concurring.
I join in Parts I-IV of the Court’s opinion. I concur in the result, not for the reasons stated by the Court in Part V, but for the reasons given by Judge Moylan in his dissenting opinion below, Runkles v. State, 87 Md.App. 492, 502-08, 590 A.2d 552 (1991).
ROBERT M. BELL, Justice, dissenting in which ELDRIDGE, J., joins.
Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Rpl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 35C is straightforward in its prohibition:
A person may not sell, barter, or trade or offer to sell, barter, or trade a child for money, for property, either real or personal, or anything else of value.
Moreover, the language it employs is clear, concise, and unambiguous. Consequently, we need not look beyond the statute to discover the intention of the Legislature in enacting it. See Bacon v. State, 322 Md. 140, 147, 586 A.2d 18, 22 (1991); State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 *407(1990); Fowel v. State, 206 Md. 101, 105, 110 A.2d 524, 526 (1955) (“where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity and so expresses the definite and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning the Legislature intended.”) In that regard, I agree with the State.1 Unlike the State, however, I believe that the terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings, rather than meanings which serve to support a desired result.2
I am largely in agreement with Judge Davis’s well-reasoned, logical opinion.3 The statute proscribes "selling, bartering, and trading children,” or the offer to do so. It does not, expressly, or even implicitly, proscribe any other conduct. Judge Davis, speaking for majority in Runkles v. *408State, 87 Md.App. 492, 590 A.2d 552 (1991), carefully reviewed the meaning of the terms the Legislature used and concluded, I think correctly, that it did not intend, when it passed the statute, to reach a transaction in which the mere transfer of custody was involved. In my view, it intended to reach the situation in which a parent, or other person covered by the statute, sought to transfer parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child for money, property, or anything else of value. I do agree with the Court of Special Appeals, moreover, that the statute was not intended, in any event, to reach the petitioner’s conduct in this case; it does not prohibit influence peddling, i.e., persuading an innocent person to relinquish custody of a child. That is all that the record reflects the petitioner agreed to do and did. It follows, therefore, that that is all he was paid to do.
I dissent.
ELDRIDGE, J., has authorized me to say that he joins in the views expressed herein.
. The majority sees it differently. In its view, the language is not so clear and unambiguous "as to make unnecessary further inquiry concerning the intent of the Legislature." [Op. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115] Assuming that the majority is correct, my position remains the same. The legislative history of the statute makes clear that the Legislature was very much aware of how to fashion a statute that met the needs it perceived to exist. In fact, that history demonstrates that the Legislature did just that in this case. It had the opportunity explicitly to prohibit the exchange of custody of a child for money or anything of value; it chose not to do so, opting instead for very specific language, i.e. "sale,” "barter,” or “trade.” That it did so speaks volumes as to what it intended.
. The State and the majority, consistent with the dissenting opinion in Runkles, focus on the phrase "commercial trafficking in children" as being the prohibited conduct. There is nothing in the statute nor the legislative history that indicates that was the object of the statute. Indeed, as the opinion of the intermediate appellate court points out, the impetus for the statute was otherwise.
. Without so much as a supporting citation, the majority mischaracterizes the “crux” of the majority opinion of the Court of Special Appeals as holding that "§ 35C applies only to adoption proceedings,” [Op. at 391, 605 A.2d at 115] perhaps to set up a strawman for its legislative history argument. The Court of Special Appeals held, on the contrary, that the conduct with which the petitioner was charged was not covered by § 35C, Runkles v. State, 87 Md.App. 492, 501, 590 A.2d 552, 556 (1991), that that section “cannot be read to proscribe the transfer of custody for consideration.” Id., 87 Md.App. at 498, 590 A.2d at 555. It opined that it was designed "to define the crime of baby selling in terms more descriptive of a commercial transaction *408involving goods, wares, and merchandise____” Id. To be sure, the court referred to an adoption, but only to point out that giving a child up for adoption is the closest analogy to a commercial sale — the giving up of ownership — of a child. Id. That this is so is made clear by what it said, later, concerning the statute’s legislative history:
Thus, we find that there is a clear indication in the legislative history that the Legislature was responding to very specific events; the type of transaction reflected in the stipulated facts in this case was apparently never considered by the Legislature. The Floor Report, the testimony before the Judiciary Committee on March 21, 1989, and the explanation regarding Amendment No. 3 all demonstrate a legislative intent merely to address the spectre of the commercial sale of babies spurred by the action of the Pennsylvania couple. To read § 35C to include the transfer of custody would render criminally liable any parent (or lawyer) in divorce or custody proceedings wherein as part of a marital agreement, one parent agreed to relinquish a claim to custody in exchange for any other thing of value — visitation, spousal support, or property.
87 Md.App. at 501, 590 A.2d at 556. The case of the Pennsylvania couple to which reference is made involved an offer by parents to place their child for adoption, in exchange for a sum of money. Another case referred to in the legislative history involved a Maryland couple who actually “sold" their child for cash and cocaine.