dissenting:
Although the issue is not an easy one, I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that Edwards was not entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Edwards has based his motion, in part, on his allegation that his plea attorney was constitutionally ineffective. The nature of a motion is determined by its content, not its caption. Cf. Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C.1984). Edwards’ motion is therefore cognizable under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1996), as well as under Rule 32(e), and an evidentiary hearing was thus required “unless the files and records show conclusively that the movant can establish no facts warranting relief.” Southall v. United States, 716 A.2d 183, 188 (D.C.1998) (citing, inter alia, D.C.Code § 23 — 110(c)).
As my colleagues recognize, “[i]t is fundamental to due process that a defendant who waives constitutional rights in entering a plea of guilty must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Maj. op. at 987 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 705 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C.1997)) (quoting Eldridge v. United States, 618 A.2d 690, 695 (D.C.1992)). If issues of competency have been raised on the record, “the trial court must conduct a specialized hearing to determine the competence of a defendant who seeks to plead guilty....” Hunter v. *991United States, 548 A.2d 806, 810 (D.C. 1988) (quoting Willis v. United States, 468 A.2d 1320, 1323 (D.C.1983)); accord, Pierce, supra, 705 A.2d at 1089. Moreover,
where it is alleged that an individual is mentally retarded, the trial court must consider that factor when determining whether an individual “has the mental capacity to achieve the necessary understanding” of a guilty plea. See Hunter, supra, 548 A.2d at 810 (citing Masthers, supra,1 where the defendant was mentally retarded). Additionally, we have stressed that this is an area where expert testimony should be considered and a trial judge should refrain from relying on personal observations of the individual. Hunter, supra, 548 A.2d at 810-11 (expert informed judge that appellant appeared to be suffering from organic brain damage); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 609 A.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C.1992) (advising trial judge to have assistance of expert guidance and not rely on one’s own perceptions where appellant is allegedly mentally ill, citing Hunter and Masthers).
Pierce, supra, 705 A.2d at 1091-92.
In the present case, Dr. Levin reported in his evaluation that Edwards had sustained substantial brain damage which left him functioning at a level of borderline mental retardation. Edwards had an IQ of only 76,2 and, according to Dr. Levin, this condition impaired his ability to “follow more than one idea at a time.” In fact, Edwards’ intelligence placed him in the bottom 5% of the population, and in two categories where he scored among the lowest 2%, Edwards functioned at the retarded level. Indeed, Edwards could not even remember simple familiar facts, such as the name of his dog. In other words, if Dr. Levin’s assessment is credited, then for all practical purposes Edwards’ mental capacity was comparable to that of a child.3 Dr. Levin further reported that Edwards’ plea attorney “impatiently instructed Mr. Edwards to leave the thinking to him.”
During much of the plea colloquy, Edwards disputed the truth of some of the government’s principal allegations. He denied that he had threatened the complainant with a handgun, and he claimed that her sexual acts were performed voluntarily and that she had been paid for them. In fact, Edwards continued to disagree with the thrust of the government’s version — the allegation that he pulled a gun on K.W. — even after he had answered in the affirmative the judge’s question whether he was “able to admit that this act occurred as [the prosecutor] described.” Moreover, Edwards repeated his denials of guilt to the writer of the PSI.
Athough Dr. Levin’s evaluation did not focus upon the transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy, I find the conclusion inescapable that if Edwards was as handicapped as Dr. Levin found him to be, then his affirmative response to a virtual abstraction — whether the prosecutor’s account was accurate — did not constitute an intelligent and knowing acknowledgment that he forced K.W. to have sex with him. On a concrete level, Edwards denied the use of force and of á *992weapon whenever he was asked directly. His admissions of guilt, if admissions they were, presupposed a level of reasoning by analogy which, without a patient and careful explanation by counsel, would be beyond the capacity of the individual depicted in Dr. Levin’s evaluation.
The experienced trial judge made commendable efforts to ensure that Edwards’ plea was voluntary. I agree that we must also take into account the judge’s provident warning to Edwards, at the conclusion of the Rule 11 colloquy, that if Edwards persisted in pleading guilty, he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea after the proceeding was over. The trial judge was on the scene, and his vantage point, for purposes of assessing Edwards’ understanding of the proceedings, was superior to ours. Finally, Edwards’ responses to some of the court’s inquiries come across as more rational and focused than one might expect from an individual as handicapped as Dr. Levin supposed Edwards to be, and this may have been even more apparent to the trial judge, who was able to observe the defendant during the proceedings.
But at the time that Edwards entered his plea, the judge had not been apprised of Edwards’ brain damage or his impaired cognitive functioning.4 Mentally retarded people, and others with impaired cognitive abilities, are often predisposed to answer questions in a way that is designed to conceal their lack of understanding, so that “even when [their] language and communication abilities appear to be normal, the questioner should give extra attention to determining whether the answers are reliable.” James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckas-son Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 428 (1985). For these reasons, we have held that the judge may not rely exclusively on his personal observation of the defendant as a basis for finding that his plea was knowing and voluntary. See Hunter, supra, 548 A.2d at 810-11; Pierce supra, 705 A.2d at 1091-92.
In sum, in light of Dr. Levin’s assessment and Edwards’ related allegations, I do not believe that it was possible to determine without a hearing whether Edwards’ decision to enter his plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, I would vacate the order appealed from and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on Edwards’ motion. At the hearing on remand, the prosecutor would be able to cross-examine Dr. Levin, the government would have the opportunity to present contrary expert testimony if it elected to do so, and the dispositive determination — whether manifest injustice has been established — could then be made on a more comprehensive and meaningful record.
. United States v. Masthers, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 539 F.2d 721 (1976). The court stated in Masthers that "the standard Rule 11 colloquy may prove an inadequate measure of the validity of a plea proffered by a defendant of questionable mental competence.” 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 249-50, 539 F.2d at 728-29. Masthers also held that the competency standard for pleading guilty is more exacting than the standard for competency to stand trial. 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 247 n. 30, 539 F.2d at 726 n. 30; accord, Williams v. United States, 595 A.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C.1991). This aspect of Masthers was overruled in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 395 n. 5, 396-402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).
. I recognize that IQ is not an adequate substitute for an individualized and thorough inquiry into competency. "IQ alone ... is not a definitive measure of retardation.” Masthers, supra, 539 F.2d 721, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 245 n. 16.
. According to Dr. Levin, Edwards’ "[sjpell-ing ability is only equal to [that of] a third grade student.”
. Edwards alleged in his motion to withdraw the plea that his plea attorney was at fault in this regard.