Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board

HANSON (Thaxton), J.

We reluctantly concur. Under the standard of review applicable to police power regulations as set forth in cases such as Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 158-160 [130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001], we are compelled to uphold the validity of the charter amendment in question since it is reasonably related to its stated purpose.

We are constrained to state our deep seated concern with the growing trend of chipping away at the most fundamental concept of our economic system (i.e., the private ownership of property) in the name of the “public peace, safety, morals, health and welfare.”

The private ownership of property distinguishes capitalism from the other economic systems in the world. While such police power regulations merely regulate the use as distinguished from the ownership of property, the uses to which a person may put his property are becoming increasingly confined. (See, e.g., Nash v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 37 Cal.3d 97 [207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894], wherein the court upheld the validity of another section of the ordinance in question which prohibits an owner of units subject to rent control from removing those units from the market by demolition or conversion unless he first obtains permission, under rigorous guidelines, from the Santa Monica Rent Control Board.)

In our view, such police power regulations are shortsighted and threaten to “kill the goose that laid the golden egg.” The increasing number of rent control ordinances force owners of existing rental units to either remain indefinitely in the rental business with others dictating management, or sell their property at less than true value due to the rent control cloud hanging over their property. Also, the increasing number of such rent control ordinances must have the effect of serving as a disincentive for the construction of additional rental units.

In his petition for rehearing, Sterling argues that our prior disposition of this case was erroneous since the State Housing Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 17910 et seq.) preempts the field of health and safety regulation. Health and Safety Code section 17922, subdivision (f) provides: “No local ordinance may permit any action or proceeding to abate violations of regulations governing maintenance of existing buildings, unless the building is a substandard building or the violation is a misdemeanor. ” Health and Safety Code section 17960 provides that the State Housing Law is to be enforced by the city building department.

*189Sterling argues that our prior disposition permits a landlord to fail to comply with the State Housing Law or the warranty of habitability provided the landlord accepts a reduction in rent.

The fallacy in Sterling’s argument is that the charter amendment is not trying to enforce health code standards but rather its focus is to ensure that excessive rents are not charged. As pointed out by the lead opinion, a rent reduction in no way prevents the appropriate agency from enforcing health code standards.

Regarding the warranty of habitability, Civil Code section 1942, subdivision (d) states: “The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy provided by this chapter, the rental agreement, or other applicable statutory or common law.” Since charter amendments are accorded the dignity of statutes (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 3, subd. (a); 45 Cal.Jur.3d Municipalities, §58, p. 111), it is clear that Civil Code section 1942 does not preempt the remedy provided by the charter amendment in question.

If preemption in this field is to be declared, it is a task for the Legislature and not the judiciary.

Leetham, J.,* concurred.

The petition of plaintiff and respondent for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 21, 1985. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.