concurring.
I cannot agree with the statement on pages 97-98 of the opinion that "[uJnder these circumstances, the parties were free to fix the compensation at whatever figure they thought proper." Attorneys' fees must be reasonable. The Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(A) in effect prior to January 1, 1987, prohibited a lawyer from entering into an agreement for, or charging or collecting a clearly excessive fee. The Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(a), effective in this jurisdiction since January 1, 1987, provide that a lawyer's fee must be reasonable. Contingent fees are subject to the "reasonableness" and "clearly excessive" tests of the Rules and the Code. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion 86-1521 (October 26, 1986). Courts have applied the "reasonableness" test in upholding contingent fees, McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard (3d Cir.1987), 823 F.2d 43, and, on the other hand, have disciplined lawyers for charging fees pursuant to a contingent fee contract, when those fees were clearly excessive. See Florida Bar v. Moriber (1975), Fla., 314 So.2d 145; Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Tatterson (1986), W.Va., 352 S.E.2d 107.
Because of the ethical constraints imposed upon lawyers, all fees must be reasonable and not clearly excessive. To the extent that a lawyer and his client are free to contract for the lawyer's fees, that contract must meet the tests of reasonable and not clearly excessive. However, in this case, the majority opinion applies the reasonableness test and finds Belli's fee to be reasonable under the facts and cireum-stances of the case. With that assessment, I agree.
Except for my disagreement with the overbroad statement concerning the parties' freedom to contract for any amount of attorneys' fees, I concur in the majority opinion.