concurring and dissenting, in which ADKINS, J., joins.
I agree that a “harmless error analysis is inapplicable to [the] violation of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3) [that occurred in the case at bar].” In my opinion, when no defense counsel has ever entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant, (1) the trial court should not hold a post-sentence evidentiary hearing to determine whether that defendant had actual knowledge of the information that should have been provided pursuant to the rule, and (2) the record must show that the trial court has “advise[d] the defendant that if the defendant is a subsequent offender, that there may be enhanced penalties, and [has recited] the possible enhanced penalties.” Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 89, 945 A.2d 638, 646 (2008). Unlike the majority, however, I would apply a harmless error analysis in a “discharge of counsel” case where the defendant—having been permitted to discharge counsel—seeks a new trial on the ground that the trial judge failed to comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-215(e).
I would also hold that when the failure to advise about the possibility of an enhanced penalty is the only violation of Md. Rule 4~215(a), the appropriate remedy is a new sentencing proceeding at which the State is prohibited from seeking an enhanced penalty. I therefore dissent from the holding that *60the Respondent is entitled to a new trial rather than a new sentencing proceeding.
Judge ADKINS has authorized me to state that she joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.