concurring.
The majority finds the Code’s definition of tangible personal property to be ambiguous to the degree to which canned computer software is intended to be included, but dismisses Taxpayer’s argument that it is entitled to the benefit of the *352doubt via a reductio ad absurdwn rationale. See Majority Opinion, op. at 348 n.8, 998 A.2d at 584 n.8. This logic, however, fails to account for the possibility of affording a taxpayer the benefit of the doubt short of courting the absurd.
In my view, to the degree the Legislature intended to capture intellectual work product conveyed or housed in non-fixed media, the Code would benefit from a more conceptual explanation of such intention in the statutory text. As it is, the Code’s definition of tangible personal property is prolix, non-cohesive, and, at times, counterintuitive. In such circumstances, I am sympathetic to Taxpayer’s position that a broad-sweeping ejusdem generis approach to the catch-all language — based on the enumeration of non-similar “tangibles” such as steam and telecommunications service-is unmanageable and inappropriate.
Nevertheless, I support the majority’s consideration of the Code’s history to provide some guidance. To me, the Legislature’s previous effort to specifically capture computer programming services and custom software programming strongly suggests that the Assembly believed that canned programs already were amenable to the tax. Such a belief seems reasonable, particularly as the most common conveyance of canned programming was in fixed media.
I also agree with the majority that the Department’s interpretation is entitled to substantial deference. See Majority Opinion, op. at 351, 998 A.2d at 586. However, I note the presence of competing principles of construction in my own analysis, since I also believe that Taxpayer’s arguments are strengthened in light of the definitional ambiguity. To my mind, this is a very close case.