Eittreim v. State Beer Permit Board of Iowa

Oliver, J.

(specially concurring) — I agree with the majority opinion but would base the holding, in part, upon other considerations. In 1933 the Forty-fifth General Assembly enacted, as a revenue measure, a nonintoxicating liquor law. This Act, chapter 37, with various amendments by subsequent legislatures is now chapter 124, Code of Iowa 1950, entitled Beer and Malt Liquors. An amendment adopted in 1935-placed in the Act provisions relative to the creation, powers and functioning of the state permit board. Some of the provisions relative to the state permit board have been since changed by amendments.

Code section 124.2 provides in part:

«# # #

“3. ‘Permit board’ shall mean the state permit board composed of the chairman of the state tax commission, the secretary of state, and the auditor of state.

«* # #

“7. ‘Permit’ or ‘license’ shall mean an authorization issued by the state, tax commission or by the city or town council of any city or town or by the board of supervisors of any county.”

Section 124.3 provides the state permit board is created to promote uniform compliance with the provisions of this chapter. It shall issue state permits and shall have the power'to revoke the same upon hearing and to review actions of city or town councils and boards of supervisors in refusing to revoke permits.

The foregoing definitions and provisions show chapter 124 provid.es for two kinds of permits: (1) “state permits” issued by the state permit board, and (2) “permits” issued by the tax commission, city or town councils and boards of supervisors. A difference between permit fees and state permit fees is recognized in other sections of chapter 124. Section 124.33 provides for the disposition of the revenues from permit fees. Section 124.5 provides the state permit fee is $3 and shall be used by the state *1157permit board to enforce tbe Act. In other words, permit fees are revenues while state permit fees are merely license fees.

Code section 124.5 authorizes the issuance of “B” and “C” permits by councils and boards of supervisors, through whom each applicant shall make application to the state permit board for a state permit. “The state permit board shall promptly issue a state permit to all applicants to whom a permit has been issued by a city or town council or by a board of supervisors.” A council or board revoking a permit shall certify such action to the state permit board which shall immediately cancel its permit.

This is an action in mandamus to compel the state permit board to issue a state permit to an applicant to whom a permit has been issued by a city council. Plaintiff asserts the above quoted language in Code section 124.5 requires the state permit board to do this. The state permit board contends mandamus does not lie because its duty to issue a state permit to such applicant is not mandatory but depends upon its determination of the fitness of the applicant, etc., and hence is discretionary. It relies largely upon Code section 124.23, which provides in part: “The authorities empowered by this chapter to issue permits shall make a thorough investigation to determine the fitness of the applicant * *

This contention is necessarily based upon the premise the state permit board is among “the authorities empowered by this chapter to issue permits.” That premise is false. The authorities so empowered are listed in subsection 7 of Code section 124.2, above-quoted. The state permit board is not included in the list. It is empowered to issue “state permits” only, as distinguished from “permits.” Hence, the provisions of section 124.23 do not refer to the state permit board.

Language similar to that in question appears in Code section 124.30 which requires the revocation of permits “by the authorities issuing same” for various offenses, including violations pf ordinances. For the reasons above-noted it is apparent the state permit board is not one of such authorities and that section 124.30 does not apply to it. However,- were the state permit board one of such authorities it would be virtually impossible for it to perform the duties imposed on it by this section without maintaining a representative in each community.

*1158The language in section 124.23 is not unusual. It should be interpreted in accordance with definitive provisions of chapter 124.