Dissenting Opinion
Buchanan, J.I respectfully but unhesitatingly dissent from the majority opinion on these grounds:
*6221. The consents to adoption executed by the natural parents were invalid because they were:
(a) executed prior to the child’s birth (father only), and
(b) executed in blank.
2. These consents are nullities. At best they indicate an intention to consent to adoption.
Ground 1(a). A consent to adoption executed prior to the birth of the child is void for various reasons.
First, the majority opinion does not strictly construe our adoption statute, Ind. Ann. Stat. §3-120 (1968 Repl.), as it purports to do, as required by Indiana law. In the Matter of the Adoption of Bryant (1963), 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N. E. 2d 593, 1 Ind. Dec. 298; In Re Adoption of Chaney (1958), 128 Ind. App. 603, 150 N. E. 2d 754; In the Matter of Adoption of Force (1956), 126 Ind. App. 156, 131 N. E. 2d 56. In pertinent part, our statute is worded in a manner evincing legislative intent that a child must be born before consent can be given, i.e., “If such child have parent or parents living. . . .” “In every case where such child shall have been born out of wedlock. . . .” Ind. Ann. Stat. §3-120 (1968 Repl.). (Emphasis supplied.) The majority interprets this language as only requiring the parents’ consent if they are living. However, if the parents are not living, then there can be no child, unless he has already been born.
Strict construction means a literal reading of words as they outwardly appear. It does not mean reading something into the language which is not there. Lagler v. Bye (1908), 42 Ind. App. 592, 596, 85 N. E. 36; 50 Am. Jur. Statutes §388.
The majority finds no direct or indirect reference to the time of consent in this statute. However, this is not a strict, literal reading because they failed to consider the effect of the words “child”, “have”, and “shall have been born”. Such words speak of a human being in existence, not a fetus. Ac*623cordingly, the word “child” has been defined to be an immediate offspring of human parents. Houston v. McKinney, 54 Fla. 600, 45 So. 480; Matter of Conant’s Estate (1932), 144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y. Supp. 885.
Another reason a consent prior to birth is invalid is that it is vague, uncertain, and inevitably leads to confusion. There is the ever-present possibility that the child may be stillborn, defective, or there may be a multiple birth. Various questions come to mind. Have the natural parents consented to adoption of all the babies if there is a multiple birth? If not, what would become of the remaining baby or babies? What if the adopting parents die before the birth of the child?
The majority cites a Florida case holding a consent prior to birth as valid because of the welfare of the child was adequately protected. In Re Adoption of Long (1952), 56 So. 2d 450. Query — how can a child’s welfare be protected in view of these uncertainties ?
Finally, such consents fail to allow for one of nature’s strongest instincts. Who knows what the reaction will be of a mother once she sees her baby? Does the view of the majority that such a consent is valid allow for maternal instinct? To deny the mother’s natural desire to keep her baby is in derogation of the purpose of our statute to preserve the natural family relationship to the fullest extent possible. In the Matter of the Adoption of Bryant (1963), supra; Duckworth v. Duckworth (1932), 203 Ind. 276, 179 N. E. 773.
It can safely be said such consents are premature.
Ground 1(b). The execution of a blanket consent in a private adoption is inconsistent with the duty of the natural parents to select the most suitable foster parents for their child.
Because it was their act which brought the child into the world, they must bear this responsibility. Without full knowledge of the adopting parents’ identity, their home life, financial condition, character, etc., they do not discharge this *624responsibility. They merely evade it -by executing a “blank check”.
The majority contends that although blanket consents in private adoptions allow the natural parents to- evade- performance of their duty to place the child in a proper foster home, there still exists the necessary degree of control exercised by the court and the welfare department in assuming the natural parents’ role. In response thereto', it may be observed that the press of other responsibilities often makes investigations as to the suitability of private adoptions perfunctory.
In support of the argument that blanket consents are invalid is In Re Holder (1940), 218 N. C. 136, 141, 10 S. E. 2d 628:
“The consent-must at least be'in fair contemplation of the proposed adoption, and this includes its most essential feature — the identity of the adoptive■ parents. . . . Jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon a blanket release or consent on the part of the parent that the child may be adopted in whatsoever proceeding may be brought and to whomsoever it may apply.” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also 2 Am. Jur. Adoption § 45; 24 A. L. R. 2d 1138, § 7.
Here, as in the consent prior to birth question, the majority grounds its decision on the fact that the 1969 General Assembly amended Burns § 3-120 and endorsed blanket consents, since the previous statute made no mention of the subject. They assert that this amendment was merely restating the previous law by putting it in writing and adding a safeguard. However, is it not just' as logical to argue the converse?
Some interesting analogies come to mind. Deeds and other instruments affecting title or an interest in real estate must be properly filled in before they are accepted for recording and thereby give effective notice to all concerned. Wilson v. Johnson (1895), 145 Ind. 40, 38 N. E. 38. A lien on personal property does not become effective to the world until properly *625filed. UCC §§ 9-401 et seq. Daily, governmental offices refuse various instruments for filing which do not have all the blanks filled in.
We provide safeguards for instruments which affect property and other aspects of life as we lead it today. What safeguards have we provided for human' life in' adopting the majority view that a blank check may be written by natural parents of a child not yet in existence?
In times gone by, and even today, those knowledgeable in the field of private adoptions are aware that a certain amount of “trafficking in human flesh” exists. Sometimes this is referred to as a black or gray market in babies.. Legislation in recent years has done much to rectify this vicious traffic. Without delving into the details of how this is done, suffice it to say that the kind of consents under attack here aid and abet placement of newborn children where the paramount-consideration is monéy, not the welfare of the child. :
Ground 2. A blank consent executed prior to birth is á nullity. At best it is only an indication of ah intent to consent to adoption which is not binding and may be- withdrawn at any time prior to final judgment by the court having jurisdiction. In Re White, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. 2d 579, 138 A. L. R. 1034; In Re Adoption of Lauless, 216 Ore. 188, 388 P. 2d 660.
The Cupps testified to realizing that when one takes a child into his home, there can be no final adoption until the court approves it. Before this final approval was given, the natural parents changed their intention, an action they rightfully took as their consents were invalid or only indicative of intent to consent.
Authority is meager, both in Indiana and elsewhere, as to the validity of consents, but the approach to this subject is perhaps best summarized by In the Matter of the Adoption of Bryant, supra, at 301:
“[Sjince the relationship between a parent and a child is a bundle of human rights of such fundamental importance, *626it has generally been held that adoption statutes being in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed in favor of a worthy parent and the preservation of such relationship. Therefore the rules in the above paragraph need be tempered by the rule that neither should the statute be so liberally construed that it would destroy safeguards erected for preservation of family relationships.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Has human life become so insignificant that we lightly set a child adrift with fewer safeguards for its protection than we prescribe for a chattel?
The net effect of the majority opinion is to prevent a natural parent from repudiating a “consent” executed in blank prior to the birth of the child, and at any time after the child is born, even befor a final adoption decree has been entered. Such a result is contrary to a strict interpretation of Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-120, supra, and the public policy of this and other states concerned with the paramount importance of the welfare of the child.
Therefore the decision of the trial court should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 274 N. E. 2d 411.