dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority in this case. It is well settled that “[i]n construing a statute this [CJourt’s purpose is to establish and effectuate the legislative intent behind the enactment.” State v. Powers, 644 A.2d 828, 830 (R.I.1994) (citing In re Barnacle, 623 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I.1993)). “We determine such intent ‘by examining the language, the nature, and the object of the statute while giving its words their plain and ordinary meaning.’” C & J Jewelry Co. v. Department of Employment and Training, Board of Review, 702 A.2d 384, 385 (R.I.1997) (quoting Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee, 691 A.2d 573, 578 (R.I.1997)). “Furthermore, “when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, there is no room for statutory construction or extension, and we must give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996)).
I do not agree with the majority’s holding that G.L.1956 § ll-37-16(a) defines the universe of persons required to register under the statute. Indeed, § 11-37-16(b) clearly states that “[a]ny person who, after July 1, 1992, is discharged or paroled from a jail, prison, or other institution * * * because of the commission * * * of the above mentioned offenses * * * shall, prior to discharge * * * be informed of his or her duty to register under this section * * *.” Thus, while § ll-37-16(a) addresses those persons who are convicted after July 1, 1992, § ll-37-16(b) pertains to individuals who were released after that date, without regard to when they were convicted, referring to “any person” discharged or released on parole after July 1, 1992. Thus, we are bound to give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words utilized by the Legislature imposing a duty to register on inmates released from incarceration on or after July 1, 1992, irrespective of the date of their conviction.
I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that § ll-37-16(b) does not broaden the pool of persons upon whom a duty of registration is imposed, but merely instructs correctional officials to inform those covered by the statute of their duty to register. Such a construction produces the “absurd result” of exempting an entire class of sex offenders from registration requirements. State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581, 583 (R.I.1998) (citing Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)). The majority’s interpretation of this statute excludes such a class of offenders, namely, those who were convicted before *1036the act was passed but who were released from incarceration after July 1, 1992. Since those being released after long periods of imprisonment often are the most dangerous types of sex offenders, it is inconceivable to me that the Legislature could have intended such a result.
Section ll-37-16(b) provided that any person released after July 1, 1992 “shall * * * be informed of his or her duty to register * * Under § ll-37-16(b), it is incumbent upon the official in charge to require the inmate to sign a form “as may be required by the [Ajttorney [GJeneral stating that the duty of the person to register * * * has been explained to the person.” Furthermore, the official is required under that subsection to give one copy of the form to the inmate and one copy “to the appropriate law enforcement agency having local jurisdiction where the person expects to reside upon discharge * * Id. “All such forms shall * * * be transmitted within such times as to be received by the local law enforcement agency, and the prosecuting agency thirty (30) days prior to the discharge, parole, or release of the person.” Id. It seems utterly implausible that the Legislature would require officers in charge to notify inmates of their duty to register and comply with specified procedures regarding notification without also requiring the notified offenders to register. Thus, to effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute’s enactment, the language must be construed literally to impose an accompanying duty to register on those individuals who were informed of this duty prior to their release.
For the foregoing reasons, I would deny the defendant’s appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.