dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would transfer this case to Commonwealth Court. This court recently noted in Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 410 Pa.Super. 416, 418, 600 A.2d 210, 211 (1991) that:
[W]e retain the power and, indeed, the responsibility to determine whether retention of jurisdiction in this case is appropriate or, alternatively, whether the matter should be transferred to Commonwealth Court. Lara, Inc. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 27, 534 A.2d 1062 (1987). See also Pa.R.A.P. 741, 751.
42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4)(i)(A) provides, in pertinent part, that the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the Courts of Common Pleas concerning:
“All actions or proceedings arising under any municipality, institution district, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a municipality or other political subdivision may be formed or incorporated or where is drawn into question the application, interpretation, or enforcement of any:
(A) Statute regulating the affairs of political subdivisions, municipality and other local authorities or other *396public corporations or of the officers, employees or agents thereof acting in their official capacity
All parties to this appeal, with the exception of Lehman Engineering, are Cambria County or Barr Township agencies and authorities. The Cambria County Redevelopment Authority was organized to oversee and implement grants pursuant to the Urban Redevelopment Authority Law 35 Pa.C.S. § 1702 et seq. The Marsteller Community Water Authority is a political subdivision of Barr Township incorporated to provide water service to the village of Marsteller.
Federal and state grant funds were expended to upgrade a water system, the water system as upgraded does not comply with Department of Environmental Resources standards, and cannot be issued a permit. Appellant Marsteller Water Authority filed suit to recover those funds which were expended. The appellee defendants raised preliminary objections which challenged appellant’s standing to sue, which were granted, and this appeal followed.
The appellees have argued that the Water Authority lacks standing to sue for three reasons. First, they contend that the Water Authority is not a party to the contract and cannot sue as an incidental beneficiary. Secondly, they argue that any recovery could not be paid to Marsteller Water Authority because such payment would circumvent the regulatory framework for administering grants and allow the Authority to spend without supervision. Finally, it is alleged that allowing an authority to sue the township which created it would have a serious negative policy impact in the development of Pennsylvania’s municipal improvement projects.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that this case falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Section 762 is phrased in the disjunctive, allowing for alternate grounds for establishing jurisdiction. The first ground is when the proceeding arises under a planning or zoning code under which a political subdivision may be formed. Clearly, the subject matter of this appeal, whether Marsteller as a formed political subdivision has standing to *397sue up the chain of authority, falls within the ambit of the jurisdictional statute.
Additionally, appellees Barr Township and Cambria County have argued that Marsteller Water Authority may not administer the grant money, and that a water authority should not be allowed to sue the township under which it was formed. These both are issues relating to the interpretation of statutes “regulating the affairs of political subdivisions” and are best left to the Commonwealth Court and its particular expertise to decide. As this issue falls within that court’s portion of the “legislatively ordained division of labor”, Newman v. Thorn, 359 Pa.Super. 274, 518 A.2d 1231 (1986), I would transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court.