I concur in the issuance of the writ on the narrow ground that the evidence does not support a finding that petitioner wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Stanislaus Superior Court. On October 17, 1984, that court explicitly told the parties that if the Solano County Juvenile Court found it had jurisdiction the orders of the Stanislaus court “would be superseded.” Since the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction, there is no basis for the Stanislaus contempt finding insofar as the orders from the two courts conflict.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that the Solano County Juvenile Court properly exercised its Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 jurisdiction under the particular facts of this case. To me, the record indicates that petitioner engaged in blatant forum shopping for the sole purpose of avoiding what he anticipated would be adverse rulings by the Stanislaus court on the various custody and visitation motions then pending in that court. Petitioner’s complaint to the Solano County Child Protective Services which triggered the juvenile court petition stemmed from claims of threats made by the mother, resurrecting alleged acts of sexual child abuse and burning which had occurred months and years before. These alleged acts had already been thoroughly investigated by the Stanislaus County Child Protective Services, and the results of its investigation (recommendation that no action be taken) had been communicated to the Solano County Child Protective Services. It was not until August of 1984, after petitioner’s motion for change of venue based on “convenience of witness and ends of justice” had been denied by the Stanislaus court, that Solano County Child Protective Services chose to take any action. As aptly noted by the Stanislaus court, the Solano County proceeding was “strictly an end run play designed to defeat [the Stanislaus court] of jurisdiction in a matter in which it was appropriately exercising its jurisdiction . . . .”
Welfare and Institutions Code section 304.5 provides in pertinent part: “The fact that a minor is a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 300 shall not divest a superior court, pursuant to Section 4600 of the Civil Code, from hearing proceedings between two parents regarding the custody of a minor who is within the jurisdiction of the superior court. *805...” This statute gives concurrent jurisdiction to the juvenile and superior courts when the custody of a minor is in dispute. It also suggests to me the applicability of the traditional rules of comity to the end that where a custody (or visitation) dispute between parents is pending in the superior court at the time a dependency petition is filed in the juvenile court, the latter court should defer to the superior court’s handling of these matters unless some compelling reason is shown as to why the superior court cannot protect the safety and best interests of the minor. No such showing was made in the present case.
As the majority acknowledges, this custody war has been going on since 1979. The August 1984 dispute over what the mother allegedly said to the child during a weekend visit was but another battle in the war. The Stanislaus court’s various orders concerning custody and visitation reflect a continuing sensitivity to the minor’s welfare. Petitioner’s alleged concern about the safety of the minor following the early August 1984 visit with the mother and grandmother could easily have been presented to the Stanislaus court pursuant to the pending motions with a suspension of further visitation until the court decided the issue. Thus, there was no urgency or other compelling reason for the juvenile court to exercise its jurisdiction. It should not have done so.