(concurring). The majority's rationale rejecting the guardian ad litem's equal protection argument addresses whether "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in conserving the limited funds it has available to provide for all needy children." Majority op. at 715. That, however, is not the issue in this case. The issue, I think, is whether the different status of children on AFDC constitutionally allows courts to treat them differently from children not on AFDC when considering whether trusts may be ordered on their behalf. Unfortunately, on this issue, the parties have offered little authority.
The guardian ad litem argues that the State's position would produce a "prohibition on the use of a trust *717when AFDC is received." In its brief to this court, however, the State maintains that it "has not argued that an AFDC recipient can never have a child support trust." Indeed, the State argues that it often "will advocate for a trust. . . when the noncustodial parent has been proven unreliable in making timely and consistent child support payments and there are sufficient resources available to establish a trust."
If, as I think the State's argument may implicitly concede, sec. 49.19(4)(h)1.b, Stats., effectively prohibited courts from ordering trusts for children on AFDC, it might very well violate equal protection. If, however, children on AFDC remain eligible for court-ordered trusts, and if any difference in their eligibility for trusts results from a reasonable classification, see State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130-31, 447 N.W.2d 654, 660-61 (1989), then, as the majority explains, sec. 49.19(4)(h)1.b would comport with equal protection. These possibilities, however, are just that — possibilities, unknown and undeveloped on the record before us. Without resolving the potential equal protection issue, however, I do agree that the trial court order violated the statutory requirement that the child support arrearages be assigned to the State. Accordingly, I concur.