant Software v Herman (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 229 [257 Cal.Rptr. 200], There, the court held judicial immunity did not bar an action for conspiracy although evidence of the conspiracy was revealed in the course of a judicial proceeding. Following a well-established line of cases, the court concluded the privilege did not apply since the conduct giving rise to the cause of action occured prior to the judicial proceeding. (Id., at p. 240.) The court further noted the judicial conduct was properly admissible to prove the tort since section 47, subdivision 2 does not create an evidentiary privilege for such judicial conduct or statements. (Id., at pp. 236-237, 240; accord Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168 [232 Cal.Rptr. 567, 728 P.2d 1202]; White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888 [221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309]; Harris v Tashma (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1197, 1205-1207 [258 Cal.Rptr. 20] review granted July 13, 1989 (S010575).)
The majority’s application of section 47 to these facts is troublesome. A party may use an unrelated judicial proceeding to reveal tortious conduct previously undiscovered by the other party in an attempt to cloak such conduct with this absolute privilege.
For example, a physician involved in litigation over a fee dispute with his patient could announce during some stage of that lawsuit that he had *1276committed malpractice against the patient. Under the majority’s construction of section 47, the patient would then be barred from pursuing a malpractice action against the physician. This result is neither desirable nor does it promote the purpose underlying section 47, namely, “aifording free access to the courts and facilitating the crucial functions of the finder of fact.” (Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 364-365.) Or to bring the analogy closer to the facts of the instant case, imagine the wife had announced during the dissolution proceeding: “You know how you haven’t been feeling well the past few months, well, I’ve been slipping a bit of arsenic into your evening brandy every night.” To the extent the majority’s opinion suggests section 47 confers immunity merely because a past or ongoing wrong is revealed as part of a judicial proceeding, I respectfully disagree. Conversely, to the extent the majority’s opinion does not reach that far, it fails to immunize respondent’s intentional conduct which may have been first revealed during the dissolution proceeding but which had been continuing over a period of three and one-half years prior to that proceeding. For reasons mentioned earlier in discussion of the fraud count, however, I reluctantly conclude public policy considerations outweigh by a slight margin the values that would be promoted by allowing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional injury in the instant case. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 17, 1989.
The majority argues emotional distress damages are only permitted in fraud actions “as an aggravation of other damages.” This is incorrect. Assuming the only damages incurred in this case were emotional, the cases upon which the majority relies do not support the assertion these damages would not be recoverable in a fraud action. To the contrary, in Cristi v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 434, fn. 4 [58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173], an insurance bad faith action, the Supreme Court specifically held it was not deciding “whether invasion of the plaintiff’s right to be free from emotional disturbance is actionable where there is no injury to person or property rights in addition to the inflicted mental distress.”
Moreover, case law has established a plaintiff may recover emotional distress damages in actions based upon intentional torts absent other pecuniary or physical damages. (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 927 [167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813, 16 A.L.R.4th 518] [“intentional torts will support an award of damages for emotional distress alone, ... in cases involving ‘extreme and outrageous invasions of one’s mental and emotional tranquility’ ”]; State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal.2d 330, 338 [240 P.2d 282].) Here, it is manifest, at least to me, a wife’s fraudulent representations concerning her child’s parentage could constitute such an outrageous invasion to permit recovery for emotional distress under a theory of fraud.