Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the business of the sale and storage of furniture and household appliances in the city of Flint, Michigan.
On March 21, 1955, the city of Flint adopted an' ordinance which provided:
“Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation or anyone acting in behalf of any person, firm or corporation whether owner, proprietor, agent or employee, in the city of Flint, to conduct or engage in the business of selling, renting, leasing or exchanging furniture, including but not limited to televisions and radios, and/or household appliances, or to keep open any store, office or other place for .the purpose of selling, renting, leasing or exchanging thereof, on the first day of the week commonly called Sunday: Provided, That the foregoing provisions shall not apply to works of necessity and charity, and provided further, that the provisions contained herein shall not be applicable to any persons [sic?] who conscientiously believes that the seventh day of the week should be observed as the Sabbath and actually refrains from such secular business and/or labor on ‘ that day.
“Sec. 2. Any person, firm or corporation or anyone acting in behalf of any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $300 or to imprisonment in the city jail for a period of not more than 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the • court.
“Sec. 3. Should any provision, sentence, clause or (-phrase of this ordinance be held to be invalid for any reason, such holding shall not .affect the validity *38of the ordinance as a whole or any part thereof other than the part so declared invalid, it being the legislative intent that this ordinance shall stand notwithstanding such holding.
“Sec. 4. All ordinances or parts of ordinances, in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.”
Plaintiff filed a bill of complaint in Genesee county circuit court seeking an injunction restraining the city of Flint, the city manager, the police department, their agents, servants and employees from prosecuting any suits or criminal proceedings under the ordinance.
It was the claim of plaintiff that the city of Flint had no right or power to prohibit the sale of furniture on Sunday, and that said ordinance is wholly void; that the city commission in adopting said ordinance acted arbitrarily and unreasonably and in contravention of the rights of plaintiff as set forth in the Constitution of the State of Michigan (1908), art 2, §§ 1, 16,* and in the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America; that the said ordinance unjustly discriminates against plaintiff and other persons and corporations in the same business; that the classification attempted to be made by said ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary and void and bears no reasonable relationship to any object or purpose which might possibly have been sought or attempted to be accomplished by said ordinance; that there are no sanitary problems involved in the furniture business and no reason for police regulation of it.
The city of Flint appeared specially and made a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint claiming the bill stated no cause of action. It was subsequently *39stipulated that the bill of complaint be amended to plead article 5, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Michigan (1908).*
The court in a written opinion, in which he entered into a lengthy discussion of the constitutional questions involved, came to the conclusion that the ordinance was unconstitutional in that the ordinance bore no reasonable relation between the remedy adopted and the public purpose. He held that the inclusion of furniture stores in this ordinance had' no rational relation to promoting the health of the community, and unlike the former Michigan cases, evidence was introduced in this case to show discrimination between different types of businesses. The opinion authorized the entry of a decree, which was subsequently entered oh January 3, 1958, holding that the ordinance and all amendments thereof were null and void. The decree also restrained the enforcement of said ordinance.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff swore a witness, Mannie Colish, who testified that he was the president and a stockholder of People’s Appliance & Furniture, Inc., and that it had been his policy to keep the furniture store open 7 days a week, including Sunday. He further testified that a large number of other businesses were being operated in the city of Flint on Sunday, including gasoline stations, beer gardens, restaurants, dairy bars, bowling alleys, golf courses, grocery stores, construction businesses, hardware stores, clothing stores, model homes, flower shops, and others; that he had closed his business on Sunday and suffered a loss from *4020 to 25% over the week’s volume; that when he closed his business on Saturday and remained open on Sunday he suffered approximately a 10% loss in gross volume.
Following the testimony of Mr. Colish, it was stipulated that at least 7 hardware and sporting-goods stores were open in the city of Flint both on Saturday and Sunday, 7 days a week.
Defendants appeal to this Court. There appears to be only 1 question involved: Was the trial court correct in holding the ordinance void because of arbitrary and discriminatory classification?
This is not a new question in Michigan or the other States of the nation. A large volume of cases have found their way into the appellate courts of the several States and the United States supreme court attacking Sunday ordinances on exactly the same reason as was given in the instant case. Always the court has before it the question of determining whether or not the prohibition against a particular business is reasonable and whether it includes all in a particular class. It would be of little benefit to the bench and bar of this State to engage in a long-historical discussion of the reasons for the law and the different conclusions reached in the several States. Suffice it to say that from all of these cases there is a general pattern developed from which certain rules can be deducted:
1. It is generally conceded (as it is by plaintiff here) that a governing body of a municipality, clothed with power to enact and enforce ordinances for the observance of Sunday, is vested with discretion in determining the kinds of pursuits, occupations, or businesses to be included or excluded, and its determination will not be interfered with by the courts provided the classification and discrimination made are founded upon reasonable dis*41tinctions and have some reasonable relation to the public peace, welfare, and safety.
2. It has been generally held that legislative bodies may distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation. It suffices if the classification is practical. They may prescribe different regulations for different classes, and discrimination as between classes is not such as to invalidate the legislative enactment. The one requirement is that the ordinance must affect all persons similarly situated or engaged in the same business without discrimination.
This Court has passed specifically on this question. People v. Krothiewicz, 286 Mich 644. Defendant Krotldewicz was convicted in justice court in the city of Hamtranck on the charge of selling groceries and meats on Sunday in violation of an ordinance almost identical with the ordinance of the city of Flint. Justice McAllister, quoting from People v. DeRose, 230 Mich 180, 184, said (pp 646, 647):
“ ‘It was made to operate alike on all members of a particular class who kept their places of business open on Sunday. Why it was not made to apply to other classes in like manner offending we have no means of knowing. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the city council acted upon facts within its possession, which justified the classification as reasonable and proper.’ ”
Justice McAllister went on to say (p 648):
“The fact that the ordinance prohibits the sale of certain commodities does not constitute class legislation if it applies with equal force to all situated in a like business. We must assume that the city council acted upon facts within its possession which justified the classification as reasonable and proper.” , .
*42' In the case of People v. DeRose, 230 Mich 180, dealing with a similar ordinance prohibiting the operation of a grocery store on Sunday, Justice McDonald, speaking for the Court on the subject of class legislation, said (p 184):
“It is contended by counsel for the defendant that this ordinance is class legislation because it does not operate on all citizens who keep their places of business open on Sunday; that in permitting drug stores, tobacco shops and other places to remain open on Sunday, while forbidding the same right to the defendant, it denies to him his constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. We do not think the ordinance is open to this objection. It was made to operate alike on all members of a particular class who kept their places of business open on Sunday. Why it was not made to apply to other classes in like manner offending we have no means of knowing. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the city council acted upon facts within its possession, which justified the classification as reasonable and proper.”
In the case of People v. Bellet, 99 Mich 151 (22 LRA 696, 41 Am St Rep 589), Justice Montgomery, speaking for the Court with reference to an appeal from a conviction of a city ordinance for keeping a barber shop open on Sunday, in answer to the question of class legislation, said (p 153):
“By.class legislation, we understand such legislation as denies rights to one which are accorded to' others, or inflicts upon one individual a more sévere penalty than is imposed upon another in Hice case offending.”
Justice Montgomery, then quoted from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations' (p 390; 6th"ed p 479— 481) as follows (pp 153,154): .
*43“ ‘Laws public in their objects may, unless, express constitutional provision forbids, be either general or local in their application. They may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors or married women, bankers or traders, and the like. * * * The legislature may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights, obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of common carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special statutory regulations for the general benefit; and it may be matter of public policy to give laborers in one business a specific lien for their wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do the same for persons engaged in some other employments. If the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, ail that can be required in these cases is that they be general in their application to the class or locality to which they apply; and they are then public in character, and of their propriety and policy the legislature must judge.’ ”
Subsequently, Justice Montgomery said (pp 155, 156) :
“The better reason for maintaining the police power to prohibit citizens from engaging in secular pursuits on Sunday is the necessity of such regulation as a sanitary measure. As to those employments which are noiseless, and harmless in themselves, and conducted in a manner not calculated to offend those who, from religious scruples, observe Sunday as the Lord’s day, this necessity appears to be the only valid source of legislative power; and this is based upon the fact that experience has demonstrated that one day’s rest is requisite for the health of most individuals, and not all individuals possess the power to observe a day of rest of their own volition. As is well said by Mr. Tiedeman:
*44“ ‘If the law did not interfere, the feverish, intense desire to acquire wealth, so thoroughly a characteristic of the American nation, inciting a relentless rivalry and competition, would ultimately prevent, not only the wage-earners, but likewise the capitalists and employers themselves, from yielding to the warnings of nature, and obeying the instinct of self-preservation, by resting periodically from labor, even if the mad pursuit of wealth should not warp their judgment and destroy this instinct. Remove the prohibition of law, and this wholesome sanitary regulation would cease to be observed.’ Tiedeman, Limitations of Police Power, 181.”
Similarly, in the case of Irishman’s Lot, Inc., v. Secretary of State, 338 Mich 662, this Court upheld a Sunday ordinance, in an opinion written by Justice Sharpe, preventing the sale of used cars on Sunday in certain counties of the State.
Justice Reid, writing in In re Berman, 344 Mich 598, had before him the same question involving an identical ordinance as the instant case in the city of Detroit. In discussing the question of whether it is beyond the police power of a city to enact such an ordinance, Justice Reid said historically, the Sabbath day has been known as a day of rest, and rest is essential to public health. Justice Reid quoted from People v. Bellet, supra, 156, as follows (p 603):
“ ‘Experience has demonstrated that one day’s rest is requisite for the health of most individuals, and not all individuals possess the power to observe & day of rest of their own volition.’ ”
It was held that the enactment of the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power. Justice Reid further said (p 603):
“Under the home-rule act, cities are authorized to' require business places to be .closed on Sunday, it being'a'sanitary measure not in conflict with the general laws of the State.”
*45This Court in Kelly v. Judge of Recorder’s Court of Detroit, 239 Mich 204, 214, 215 (53 ALR 273), said:
“ ‘The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community.’ Crowley v. Christensen, 137 US 86, 89 (11 S Ct 13, 34 L ed 620). See, also, Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 US 183 (20 S Ct 633, 44 L ed 725).
“All presumptions are that this law was regularly enacted in full compliance with all provisions for its adoption and is in conformity with all constitutional requirements. To hold it void the repugnancy must clearly appear. In case of doubt courts will not interfere to declare a regularly enacted statute unconstitutional.
“Regulation of certain lawful trades, occupations, and business activities is a question for the legislature. Its determination comes within the proper exercise of the police power of the State unless affirmatively shown so unreasonable, oppressive, extravagant, and arbitrary as to needlessly invade property or personal rights as protected by the Constitution.
“ ‘A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing. * * * A State may properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the whole field of possible abuses. * * * The statute must be presumed to be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical need; and is not to be overthrown merely because other instances may be suggested to which also it might have been applied; that being a matter for the legislature to. determine unless the case is very clear, * * * And it is not open to objection unless the classification is so lacking in any adequate or reasonable basis as to preclude the assumption that it was made in the exercise of the legislative judg*46ment and discretionciting numerous cases throughout the quotation. Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, 370 (47 S Ct 641, 71 L ed 1095).”
This Court, under the authorities above cited, cannot speculate as to why the legislative body did not include in its Sunday closing law other retail businesses. Perhaps it was because they were having difficulty only with the furniture stores; perhaps there were other valid reasons why other businesses were allowed to remain open on Sunday in the city of Flint. The constitutionality of such an ordinance is presumed. No proof was offered from which we could reasonably infer that the ordinance was unreasonable and discriminatory because of arbitrary classification. We have considered the question of whether or not it is local legislation. We do not agree that it is. It covers all merchants selling furniture and household appliances in the city of Flint. This covers a complete class. It is made to operate alike to all members of that class without discrimination. Therefore it does not violate article 5, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Michigan (1908) as a local act.
Since writing the above, we have had the benefit of Justice Voelker’s opinion. He indicates that he finds the ordinance bad for several reasons and then proceeds to outline 4 in particular. He admits that the numerical weight of authority seems to be plainly against his view “that the present Flint ordinance is unreasonably discriminatory and void— when judged, that is, without reference to any existing State statute.” He refers to what he believes to be confusion in our law with reference to Sunday ordinances.
It would appear to be admitted that no confusion exists in the settled case law of this State or the other States of the Union.
*47The first portion of this opinion, we think, adequately answers all of the questions raised, excepting the one with reference to the State statute which this ordinance is alleged to he violating.
The State statute provides:
“No person shall keep open his shop, warehouse, or workhouse, or shall do any manner of labor, business, or work, or be present at any dancing, or at any public diversion, show, or entertainment, or take part in any sport, game, or play on the first day of the week: The foregoing provisions shall not apply to works of necessity and charity nor to the making of mutual promises of marriage nor the solemnization of marriages. And every person so offending shall he punished by fine not exceeding 10 dollars for each offense.” (CL 1948, § 435.1 [Stat Ann 1957 Eev § 18.851]).
The city ordinance in question is directed against any person, firm or corporation whether owner, proprietor, agent or employee, from conducting or engaging in the business of selling, renting, leasing or exchanging furniture. Only a portion of the people included in the State statute are involved in this ordinance. Clearly this limited ordinance cannot he in conflict with the broad State statute. The local municipality does not attempt to include more people than the State statute, but rather only a portion of those people covered by the State act. The only conflict in the 2 that could possibly he claimed would be the penalty provision, the State statute providing for a fine not exceeding $10 for each offense; the ordinance, a fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment. in the city jail for a period of not more than 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Confusion should not result from this, since it has been clearly established that the Sunday statute referred to is not a criminal statute. ...
*48Yerkes v. Smith, 157 Mich 557, People v. Dixon, 188 Mich 307 (Ann Cas 1918B, 385) and, Crawford v. Huber, 215 Mich 564 (39 ALR 1392), are authority for the position that the Sunday statutes are not criminal in nature hut civil and the penalties provided can only be recovered in civil actions. It is for this very reason that all of the Michigan cases have failed to make any reference to this statute when dealing with criminal ordinances adopted by local municipalities under the police power. Only Builders Association v. City of Detroit, 295 Mich 272, makes any reference to the Sunday civil statute and admittedly the case does not turn on this point.
Since all of the 4 points raised by our Brother overlap to such an extent that basically his arguments are directed to the claim of conflict with the State statute, we do not feel that any further answer is necessary, except to say it is not the judicial function to determine the wisdom or lack of wisdom in adopting certain ordinances. This is for the legislative authority. The judicial function lends itself only to determine whether an act is constitutional. Reference is made to the body of the forepart of this opinion for a statement with reference to the presumption of constitutionality and the reasons why it is felt this ordinance is constitutional.
The decree of the lower court will be reversed. Decree dismissing the bill may be entered in that court in accordance with this opinion, with costs in favor of defendants.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, Kelly, and Smith, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.See. 1. “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.”
Sec. 16. “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”
See. 30. “The legislature shall pass no local or special act in airy ease where a general act'can be made applicable, and whether a 'general act can be made applicable shall be a‘judicial question. No local ,or special act, excepting acts repealing local or special acts in ■’effect January one, nineteen hundred nine and receiving a two-thirds vote of the legislature shall take effect until approved by a majority of the electors' voting thereon in the district to be’ affected.”