dissenting: I can see no reason to recede at this
time from principles laid down almost twenty-five years ago in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352. While there was evidence in that case from which it could be found that the minor child had been emancipated, it also appeared that the father was insured. Either circumstance, standing alone was held sufficient to "remove the only substantial objection to the maintenance of the action.” Id., 373. The argument that “taking out insurance . . . cannot create liability where none existed before” (Id., 367) was fully answered, and questions of public policy were considered at length. The Legislature has not seen fit in the intervening years to announce any policy differing from the conclusions then reached by the court. Since the father who is defendant in this case was admittedly insured, the suit on behalf of his minor son falls squarely within the principles of the Dunlap case. Whether the rights of the mother have been invaded (see Woodman v. Peck, 90 N. H. 292, 294) so that her suit for expenses may be maintained, or whether the right is actually the father’s (see McConnell v. Lamontagne, *15082 N. H. 423) so that it should not be maintained (Bullard v. McCarthy, 89 N. H. 158, 164), involves questions of fact determinable on trial and not raised by the motions to dismiss. The plaintiff’s exceptions should be sustained.