(dissenting):
I would affirm the conviction.
This case does not turn on the defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial; it involves his statutory rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
The negligence or mistake of the Maryland official involved was the determinative factor in the inability of the defendant to invoke successfully the provisions of the Agreement. In my opinion, the right of the State of Delaware to try and to punish an offender against its laws is not foreclosed under the Agreement by the failure of an official of another party state to perform properly the latter’s duties and functions thereunder.
The controlling mistake in this case was committed by the official at the Maryland House of Corrections. On May 4, 1970, he responded to the defendant’s request for final disposition of the Delaware charges under the Agreement by erroneously replying: “The State of Delaware is not a par*515ty to the Agreement on Detainers.1 You will have to write to the Prosecuting Attorney, Court House, Wilmington, Del. and request a speedy trial.”
Instead of such mistaken response and advice, the Compact required the Maryland correctional authorities: (1) to attach to the defendant’s request for final disposition of the Delaware charges pending against him a certificate “stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole, eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner”; and (2) to transmit directly to the “appropriate prosecuting official and court” in Delaware the prisoner’s request, the above certificate, and an “offer of temporary custody”. 11 Del.C. § 2542(a) and (b) and § 2544(a). The failure of the Maryland official to fulfill his statutory duties in these respects commenced the chain of events and the confusion of which the defendant now complains.
Instead of the clearly defined and readily identifiable documents utilized by party states under the Agreement, which should have been received in good official order from the Maryland authorities, Delaware officials received directly from the defendant an assortment of communications in various forms:
(1)A letter to the Attorney General, dated July 2, 1970, in which the defendant stated that he had been informed by Maryland authorities both that the Delaware de-tainer against him had been “dropped” and also that it was still in effect; and the defendant requested the Attorney General “to clear up this situation once and for all”, stating that if there was a detainer, he wished “to answer it immediately”.
(2) A handwritten letter to the “Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Wilmington, Del.”,2 dated August 4, 1970, petitioning that the State of Delaware “bring forth the body of the defendant to comply with the Interstate Detainer Act”.
(3) A handwritten petition to the “Honorable Chief Justice (of the Circuit Court),2 Court House, Wilmington, Delaware” entitled “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus” in which speedy trial on the Delaware charges was requested.
Insofar as these communications related to the defendant’s rights under the Agreement, all were misdirected; all should have been addressed to the Maryland authorities. None was the identifiable and complete communication that Delaware authorities were entitled to receive from the defendant via the Maryland Correctional authorities under the Agreement. None constituted the notice and request for final disposition of the Delaware charges, complete with “Certificate of Inmate Status” 3 and “Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody” from the Maryland Correctional authorities, as is required by the Agreement. Moreover, no confirmatory communication was received directly from the Maryland authorities as the Delaware authorities were entitled to expect under the Agreement.4
Under these circumstances, Delaware had no responsibility as a party state under the Agreement either to recognize the mis*516cellaneous communications received from the defendant as official communications under the Agreement, or to attempt to perfect the defendant’s abortive attempts at compliance without the aid of the State having custody of him. Prosecutors and judges constantly receive communications from prisoners in all manner of completeness and correctness, requesting all manner of relief, proper and otherwise. The Agreement does not require a party state, in my opinion, to screen all such communications to assure compliance with the terms of the Agreement by another party state. Unless and until the state having custody has complied substantially with the terms of the Agreement on its part to be performed, the prisoner’s recourse to speedy trial is limited, in my view, to his usual constitutional rights. His standing to invoke his statutory rights under the Agreement must be based upon substantial performance under the Agreement by the state having custody of him. For the requirement of at least substantial compliance with similar statutory provisions, see Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107, 402 P.2d 789 (1965); King v. State, 5 Md.App. 652, 249 A.2d 468 (1969).
Accordingly, it is my conclusion that no complete and official request for final disposition of the Delaware charges was ever received from, or on behalf of, this defendant; that, therefore, the 180 day period of limitations never began to run against the prosecution here involved. Necessarily implicit in the Agreement, I think, is the rule of practicality that the 180 day limitation period does not commence to run until substantially complete and accurate documents have been received by one party state from the other.
This prosecution was commenced within 120 days after the defendant’s arrival in Delaware pursuant to the action initiated by this State under 11 Del.C. § 2543. Accordingly, the trial was timely thereunder.
I would hold, therefore, that the Superi- or Court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
. This, of course, was the basic mistake. Delaware had become a party to the Interstate Agreement in July 1969. Obviously, the news had not reached the Maryland official.
. There are no judicial officers in Delaware having such titles.
. The statutory Certificate of Inmate Status may be important to the prosecuting party state in deciding whether the prosecution should be pressed or dropped.
.“The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner * * 11 Del.C. § 2542(a).
“[T]he Commissioner of Corrections or other official having custody * * * shall promptly forward [the request] to-*516getlier with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court * * *.” See § 2542(b).
“The Commissioner of Corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the State to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, request, and the certificate.” See § 2542(d).
“If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in section 2542 of this agreement.” See § 2544(a).