specially concurring:
I believe it is important for future cases that this court make, clear once and for all the question of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission in cases involving injured workers in Illinois or otherwise covered by this State’s workers’ compensation laws. The opinion in this case finds that, in this particular case, jurisdiction to construe the contract of insurance is in the Commission, thus requiring Employers Mutual to return to the Commission to determine its liability to the employee under the Act. The impression left by the wording of the opinion in this case is that the jurisdiction of the Commission over matters involving injured workers is not exclusive.
While I agree with the result reached in this case, I disagree with that portion of the opinion of Justice Bowman that initial jurisdiction to construe the contract of insurance was in the court but that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies to the secondary jurisdiction question. I further disagree with Justice McLaren’s conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction exists between the circuit court and the Commission.
Section 5(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 1992)), provides in pertinent part as follows:
"No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, *** or the agents or employees *** for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.”
Also, section 11 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1992)), states in relevant part as follows:
"The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer *** for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment ***.”
The clear language of the above statutes is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. (People v. NL Industries (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 82.) The title of the Workers’ Compensation Act provided that it is "An Act to promote the general welfare of people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injury or death suffered in the course of employment ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq. (now 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)).) In addition, section 18 of the Act states in pertinent part:
"All questions arising under this Act, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein, shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the Commission.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/18 (West 1992).
The last-quoted provision of the statute contains the words "except as otherwise provided.” In view of this language, to eliminate the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, a specific provision or action of the legislature is required. For example, in Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 229, the supreme court held that to escape the bar of sections 5 and 11 of the Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury (1) was not accidental, (2) did not arise from his or her employment, (3) was not received during the course of employment, or (4) was not compensable under the Act.
The decision in this case as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission will fulfill the purpose of the Workers’ Compensa.tion Act by providing a prompt, sure remedy for the injured employee. It was designed to provide a speedy recovery without the proof of fault for accidental injury and will not force the employee and his counsel to defend litigation outside of the Commission and the procedure followed to appeal the Commission’s orders. The Act has been interpreted as providing an exclusive remedy for the resolution of all issues arising out of employment-related issues. Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 441, 447.