dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion granting appellant a new trial. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
The court, sitting as the trier of fact, is presumed to be able to ignore inflammatory evidence or impermissible argu*254ment. Commonwealth v. Davis, 491 Pa. 363, 421 A.2d 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Glover, 266 Pa.Super. 531, 405 A.2d 945 (1979). The majority acknowledges the court’s detachment, yet in this case holds that the statements at issue were so prejudicial as to overcome that detachment.
Merely because prosecutorial statements are “highly emotional” does not mean they should be presumed to prejudice the court. I would require the appellant to show the prejudicial effect of inflammatory evidence or impermissible argument, evidenced by statements made by the court, before granting a new trial in cases such as the one at bar. Accordingly, since appellant has not shown such an effect, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.