dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Much has been ignored by the majority en route to its conclusion that Ind.Code § 8-15-2-1 et seq. (Burns 1982 Supp.) is unconstitutional “to the extent that it grants authorization to the Indiana Department of Highways to issue toll road revenue bonds .... ” Majority Opinion, supra.
For instance, the majority has not acknowledged the legislature’s mandate in Ind.Code § 8-15-2-2, supra, entitled “Toll road revenue bonds—Limitation of liability”:
“Toll road revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a debt of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state or of any such political subdivision, but such bonds shall be payable solely from the funds pledged for their payment as authorized by this chapter, unless such bonds are refunded by refunding bonds, issued under the provisions of this chapter, which refunding bonds shall be payable solely from funds pledged for their payment as authorized by this chapter. All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement to the effect that the bonds, as to both principal and interest, are not an obligation of the state of Indiana, or of any political subdivision thereof, but are payable solely from funds pledged for their payment, as authorized by this chapter.
*1137“All expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this chapter shall be payable solely from funds provided under the authority of this chapter and nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to authorize the department to incur indebtedness or liability on behalf of or payable by the state or any political subdivision thereof.”
Nor has the majority acknowledged the existence of the legislature’s requirement that “The principal of and the interest on such bonds [toll road revenue bonds] shall be payable solely from the revenues or from the proceeds of bonds . .. and earnings thereon, or from both.” Ind.Code § 8-15-2-9, supra.
Likewise, the majority has failed to observe that the bonds at issue in the instant cause bear on their face the following statement:
“Under the Act [Ind.Code § 8-15-2-1 et seq., supra], the Bonds shall not be deemed to constitute a debt of the State of Indiana or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of said State or of any such political subdivision. The Bonds, as to both principal and interest, are not an obligation of the State of Indiana or of any political subdivision thereof, but are payable solely from the funds pledged for their payment.”
Similarly, the majority has failed to state that Article XII, Section 12.01 of the Trust Agreement is explicit with respect to the matter before us:
“SECTION 12.01. Credit of State or Any Political Subdivision Not Pledged. Nothing in the Bonds or coupons or in this 1980 Trust Agreement shall be construed as pledging the faith and credit of the State of Indiana or any political subdivision thereof for their payment, or to create any debt against said State or any political subdivision thereof.”
These unequivocal statements common to the governing statutory scheme, the revenue bonds at issue, and the trust agreement before us cannot be ignored.
These declarations belie the majority’s notion that Ind.Code § 8-15-2-1 et seq., supra, creates a “debt” upon the state, as that term is employed in Article 10, Section 5, of our Constitution. In the context of cases identical to the one before us, this Court has repeatedly stated that the constitutional term “debt” applies only to “legally enforceable obligations.” Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm, et al, (1958) 238 Ind. 120, 148, 149 N.E.2d 273, 289; accord, Kees v. Smith, (1956) 235 Ind. 687, 137 N.E.2d 541; Protsman v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp., (1953) 231 Ind. 527, 109 N.E.2d 889.
In the face of the unequivocal language employed by the legislature and the equally unequivocal statements on the face of the bonds and trust agreement, there simply is no “legally enforceable obligation” created here. Nor does the majority explain how a legally enforceable obligation of the state is created.
Neither does the majority explain why the statutory scheme at issue should be declared unconstitutional under Article 10, Section 5, when identical municipal schemes have been ruled constitutional under Article 13, Section 1, which proscribes indebtedness of municipal corporations in this state. The application of the latter constitutional provision was discussed in Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm. et al., supra:
“The law is well-settled in Indiana that, ‘Bonds which are to be paid solely from the revenue collected from a project’ do not ‘create a debt of the municipal corporation involved, under Section 1, Article 13, of the Constitution of Indiana.’ Ennis v. State Highway Commission, supra, at page 336 of 231 Ind., at page 699 of 108 N.E.2d, and cases there cited.
The provision pertaining to the creation of a debt in Art. 10, § 5, supra, is of no greater weight than the provision in Art. 13, § 1 pertaining to the creation of a debt by political or municipal corporations; hence the rule as followed in this State with reference to the creation of a debt through the issuance of revenue bonds by municipal corporations applies with equal force to the State of Indiana. *1138Ennis v. State Highway Commission, supra, 1952, 231 Ind. 311, 337, 108 N.E.2d 687, 699; Loomis v. Keehn, 1948, 400 Ill. 337, 341, 80 N.E.2d 368, 371; McArthur v. Smallwood, 1955, 225 Ark. 328, 337, 281 S.W.2d 428, 434; Kelley v. Earle, supra, 1937, 325 Pa. 337, 347, 190 A. 140, 145; State ex rel. Watson v. Caldwell, 1945, 156 Fla. 618, 621, 23 So.2d 855, 857; Sheffield v. State School Bldg. Authority, 1952, 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590; State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 1955, 271 Wis. 15, 41, 72 N.W.2d 577, 590.” Id., 238 Ind. at 139, 149 N.E.2d at 283-4.
As this Court in Book expressly recognized the two constitutional provisions are of equal force and weight, the majority implicitly overrules that aspect of Book. In its place, we gain a wholly arbitrary distinction, albeit without rationale.
It is noted that pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.08 of the trust agreement executed by the parties, the following duty is imposed on the Department of Highways:
“If, despite use of best efforts to fix, charge and collect tolls and charges for use of the Toll Road adequate to meet the Net Revenue Requirement as provided above, the Commission [Department of Highways] is unable to charge and collect such level of tolls and charges, the Commission covenants that at the appropriate time or times it will report and propose to the State Budget Agency that there be included in each budget bill an appropriation by the Legislature to the Commission sufficient to pay the Operating Expenses of the Toll Road for the budget period but not in excess of that amount which will permit the application of additional amounts from the Revenue Fund so that the Commission will meet the Net Revenue Requirement.” (Emphasis added.)
As emphasized, the provision requires the Department of Highways to “propose” the legislature appropriate funds if revenues are inadequate to meet the requirements of the trust agreement. Although the position is not embraced by the majority, American National Bank and Trust Company has argued that the provision establishes the existence of a debt on the part of the state.
The argument was rejected by this Court in Steup v. Indiana Housing Finance Authority, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1215, 1219:
“Furthermore, the legislature may appropriate funds to the capital reserve fund. However, no funds can flow into the reserve fund unless and until there is an appropriation by the legislature. The Act allows but does not require such appropriations. In Utah Housing Finance Agency v. Smart, (1977) Utah, 561 P.2d 1052, 1056, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
“ ‘If the legislation requires future appropriations to defray the obligations of the Agency it would be invalid as lending the state’s credit, but where, as here, it merely allows future appropriations without requiring such, it creates no binding obligation upon the state and therefore does not result in a debt of the state or the lending of the state’s credit.’
“We hold that the Act does not create a state indebtedness and, therefore, does not contravene Ind.Const. Art. 10, § 5.”
Likewise, the trust agreement here obviously creates no obligation on the part of the legislature.
Steup bears out the fallacy of the majority’s insistence that the existence of a separate corporate entity is dispositive in the determination of what constitutes a “debt” within the meaning of Article 10, Section 5. In either case, the legislature may appropriate money to support the revenue bonds. What is significant, however, is whether the legislature is required to make such an appropriation. Here, no such requirement exists, nor is the state general fund obligated.
As Justice Prentice has explained in his dissenting opinion, that renders the separate corporate entity an artificial device, a mere “veil” without significance in the determination of whether a “debt” within the meaning of Article 10, Section 5, has been created. The trial court reached the identical conclusion in finding Ind.Code § 8-15-2-1 et seq., supra, was not unconstitutional. And the vast majority of jurisdictions *1139which have confronted the question before us have reached the same conclusion. Those states have held that the financing of a special state project through bonds to be paid solely from the revenues of the special project, and which neither obligate the state’s general fund nor pledge the credit of the state, did not violate constitutional prohibitions against indebtedness. The validity of the “special fund” doctrine is widely recognized. See e.g., Clipson v. State Board of Education, (1960) 271 Ala. 160, 123 So.2d 16; Arizona State Highway Comm. v. Nelson, (1969) 105 Ariz. 76, 459 P.2d 509; California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, (1933) 218 Cal. 7, 21 P.2d 425; Johnson v. McDonald, (1935) 97 Colo. 324, 49 P.2d 1017; State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, (1948) 160 Fla. 230, 34 So.2d 443; Farrell v. State Board of Regents, (Iowa 1970) 179 N.W.2d 533; Meagher v. Commonwealth ex rel. Unemployment Comp. Comm., (1947) 305 Ky. 289, 203 S.W.2d 35; Schureman v. State Highway Commission, (1966) 377 Mich. 609, 141 N.W.2d 62; Naftalin v. King, (1960) 257 Minn. 498, 102 N.W.2d 301; State ex rel. Dragstedt v. State Board of Education, (1936) 103 Mont. 336, 62 P.2d 330; State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm. v. Connelly, (1935) 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097; State v. Jones, (1946) 74 N.D. 465, 23 N.W.2d 54; Application of Oklahoma Planning and Resources Bd., (1949) 201 Okla. 178, 203 P.2d 415; Moses v. Meier, (1934) 148 Or. 185, 35 P.2d 981; State v. Byrnes, (1951) 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33; State v. Giessel, (1955) 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577; State ex rel. Wyoming Farm Loan Bd. v. Herschler, (1981) Wyo., 622 P.2d 1378. See generally, 81A C.J.S. States § 221, p. 785 (1977).
The majority suggests that the application of the “special fund” doctrine, as envisaged by our General Assembly in its enactment of Ind.Code § 8-15-2-2, supra, would result in “once again opening the floodgates of authorizing unlimited state indebtedness.” Majority Opinion, supra. The majority’s use of the phrase “once again” apparently is a reference to the era in this state’s financial history which prompted the framers of our Constitution to insert Article 10, Section 5, into that document in 1851.
During the 1830s and 1840s, the infancy of our statehood, our state government had embarked on a bevy of public works projects to achieve the internal improvements deemed necessary to sustain the state’s cultural and commercial growth. Foremost among the projects was the construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal. Bonds to finance the construction were authorized by the General Assembly in 1835. Acts 1835, c. 2, p. 6. Pursuant to the statute, the bonds were issued from 1835 until 1839, when the market failed; the bonds expressly obligated the state and its general revenues. Ultimately, the state fell into arrears on its financial responsibilities under the bonds and was forced to call in the state stock and enter into an agreement with bondholders whereby “canal stock” was issued, payable only from the revenues of the canal and unsecured by the state. See generally, Bates, The Borrowing Power Under the “Casual Debt” Proviso of the Indiana Constitution 8 Ind.L.J. 341 (1933).
The majority’s fear that history will repeat itself—that this state’s financial condition will be plunged “once again” into debt—is unfounded. Unlike the state-secured bonds issued from 1835 to 1839 to finance construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal, the toll road revenue bonds, by the very legislative language authorizing the issuance of them, specifically “are not an obligation of the state” and do not constitute “a debt of the State of Indiana or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of said State or of any such political subdivision.” Ind.Code § 8-15-2-2, supra.
It simply cannot be said that a state “debt,” a “legally enforceable obligation,” is created by the legislature’s language. To assume that the “floodgates” of “unlimited state indebtedness” are opened by statutory language such as that before us is to assume that the legislature will authorize project after project wherein the special revenues designated to finance the improvement will be inadequate to meet the responsibility, that shortsighted financial *1140institutions and investors will flock to the schemes like lambs to the slaughter, and that the legislature will repeatedly bail out the projects with appropriations from general revenues, leaving the state unable to meet its total financial obligations.
It is not this Court’s prerogative, however, to prospectively question the wisdom of our General Assembly and speculate or assume its future legislation will take a certain course. Here, the legislature has merely passed responsibility for the operation of the toll road from the Toll Road Commission to the Department of Highways. The powers and revenue-producing responsibilities have remained unchanged; the issue before us involves a special funding mechanism for the completion of a special public project. The wisdom of all this is not for us to question; only its constitutionality is at issue.
In resolving that question, it is well established that the statute comes before this Court clothed with a presumption of constitutionality. The burden of prove otherwise rests with the party challenging the statute. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., (1981) Ind., 418 N.E.2d 207; Short v. Texaco, Inc., (1980) Ind., 406 N.E.2d 625; Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585; Sidle v. Majors, (1976) 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763; Allen v. Pavach, (1975) 263 Ind. 574, 335 N.E.2d 219; Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867; City of Aurora v. Bryant, (1960) 240 Ind. 492, 165 N.E.2d 141.
Here, that burden has not been satisfied. Where doubts exist as to the validity of a statute, those doubts must be resolved in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Id. In that respect, I agree with the majority that “We must always remember that while we have the duty to guard the constitution, we are nevertheless a court and not a legislature.” Majority Opinion, supra. Ultimately, that is in fact the foremost reason for my refusal to join the majority.
It is my belief that a case of such public importance and interest, involving as it does the legislature’s view of the statute’s nonbinding effect on the state’s general revenues, demands a more in-depth and cautious scrutiny than that which is revealed in the majority opinion.
For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
I dissent.