(dissenting). Defendant attorney appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals (9 Mich App 342), which affirmed the order of the trial court holding defendant in contempt for failing and refusing to prepare and file an appeal in the matter of People v. Sandefur.1
Ernest Sandefur entered a plea of guilty to an open charge of homicide. The trial court, after holding a hearing to determine the degree of guilt, *85found Sandefur guilty of second-degree murder' and sentenced him on October 9, 1962, to a term of 20 to 40 years. On May 24, 1965, Sandefur filed a written request, and the required affidavit of indi-gency for appointment of counsel to appeal his conviction.
The circuit court of Allegan county appointed defendant, on May 27, 1965, to act as appellate counsel for Sandefur.
On September 24, 1965, defendant filed a report in the Allegan circuit court stating:
“Some time ago you appointed me to represent Ernest Sandefur, who is now serving a sentence in Jackson Prison for the murder of a son, G-aylon Sandefur.
“I have obtained his file from Mr. Nahan, who represented Mr. Sandefur during the proceedings had in the circuit court for the county of Allegan, and I have reviewed the transcript and the record on proceedings in the court file.
“It is my conclusion that Ernest Sandefur, after being properly advised of all his constitutional rights, voluntarily, without duress of any kind, entered a plea of guilty. That he made a voluntary confession to the officers attached to the sheriff’s office, that he voluntarily took the stand and testified, and that the degree of crime was properly determined by the circuit court and that his sentence was proper. I can find no reason or ground to file a motion for new trial or to take an appeal in this ease.
“There is no question but that Ernest Sandefur, while sane, not in self defense, without that provocation sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter, deliberately and intentionally, in accordance with a determination to kill his son, shot his son several times and caused his death.
“Even if there were some legal technicality, which might conceivably result in this man securing a new *86trial, I would not feel obligated or bound to pursue it' under the circumstances.
“I am- fully aware of the constitutional protection that is afforded persons accused of crime, as set forth in section 20, article 1 of our Constitution of 1963, which, among other rights, affords to him; Ian appeal as a matter of right[;] and in courts of record [,] when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to execute [perfect, sic] and prosecute an appeal’. I do not interpret this provision of the Constitution as meaning that every attorney appointed by the court shall be required to file an appeal where there is no error in the proceedings, either as to fact or law, and an appeal could not possibly benefit the accused.
“Being mindful of my oath taken when I was admitted to the bar * * * and having in mind the canons of professional ethics as spelled out by the American Bar Association and by our State Bar Association, I have concluded that it would be improper and unethical for me to advance a defense that, in my opinion, would be useless and hot of any benefit to my client and contrary to my professional opinion and personal convictions.
“I am therefore, stating as a matter of record, that 1 cannot and will not file a motion for a new trial or an appeal for Ernest Sandefur.” (Emphasis added.)
On December 3,1965, the circuit judge, on his own motion, ordered defendant to appear in the-circuit court to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court and punished for refusing to file a motion for a new trial and to take an appeal for and on behalf of Ernest Sandefur.
■ After a full hearing in the matter the circuit court, in its opinion, stated that the citation of authorities from other jurisdictions and from the canon of ethics “simply ,does not solve the practical problem *87of implementing the Michigan constitutional grant of an appeal of right.” (Emphasis added.) The circuit court concluded in its order that such refusal to prepare and file an appeal “as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Michigan 1963, particularly article 1, § 20, and GfCíí 1963, 785, constitutes a violation of a valid order of this court, and that a refusal to proceed as directed constitutes contempt of this court.” A civil fine of $25 with a 20-day stay of performance was imposed by the circuit court.
Defendant filed his appeal as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals. The opinion of the Court of Appeals quoted at length from Anders v. California (1967), 386 US 738 (87 S Ct 1396, 18 L Ed 2d 493),2 and tacitly adopted the “single inflexible answer” contained in Anders to the difficult problem of how to afford equal protection to .indigent appellants. While recognizing that the Anders rule postdated defendant’s cause of action, the Court of Appeals concluded that the language and logic of Anders was binding upon the defendant, and affirmed the circuit court.
Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by order dated April 16, 1968. 380 Mich 766.
On appeal defendant contends that (1) Const 1963, art 1, § 20, does not apply to criminal prosecutions concluded prior to the effective date of the Constitution; (2) the order of the circuit court appointing defendant as counsel for Sandefur did not, by its terms, order the defendant to file a delayed motion for new trial and, upon denial thereof, a delayed appeal; (3) the circuit court for the county of Allegan did not have the authority and power to compel a court-appointed attorney to violate his oath of office, the canon of ethics or case *88law defining Ms duties to Ms client, the court and the public, and if so construed the order would constitute an unlawful order; (4) the defendant did act in good faith and, in fact, was not contemptuous; (5) it was impossible to file an application for delayed new trial and a delayed appeal, within the framework of the law.3
Defendant’s contentions wholly miss the point and the decisions of both courts below reach the proper conclusion but for the wrong reasons.
The primary issue is twofold: (1) Did the circuit court issue a lawful and valid order? (2) Did defendant’s noncompliance with a valid order of the circuit court constitute contempt?
The secondary issue focuses upon the extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute an application for leave to appeal from a criminal conviction after that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal. Ancillary to this secondary issue is the question of whether appellate counsel, appointed to prosecute an application for leave to appeal, is held to the same standards as appellate counsel appointed to perfect an appeal as of right as required in Anclers.
*89Prior to the consideration of these issues, we must distinguish the basis of Ernest Sandefur’s claim of appeal and defendant Hoffman’s claims and objections to this appeal.
Ernest Sandefur’s claim of appeal was in the nature of an application for leave to appeal. Sandefur was convicted on October 9, 1962. At that time there was no appeal as a matter of right in criminal cases in Michigan, the date of conviction being prior to the effective date of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. The request for appointment of appellate counsel and the appointment of defendant Hoffman occurred in May of 1965. The circuit court, finding defendant Hoffman in contempt, apparently thought that Sandefur’s claim of appeal was “of right.” In its opinion the circuit court stated:
“An appeal as of right requires an appellate court to pass final judgment. Neither the judgment of the trial court or a member of the bar is a proper substitute for appellate review. * * *
“Since the 1963 Michigan Constitution changed the law from ‘leave to appeal’ to ‘an appeal as of right’ there seems no other recourse but to amend the Constitution.”
In this respect the circuit court was in error. Absent some provision in the 1963 Constitution making the appeal as of right provision retrospective, Sandefur’s appeal was discretionary in nature. This nonretrospective aspect of article 1, § 20, on “appeal as of right” comports with the intent of the drafters of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. 1 Constitutional Convention 1961, Official Record, pp 562-568.4
*90For the circuit court to make a proper appointment of appellate counsel, it had to proceed under the provisions of Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which reads in part:
“and in courts of record, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal.”
It is to be noted that this language is in substance identical with the Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 2, § 19.
Further, the trial court was required under the then existing Michigan General Court Rules to appoint appellate counsel. GCR 1963, 785.4(2)5 read in part as follows:
“Delayed Appeal. * * * Upon defendant’s request, if defendant is indigent, the trial court in which defendant was convicted shall appoint counsel for him and shall furnish such portions of the trial transcript counsel so appointed requires to prepare delayed motions for postconviction proceedings in the trial court and to prepare an application for leave to take delayed appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
*91This subrule is to be distinguished from GCR 1963, 785.4(1), which required the appointment of counsel to perfect an appeal where the defendant “is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to appellate review of his conviction.”6 In People v. Mallory (1967), 378 Mich 538, 568, Justice Souris drew this distinction between the subrules as follows:
“While 785.4(1) applies prospectively, in the sense that it specifies procedures to be followed at sentencing in current criminal cases where timely appeal as of right exists, 785.4(2) applies retrospectively, in the sense that it specifies the procedures for furnishing appellate counsel and free trial transcript to indigents in all other criminal cases completed through sentencing before August 1, 1964, the effective date of 785.4(1).” (Emphasis added.)
We conclude that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to appoint appellate counsel to prosecute leave to appeal under the then existing subrule of this Court.7 The trial judge proceeded properly, even .though under a misapprehension as to his duty and authority.
The Court of Appeals, after quoting at length from Anders, found that defendant did not ash the court to withdraw from representing Sandefur, but told the court he would not file a motion for new trial or an appeal for Sandefur. Tacitly relying upon Anders, it held that this direct refusal to comply with a court order constituted contempt.
*92In Anders, the United States Supreme Court restricted its consideration to the effectiveness of counsel on a first appeal. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, framed the specific issue (p 739):
“We are here concerned with the extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
Further, the facts involved in Anders indicate that the United States Supreme Court considered this issue solely in the light of California’s constitutional grant of “a right of appeal.”
A careful analysis of the majority opinion in Anders reveals that it was predicated upon the decisions in Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 US 12 (76 S Ct 585, 100 L Ed 891), and Douglas v. California (1963), 372 US 353 (83 S Ct 814, 9 L Ed 2d 811). In both Griffin and Douglas the United States Supreme Court was concerned solely with an appeal as of right. In fact, the Douglas opinion specifically delineated its decision. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated (pp 356, 357):
“We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of light to rich and poor alike (Cal Penal Code, §§ 1235,1237), from a criminal conviction. We need not now decide whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the California supreme court after the district court of appeal had sustained *93his conviction (see Cal Const, art 6, § 4c; Cal Rules on Appeal, Rules 28, 29), or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies within the Court’s discretion. But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an ‘invidious discrimination.’ Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma (1955), 348 US 483, 489 (75 S Ct 461, 99 L Ed 563); Griffin v. Illinois, supra, p 18. Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them. See Tigner v. Texas (1940), 310 US 141 (60 S Ct 879, 84 L Ed 1124) ; Goesaert v. Cleary (1948), 335 US 464 (69 S Ct 198, 93 L Ed 163). But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”
Defendant Hoffman’s contention in this appeal is that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals — in ruling defendant guilty of contempt of court— treated the facts and law as though defendant had refused to take “a timely appeal as a matter of right.” While defendant is correct in his observation, see this opinion supra, he is still guilty of contempt for refusing to comply with a lawful order. The basis of this conclusion involves the secondary issue framed above and results from the following analysis.
The circuit judge, under either Const 1908, art 2, § 19, or Const 1963, art 1, § 20, was empowered to appoint appellate counsel to provide “such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal.” Further, it was incumbent upon, the circuit judge under GCR 1963, 785.4(2), *94discussed above, to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. While the order appointing defendant Hoffman did not cite either of the above authorities, the order of the circuit judge was, in final analysis, a valid and lawful order. Given the validity and the lawfulness of the order appointing him as appellate counsel, defendant Hoffman had three alternative courses of action:-
First. Defendant Hoffman could have attacked the order as being invalid on its face. This would have directly put in issue the propriety of the order and the circuit judge’s authority upon which it was based.
Second. Defendant Hoffman could have categorically refused to accept the appointment immediately upon its issuance. This, of course, would have raised the issue of contempt between the trial judge and defendant Hoffman without involving the merit of Sandefur’s appeal.
Third. Defendant Hoffman could have accepted the appointment and either proceeded to perfect an appeal for Sandefur or declined to proceed with the appeal. It is this course of action which defendant Hoffman' did in fact choose.
Thus we are presented with the problem of determining whether, once having accepted the appointment as appellate counsel, defendant’s actions met the constitutional requirement of “effectiveness of counsel.” Put in more general terms, we must determine whether appellate counsel appointed to prosecute an application for leave to appeal is held to the same standard as the appellate counsel appointed to prosecute an appeal as of right, as in Anders.
A review of the United States Supreme Court decisions, especially those cited as authority in Anders, compels us to the inexorable conclusion that *95appointed appellate counsel must be held to the same standard of “effectiveness,” irrespective of the nature of the appeal.
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Ellis v. United States, 356 US 674 (78 S Ct 974; 2 L Ed 2d 1060), laid down guidelines. Concerned with operation of the Federal rules of criminal procedure as it affected an indigent’s application for leave to appeal and an appointed attorney’s role in such an appeal, the Court reasoned as follows (p 675):
“Normally, allowance of an appeal should not be denied until an indigent has had adequate representation by counsel. Johnson v. United States (1957), 352 US 565 (77 S Ct 550, 1 L Ed 2d 593). In this case, it appears that the two attorneys appointed by the court of appeals, performed essentially the role of amici curiae. But representation in the role of an advocate is required. If counsel is convinced, after conscientious investigation, that the appeal is frivolous, of course, he may ash to withdraw on that account. If the court is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated the possible grounds of appeal, and agrees with counsel’s evaluation of the case, then leave to withdraw may be allowed and leave to appeal may be denied.” (Emphasis added.)
The plain words and meaning of this opinion clearly indicate that the Supreme Court intended to restrict counsel’s request to withdraw and in addition thereto require concurrence by the appointing court in counsel’s approach and “evaluation” of the case.
However, we must recognize that where the constitutional rights of equal protection and due process are involved the Supreme Court has gone as far as striking down a trial judge’s independent determination of the merits of an appeal. In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board (1958), 357 US 214 (78 S Ct 1061, 2 L Ed 2d 1269), the Court, dealing with *96the denial of a transcript by a State judge, stated (p 216):
“The conclusion of the trial judge that there was no reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of a transcript.”
In view of the decision in Eskridge, it was logically consistent for the Supreme Court to likewise protect these rights from the unreviewable and independent determination of a nonjudicial officer. In Lane v. Brown (1963), 372 US 477 (83 S Ct 768, 9 L Ed 2d 892), the Court, reviewing the denial of a writ of error coram nobis and the Indiana public defender’s determination of “no merit,” reached this conclusion (p 485):
“In Eskridge the Court held constitutionally invalid a provision which permitted a trial judge to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal. The provision before us confers upon a State officer outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope of any appeal at all. • Such a procedure, based on indigency alone, does not meet constitutional standards.”
Appellants have attempted to distinguish these and other cases on the basis of “appeal of right” vis á vis “leave to appeal.” See, e.g., Burns v. Ohio (1959), 360 US 252 (79 S Ct 1164, 3 L Ed 2d 1209). No logical distinction can be made on this basis in the area presently under consideration. Clearly, the Court in Lane v. Brown, supra, refuted any such distinction (pp 483-485):
“In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12, the Court held that a State with an appellate system which made available trial transcripts to those who could afford them was constitutionally required to provide ‘means *97of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.’ Id., at 20. ‘Destitute defendants,’ the Court held, ‘must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.’ Id., at 19. In Burns v. Ohio, 360 US 252, involving a $20 fee for filing a motion for leave to appeal a felony conviction to the supreme court of Ohio, this Court reaffirmed the Griffin doctrine, saying that ‘once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to- any phase of that procedure because of their poverty. * * * This principle is no less applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.’ Id., at 257. In Smith v. Bennett (1961), 365 US 708 (81 S Ct 895, 6 L Ed 2d 39), the Court made clear that these principles were not to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extended alike to State postconviction proceedings. ‘Respecting the State’s grant of a right to test their detention,’ the Court said, ‘the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each.’ Id., at 714. In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 US 214, the Court held invalid a provision of Washington’s criminal appellate system which conferred upon the trial judge the power to withhold a trial transcript from an indigent upon the finding that ‘justice would not be promoted * * * in that defendant has been accorded a fair and impartial trial, and in the Court’s opinion no grave or prejudicial errors occurred therein.’ Id., at 215. There it was said that ‘the conclusion of the trial judge that there was no reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of a transcript.’ Id., at 216.
*98“The present ease falls clearly within the area staked out by the Court’s decisions in Griffin, Burns, Smith, and Eskridge. To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, but Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle also applies to State collateral proceedings, and Burns leaves no doubt that the principle applies even though the State has already provided one review on the merits.
“In Eskridge the Court held constitutionally invalid a provision which permitted a trial judge to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal. The provision before us confers upon a State office]' outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope of any appeal at all. Such a procedure, based on indigency alone, does not meet constitutional standards.”
The underlying theory of these cases, and one which should prove valuable as a guide to future decisions in this area, was well stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Douglas v. California, supra, at page 366:
“The Court distinguishes our review from the present case on the grounds that the California rule relates to ‘the first appeal, granted as a matter of right.’ Ante, p 356. But I fail to see the significance of this difference. Surely, it cannot be contended that the requirements of fair procedure are exhausted once an indigent has been given one appellate review. Cf. Lane v. Brown, post, p 477. Nor can it well be suggested that having appointed counsel is more necessary to the fair administration of justice in an initial appeal taken as a matter of right, which the reviewing court on the full record has already determined to be frivolous, than in a petition asking a higher appellate court to exercise its discretion to consider what may be a substantial constitutional claim.” *99We agree with Mr. Justice Harlan that, as a matter of judicial policy, there is no significance in the distinction between appeal as of right and leave to appeal as far as effectiveness of counsel is concerned.8
Having reached the above conclusions and being cognizant of pervasive judicial policy, we must recognize that the guidelines set out in Anders, supra, are controlling. The majority opinion establishes a uniform answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal protection of the laws to indigent appellants. The Supreme Court, in Anders, stated (pp 744, 745):
“The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity. Counsel should, and can with honor and without conflict, be of more assistance to his client and to the court. His role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed *100him to raise any points that he chooses; the court— not counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as Federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if State law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.
“This requirement would not force appointed counsel to brief his case against his client but would merely afford the latter that advocacy which a non-indigent defendant is able to obtain. It would also induce the court to pursue all the more vigorously its own review because of the ready references not only to the record, but also to the legal authorities as furnished it by counsel. The no-merit letter, on the other hand, affords neither the client nor the court any aid. The former must shift entirely for himself while the court has only the cold record which it must review without the help of an advocate. Moreover, such handling would tend to protect counsel from the constantly increasing charge that he was ineffective and had not handled the case with that diligence to which an indigent defendant is entitled. This procedure will assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal — as nearly as is practicable — as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel.”
We are not without a pragmatic guide implementing the decision in Anders: our sister States, similarly faced with this decision of the United States Supreme Court, have responded positively. See State v. Franklin (1967), 78 NM 127 (428 P2d 982); People v. Turner (1967), 252 Cal App 2d 536 (60 Cal Rptr 567); People v. Chung (1967), 252 Cal App *1012d 436 (61 Cal Rptr 308); People v. Jones (1967), 38 Ill 2d 384 (231 NE2d 390); Commonwealth v. Baker (1968), 429 Pa 209 (239 A2d 201); People v. Carter (1968), 92 Ill App 2d 120 (235 NE2d 382). See, also, Smith v. United States (CA 8, 1967), 384 F2d 649.
We could adopt the method employed by the Florida first district court of appeal in Smith v. State (Fla, 1968), 208 So 2d 462 — divesting the trial courts of the jurisdiction to enter an order permitting withdrawal of appointed appellate counsel — but this appears to be a circuitous and problematic approach to a proper implementation of Anders. The simplest solution to the problem of establishing a guide of conduct for the bar and bench is to follow the language of Anders. This approach was well presented by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Feggans (1967), 67 Cal 2d 444 (62 Cal Rptr 419, 432 P2d 21), where it was held (pp 447, 448):
“Under Anders, regardless of how frivolous an appeal may appear and regardless of how convinced appointed counsel as an advocate may be that there is nothing to advocate, a no-merit letter will not suffice. Counsel must prepare a brief to assist the court in understanding the facts and the legal issues in the case. The brief must set forth a statement of the facts with citations to the transcript, discuss the legal issues with citations of appropriate authority, and argue all issues that are arguable. Moreover, counsel serves both the court and his client by advocating changes in the law if argument can be made supporting change. If counsel concludes that there are no arguable issues and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his brief to a statement of the facts and applicable law and may ask to withdraw from the case, but he must not argme the case against his client. Counsel is not allowed to withdraw from the case until the court is satisfied that *102he has discharged his duty to the court and his client to set forth adequately the facts and issues involved. If counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant must be given an opportunity to present a brief, and thereafter the court must decide for itself whether the appeal is frivolous. (Anders v. California [1967], 386 US 738, 741, 742 [87 S Ct 1396, 18 L Ed 2d 493] ; Ellis v. United States [1958], 356 US 674, 675 [78 S Ct 974, 2 L Ed 2d 1060, 1061].) If any contention raised is reasonably arguable, no matter how the court feels it will probably be resolved, the court must appoint another counsel to argue the appeal.”
See, also, appendix to the decision in Suggs v. United, States (CA DC 1968), 129 US App DC 133 (391 F2d 971).
Returning to the instant case, defendant Hoffman admitted on oral argument that the order of appointment was valid and lawful, that he never filed a brief giving the facts and applicable law, and that he never requested to be relieved from the order of appointment — all of which are required by the majority opinion in Anders.
Further, we note that defendant Hoffman did not meet even the minimum standards established by Anders. The minority opinion in Anders states (pp 745, 746):
“The system used by California for handling indigent appeals was described by the California Supreme Court in In re Nash, 61 Cal 2d 491, 495 (393 P2d 405, 408):
“ ‘We believe that the requirement of the Douglas Case [372 US 353] is met * * * when, as in this case, counsel is appointed to represent the defendant on appeal, thoroughly studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial counsel, and conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious grounds of appeal. If thereafter the appellate court is satisfied from its own review of the record in *103the light of any points raised by the defendant personally that counsel’s assessment of the record is correct, it need not appoint another counsel to represent the defendant on appeal and may properly decide the appeal without oral argument.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
One of the elements recited in the minority opinion is that appointed counsel “consults with the defendant and trial counsel.” Defendant Hoffman admitted on oral argument that he never requested to he relieved from the order of appointment and that he never consulted with Sandefur. Also,- he never asserted the fact that he consulted with trial counsel. In these respects we conclude that he could not have acted as an effective appellate counsel, even under the dissenting opinion in Anders.
To summarize, we hold that the order of the circuit court appointing defendant Hoffman was valid and lawful, pursuant to either Const 1908, art 2, § 19, or Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and GCR 1963, 785.4(2). Defendant Hoffman’s refusal to obey this lawful order and his constitutionally impermissive attempts to avoid its effect properly subjects him to the disciplinary proceeding of contempt.
If defendant Hoffman had so desired, the courts below and this Court would have permitted him to purge himself of his contempt. But he has tenaciously persisted in attempting to vindicate his personal views. While we commend his tenacity, we cannot condone his course of action. We suggest defendant reflect upon the wise and venerable words of Chief Justice Cooley in 1 Constitutional Limitations (8th ed, 1927), p 700:
“With us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defense by counsel. And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law has provided that, if *104the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the court may designate some one to defend him who shall be paid by the government; but when no such provision is made, it is a duty which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not to withhold his assistance nor spare his best exertions, in the defense of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline such an appointment, and few, it is to be hoped, would be disposed to do so.” (Emphasis added.)
We should affirm the decisions of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals finding defendant Hoffman in contempt.
Adams, J., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, J. T. G. Kavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.Tlie trial court denied a subsequent motion in propria persona for a new trial, but did appoint another attorney for postconvietion proceedings. The Court of Appeals by order dated March 8, 1966, denied the application for delayed appeal “for the reason that a meritorious basis for appeal is not established.” The Supreme Court by order dated September 6, 1967, denied Sandefur’s application in propria persona for leave to appeal. See 379 Mich 776.
Hereinafter referred to as Anders.
Defendant’s brief in the Court of Appeals concisely phrased these contentions in the single issue of whether a court-appointed attorney, appointed under C-C.R 1963, 785.4(2) is guilty of contempt for refusal to file an application for delayed appeal where, in that attorney’s professional opinion, there was no merit in such proceedings. The trial court, considering the matter as a disciplinary proceeding, viewed the legal question in the context of the right of an attorney “lo resist court appointment to assist indigent respondents charged with crime.” The Court of Appeals considered the legal question presented in the aspect of whether an attorney’s constitutional duty to provide “such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal” for an indigent defendant compels him to compromise his oath of office and canons of professional ethics in filing an automatic appeal regardless of whether or not there is merit in the appeal. 9 Mich App 342, 344. (Emphasis added.)
Of particular interest are the statements of Delegate Norris dealing -with the appointment of counsel (p 563) :
“All I can say to that, Mr. King, is that there are certain Supreme Court decisions, United States Supreme Court decisions, *90particularly Griffin v. Illinois, with regard to the extent of the participation of the State in giving effect to the right in the Federal Constitution to assistance of counsel, and insofar as that particular right would be applicable, then it would have some effect on what you are now questioning. I don’t think, however, there has been any State court decision which has gone farther than what the Federal eourt has provided. So, no matter what we say here, it wouldn’t go beyond what the United States Supreme Court now requires.”
The above statement is buttressed by the proposition as stated by the Court in Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 US 12, 18 (76 S Ct 585, 100 L Ed 891), that:
. “It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. See, e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 US 684, 687, 688 (14 S Ct 913, 38 L Ed 867).”
See, also, the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Douglas v. California (1963), 372 US 353, 365 (83 S Ct 814, 9 L Ed 2d 811).
Effective August 1, 1964 (see 373 Mich xvii); amended effective May 2, 1967 (see 379 Mich xxviii); repealed effective June 8, 1967 (see 379 Mich xxx).
Effective August 1, 1964; amended effective May 2, 1967; repealed effective June 8, 1967. Although this Oourt Rule was rescinded by order of this Court dated June 8, 1967, we are required —in the light of Douglas v. California (1963), 372 US 353 (83 S Ct 814, 9 L Ed 2d 811), and more recently in Anders v. California (1967), 386 US 738 (87 S Ct 1396, 18 L Ed 2d 493) — to make this rule prospeetively applicable in appeals which proceed as of right pursuant to Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
See People v. Mallory (1967), 378 Mich 538, 569.
While it may be persuasively argued that the constitutional principles of equality and due process which the Supreme Court relied on in Douglas, Lane, Draper [Draper v. Washington (1963), 372 US 487 (83 S Ct 774, 9 L Ed 2d 899)], Burns, and Bilis, are universally applicable ii-respective of the nature of the appeal, we need not now decide the thorny problem of whether this State must, as a matter of Federal constitutional requirement, appoint appellate counsel to assist an indigent in pursuing discretionary review of his criminal conviction absent a coxxtrolling court rule. See People v. Mallory, supra, pp 566, 567. See, also, State v. Herzig (Fla, 1968), 208 So 2d 619.