I concur in the judgment and its supporting reasons but do not interpret the majority’s broad disclaimer of permissible sanctions1 (itself unnecessary to the decision) to mean that the dictum stated in Ballard (64 Cal.2d 159, at p. 177) announces an absolute prohibition against use of the court’s inherent power of contempt to enforce a valid order of examination in appropriate cases. Ballard simply recognizes that, realistically, a witness may neither be compelled to submit to nor cooperate in the examination and suggests an appropriate trial remedy in the event of an inexcusable refusal. However, it provides no authority for the implied assertion that the historic power of contempt may not be invoked in the rare case involving a wilful, deliberate and contumacious disobedience. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. 5; In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10-11 [73 Cal.Rptr. 580, 447 P.2d 972]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Trial, § 138, pp. 2960-2961.) Such a broad pronouncement would seriously erode the inherent but limited power of a court of general jurisdiction to enforce an otherwise appropriate order as authorized by law. (Cf. People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187 [70 Cal.Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794].) While compulsion for an unjustified defiance is neither desirable nor possible, the authorized sanctions for wilful noncompliance should not thereby be impliedly restricted. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1218.) A contrary interpretation *312would significantly undermine the purpose and efficacy of a valid and sparingly employed Ballard order notwithstanding a clearly demonstrated showing of wilful noncompliance.
It is to be emphasized, however, that no such factual showing is demonstrated herein. To the contrary, it is difficult to understand what compelling circumstances indicated a “necessity” for the mandated examination. (See People v. Russel, supra, 69 Cal.2d 187, 193.) The underlying rationale supporting the psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in. a sex crime prosecution is to permit the jury to consider medical testimony bearing upon the accusing witness’ credibility in determining the truth of an otherwise uncorroborated charge. Ballard teaches that a trial court should exercise its discretion to grant an order of examination only where there is little or no corroboration supporting the charge and the defense properly raises the issue of the witness’ mental or emotional condition relevant to veracity. (Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 176-177.) The record herein is devoid of such requisite showing of necessity. Indeed, in light of the defendant’s voluntary confession fully corroborating the complaining witness’ account of the criminal abuse perpetrated upon her, granting of the order in the first instance constituted a palpable abuse of discretion; such an invalid order is neither enforceable by contempt nor can it serve as a basis for any other permissible sanction.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 12, 1979, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 8, 1979. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
At page 308 majority opinion.