(dissenting). While I agree with the majority that defendant’s felony-firearm conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion or error of law in charging defendant with armed robbery, as opposed to bank robbery, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant could not be convicted of four counts of armed robbery on these facts.
The incident occurred on March 20, 1979, at a Detroit branch of the Detroit Bank & Trust Co. Two men wearing ski masks entered the bank in the morning, firing a shot. One, armed with a shotgun, stopped by the door. The other (later identified as defendant) jumped over the counter and, at gun point, entered the cage of teller number three and took money from her drawer. He then entered the cage of teller number four and took money and bus tickets from her drawer. Finally, he entered the cage of teller number five and took money from that teller and the teller trainee. The men then left the bank in a green Pinto and were soon apprehended by the police.
In resolving defendant’s claim, we should look to the traditional application of double jeopardy protection as a restraint on courts and prosecutors imposing double punishment for a single criminal act.
It is settled that a prosecutor may charge a defendant with multiple offenses arising from the same transaction. See People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141; 257 NW2d 537 (1977). The Michigan Supreme *515Court has held that all offenses arising out of the same transaction must be tried in a single prosecution. People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973). To determine whether the commission of more than one crime is part of the same transaction this Court has looked to whether the crimes were committed in a continuous time sequence and whether they display a single intent and goal. People v Robertson, 67 Mich App 603, 605; 242 NW2d 24 (1976).
In the instant case, it is clear that there was one transaction; the question is whether it is divisible into four armed robberies.
I believe this multiple charge does not violate the tests of People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79; 289 NW2d 674 (1980), People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540; 256 NW2d 31 (1977), People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), because the individual armed robberies are not factually necessarily included within the others; each count is factually distinguishable and can be supported by independent testimony. For example, it is not factually or logically impossible for defendant to be found guilty of armed robbery of teller number three without at the same time being guilty of armed robbery of teller number four, etc.
I agree that one offense cannot be divided into several parts according to time and conduct, but here one transaction was permissibly divided into four factually separate offenses. There is a logical basis to the charges because of the different interests advanced by bank robbery versus armed robbery prosecutions. The bank robbery statute is intended to "protect structures intentionally constructed to protect valuables”. People v Ferguson, 60 Mich App 302, 305; 230 NW2d 406 (1975). On the other hand, the purpose of the armed robbery *516statute is to protect persons from assaultive takings by means of dangerous weapons.
Defendant’s reliance on People v Johnson, 81 Mich 573; 45 NW 1119 (1890), is misplaced. While that case may represent Michigan’s alignment with the majority rule that the taking of property from different sources at the same time and at the same place constitutes but one larceny (see Anno: Single or separate larceny predicated upon stealing property from different owners at the same time, 37 ALR3d 1407, 1410), that situation is distinguishable. The larceny charges in those cases focus on a single act of taking property which belongs to several owners; there is only one taking. However, in the instant case, the focus is on multiple assaults and multiple takings within one transaction. The present convictions do not rest on proof of one act which is wrongful as to different persons. Rather, there are separate acts wrongful as to separate persons.
I would hold that defendant’s four convictions of armed robbery do not constitute double jeopardy on the facts of this case.