(dissenting).
Let us first review the procedural background.
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging in his first cause of action that attorney Lee Tappe was negligent in rendering a title opinion for him in February 1981. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleged that Tappe negligently failed to correct defects in the title after promising that he would do so. The circuit court granted Tappe’s motion for summary judgment, which was made on the grounds that the malpractice action had been commenced in 1986 and *203was barred by the statute of limitations requiring such actions to be brought within three years of the alleged malpractice, SDCL 15-2-14.2.1 Plaintiff appeals. I would reverse and remand.
We must now review the facts.
After leasing three quarters of land from Raymond and Viola Sturgeon for several years, plaintiff exercised his option to purchase the land from them. In conjunction with the purchase, Tappe rendered a title opinion in February 1981. The opinion failed to mention a wildlife easement which existed on the property. There was evidence that plaintiff and the Sturgeons may have discussed the existence of wildlife easements. Plaintiff was acquainted with the nature of wildlife easements as some existed on his own property.
In March or April of 1981, when plaintiff picked up the abstracts in Tappe’s office, he noted a wildlife easement contained in the abstracts and asked Tappe about it. Although plaintiff claimed Tappe told him it was nothing to be concerned about and that, if plaintiff had a problem with it, Tappe would take care of it; Tappe has no recollection of this conversation.
In March 1981, plaintiff had the land ditched and drained. Although the Fish and Wildlife Service was not aware of the work plaintiff had done, they informed plaintiff, by letter, of the wildlife easement. Finally, in February 1983, plaintiff met with the United States Attorney and the Fish and Wildlife Service to discuss the problem of ditching and draining of the land contrary to the easement. Immediately after this meeting with the federal officials, plaintiff contacted another attorney who he “usually” consulted.
Tappe’s earliest recall, relative to a discussion with plaintiff on the absence of an easement from the title opinion, was November 1984, when plaintiff came into Tappe’s office again. Tappe made some contacts with South Dakota’s congressional delegation and the Fish and Wildlife Service, to include a trip from Platte to Lake Andes, South Dakota, but was not successful in resolving the problem.2 He also recalled advising plaintiff he might want to seek other counsel.
Plaintiff was able to avoid the Fish and Wildlife Service’s requests to return the land tq.its previous condition until the Fall of 1984. After plaintiff was unable to negotiate: with them about the easement, he had the drainage ditches filled and returned, the land to its previous state.
First: I shall discuss the statute of limitations as an occurrence rule.
Plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper because, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations did not begin to run: until he sustained some injury, which he claims did not occur until November 1984 when he finally reconverted his land to its original condition.3
In effect, plaintiff urges us to interpret South.-Dakota’s statute of limitations as embodying the “date of damage” rule to determine when the statute begins to run for attorney malpractice actions. Unfortunately, in South Dakota, neither the legisla*204ture nor this Court’s decisions apply this rule.
The general rule is that in the absence of an attorney’s fraudulent concealment of his negligent advice, the statute of limitations on a claim of attorney malpractice begins to run at the time of the alleged negligence and not from the time when the negligence is discovered or the consequential damages are imposed. See Annot. 18 A.L.R.3d 978, 986-87 (1968).
Hoffman v. Johnson, 374 N.W.2d 117, 122 (S.D.1985); see also Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984) (applying “act or omission” statute of limitation); see generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.4th 260 (1984); R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice §§ 389, 390, 393 (2d ed. 1981); D. Meisel-man, Attorney Malpractice: Law and Procedure, §§ 5:4, 5:6, 5:7 (1980) (discussing the injury, discovery, and occurrence rules). Although our Hoffman decision actually applied another statute of limitations which was in effect before the enactment of SDCL 15-2-14.2, the Court observed that the clearly expressed legislative intent of both SDCL 15-2-14.1 (medical malpractice) and SDCL 15-2-14.2 was to have the statute run from the date the alleged malpractice occurred. Hoffman, 374 N.W.2d at 122 (citing Holy Cross Parish v. Huether, 308 N.W.2d 575 (S.D.1981), and Alberts v. Giebink, 299 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980)). Under the “occurrence rule,” as expressed by South Dakota’s statute, a cause of action for negligently examining a title accrues at the time the attorney provides the client with the erroneous information, in effect, when the omission occurs. Meisel-man, supra § 5:12, at 90 n. 14. Thus, in this case, South Dakota’s “occurrence rule” statute of limitations would normally run from the time that Tappe rendered the erroneous title opinion, which was in February 1981, and the action would have been barred after February 1984.
I now address the continuing representation rule.
The running of our “occurrence rule” statute of limitations would normally be an easy matter to calculate from the date of an erroneous title opinion. Plaintiff, however, also presents us with the issue of whether the “continuing treatment doctrine” should be extended to prevent the statute of limitations from running in a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff argues that continuous representation occurred because of Tappe’s disputed comment to him in March or April 1981 stating that Tappe would take care of the easement. Tappe’s unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter through South Dakota’s congressional delegation in November 1984 could also be viewed by a jury as a continuing representation.
In applying the continuing treatment doctrine to medical professionals, we have held that a medical professional’s continuing treatment of a patient, which serves as the basis for a malpractice action, prevents a statute of limitation from running until the treatment ceases. Wells v. Billars, 391 N.W.2d 668 (S.D.1986); see also Alberts v. Giebink, 299 N.W.2d 454. Other courts, which have applied the continuous treatment doctrine to medical malpractice actions, have extended it to legal malpractice actions. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968); see generally Mallen, supra § 391. See also Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 155, 673 P.2d 795 (Ct.App.1983), approved as supplemented, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792 (1983) (applying the discovery rule); Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1986) (applying the discovery rule); McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651 (1973).
In the course of its recent development, the continuing representation doctrine has presented problems concerning the test to be applied in determining when an attorney’s continuous representation terminates in nonlitigation matters and, consequently, when the statute of limitations begins to run.
It has been suggested that the time of accrual coincides with the date that the attorney’s error becomes final and ir-remedial.... Thus, the inquiry is not whether there still exists an attorney-client relationship, but when the representation of the specific matter terminated.
*205Mallen, supra § 391, at 462-63 (footnotes omitted). In this case, the affidavits in support of the summary judgment raise a factual dispute over whether Tappe agreed to do something about the easement in 1981, which could have created the impression that something more was to be done and that he would proceed to accomplish it. Plaintiff states he noted the easement on the land and specifically questioned Tappe circa April 1981; and Tappe, he states, told him not to worry about same — that he, Tappe, would take care of it if it became a problem. No one disputes that when it became a problem, Tappe actively tried to take care of it but could not. See Wells, 391 N.W.2d at 671; see also Dura-Bilt Remodelers, Inc. v. Albanese, 86 Misc.2d 172, 382 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976). Although Tappe’s contact with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the congressional delegation in 1984 was more than three years after the earlier disputed contact with plaintiff, a jury might reasonably infer that Tappe was continuing to represent plaintiff through this period and was on call to do further work. A jury might infer from plaintiff s consultation with a second attorney that plaintiff himself terminated his relationship with Tappe. This Court will not draw such an inference, however, because in reviewing summary judgments, we are required to view all inferences most favorably for the nonmoving party, the plaintiff in this case.4 Viewing all the facts most favorably for plaintiff, they could reasonably be interpreted by a jury as a mutual expression by both parties that the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship continued to exist between them in March or April 1981 and through 1984, that Tappe was on call or doing further work to correct the defects, and that their relationship had not terminated. See Amfac, 673 P.2d 795; Wall, 393 N.W.2d 758; Brown v. Johnstone, 5 Ohio App.3d 165, 450 N.E.2d 693 (1982); McCormick, 198 S.E.2d 651; see also Basic Food Indus., Inc. v. Travis, Warren, Nayer & Burgoyne, 60 Mich.App. 492, 231 N.W.2d 466 (1975) (termination of attorney-client relationship in litigation matter). Some of the factors to be considered in this case to determine whether the attorney-client relationship continued or had terminated are: (1) whether plaintiff, as a reasonable layman, believed that Tappe was to do more work; .and (2) whether anything has occurred to destroy the essential trust and confidence between attorney and client. See Brown, 450 N.E.2d 693; Meiselman, supra § 1:3; J. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 Akron L.Rev. 209 (1986); cf. Noland v. Freeman, 344 N.W.2d 419 (Minn.1984) (medical malpractice). These factors were for the jury to apply in resolving the factual dispute about what occurred in 1981, or at any other time that the relationship may have terminated. See McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Hanskutt, 29 S.D. 535, 137 N.W. 286 (1912) (issue .of whether part payment of debt tolled statute of limitations was for jury to determine on special interrogatories); see also Noland, 344 N.W.2d 419; Mallen, supra §§ 123, 659. As Hanskutt suggests, 137 N.W. 286, special interrogatories to the jury may be necessary for a clear determination of the factual issues affecting the application of the statute of limitations and the continuing representation doctrine. See also SDCL 15-6-49.
Those instances of malpractice in which no remedial action can be taken by the doctor or lawyer to cure the alleged wrong present clearer cases of a “single act” of negligence, to which the continuous representation doctrine will not apply. Compare Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hosp. & Clinics, 411 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.App.1987) (explaining four elements of “single act” requirements in medical malpractice actions) with Collins v. Johnson, 374 N.W.2d 536 (Minn.App.1985) (medical malpractice). Although a negligently rendered title opinion may be a single act of negligence in some cases, the facts in this case, when viewed most favorably for plaintiff, raise a genuine issue over whether plaintiff *206reasonably believed that Tappe was continuing to represent him when he allegedly promised to correct the defects in the title. The factual disputes in this case affect whether the continuing representation doctrine should apply and thus toll the statute of limitations.
The trial court’s summary judgment for Tappe on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-14.2, should be reversed. I would remand for a jury determination of the disputed factual issues and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
.SDCL 15-2-14.2 provides:
An action against a licensed attorney, his agent or employee, for malpractice, error, mistake or omission, whether based upon contract or tort, can be commenced only within three years after the alleged malpractice, error, mistake or omission shall have occurred. This section shall be prospective in application.
Although the trial court’s memorandum opinion also makes a very brief mention of the wildlife easement as "a matter of public record,” which plaintiff had knowledge of, the sole basis for the motion for summary judgment was the statute of limitations: therefore, I consider the statute of limitations issue as the only question clearly presented to and decided by the trial court.
. Plaintiff had to secure an FmHA loan. Tappe knew that plaintiff had to rely upon his opinion to obtain the loan; plaintiff needed a merchantability'- opinion. Plaintiff secured the loan. Tappe’s title opinion did not reflect a waterfowl easement even though the abstract contained such an easement.
. I cannot express an opinion on the question of Tappe’s examination of the title as being negligent.- See SDCL ch. 43-30 app., Standard 1.1 (attitude of attorney examining title). This Court is deciding only the peripheral question of whether an action for his alleged negligence may be barred by the statute of limitations.
. Recently, I decried the excessive use of summary judgments by trial courts in this state. Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d 608, 611 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., specially concurring); Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 243 (S.D.1984).