J.—I dissent.
I agree with the majority’s eloquent recitation of the constitutional predicates of Ramey and its ultimate determination that the court below erred in finding Ramey to be inapplicable to nonresident arrestees. The schism begins with the majority’s discussion of consent.
Consent is not at issue. We have no finding of consent to review. What we do have is a finding that “the officer used a ruse to gain entry into the house.” The uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence to support this finding culminates in the testimony of the officer:
“Q. Would it be fair to say, Officer, without any reflection upon you that it was your intention to arrest him, and that it was, also, your intention to get him out of the house to effect the arrest so you need not comply with your understanding of the Ramey case?
“A. Yes.”
We must now answer the legal question: in a situation where there is no arrest warrant and no exigent circumstances and the police use trickery for the express purpose of gaining entry into a dwelling, is the subsequent arrest valid?
No. “It is well settled in this state that an entry obtained by trick, ruse, or subterfuge is illegal and that any prosecution based on such an illegal entry cannot be allowed to stand.” (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990, 993 [88 Cal.Rptr. 37], citing People v. Reeves (1964) 61 Cal.2d 268, 273 [38 Cal.Rptr. 1, 391 P.2d 393].) It follows that the entry by ruse without a warrant rendered appellant’s subsequent arrest invalid by force of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Our inquiry should end here.
*981However, the majority opinion goes on and in my view incorrectly puts its focus on the second trick the police used to avoid the Ramey rule: asking appellant to step outside. Nothing was decided by the trial court about that nor was a finding necessary because the prosecution did not even attempt to show that this scheme (admitted by the same officer) and the subsequent arrest were purged by the taint of the illegal entry.
The majority concludes that “the privacy interests protected by Ramey were satisfied when appellant voluntarily stepped outside.” That ipse dixit is equivalent of saying that if the police had simply broken down the front door and then had asked appellant to step outside that the privacy interests protected by Ramey would have been satisfied. The holding of this case is easy to state and apply: police can effectively evade the constitutional protections afforded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in a scheme to evade those constitutional rights by trickery.
If this decision stands the Fourth Amendment will read: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated except when police officers engage in schemes to violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. ”
Instead, I would remand for further hearing to determine whether or not the confession was the product of the invalid arrest.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 9, 1980. Poché, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 14, 1980. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.