(concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the defendant was not denied a speedy trial or placed in double jeopardy and that the court’s sentence upon revocation of probation was proper. I cannot, however, agree that the defendant re*31ceived adequate notice of the grounds for revocation.
The notice of revocation given to the defendant stated that revocation was being recommended because of his “engaging in illegal activities with a known prostitute.” There is nothing in the record, however, that establishes the illegality of defendant’s activities. Only in its brief on appeal does the state contend that the solicitation of a prostitute constitutes a violation of a municipal ordinance. Neither the defendant nor the trial court was given notice that the state was urging violation of this ordinance as a ground for revocation. Since the court did not find that the defendant had engaged in “illegal activities,” the sole ground of which defendant was given written notice fails as a basis of revocation.
Minn.St. 609.14, subd. 1, provides that the court may revoke probation “[w]hen it appears that the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his probation or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or execution of sentence * * Subdivision 2 requires that the defendant “be notified in writing and in such manner as the court directs of the grounds alleged to exist for revocation of the stay of imposition or execution of sentence.” Subdivision 4 provides that “[i]f none of such grounds are found to exist, the defendant shall be restored to his liberty under the previous order of the court.” (Italics supplied.)
While the trial court is vested with discretion to determine the sufficiency of the evidence in a proceeding to revoke probation, State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381, 154 N.W.2d 699 (1967), the statute permits revocation only where the evidence supports the grounds alleged to exist in the notice given to the defendant. Here, there was no evidence to support the allegation that the defendant had engaged in “illegal activities.”
The court stated that the defendant’s probation was revoked because he engaged in “conduct similar to that originally charged and to which he entered a guilty plea” and because he failed to “participate and cooperate in the treatment program scheduled on his behalf at the St. Peter State Hospital.” The record, however, contains no evidence that the defendant was notified that his engaging in “conduct similar to that originally charged” would be asserted as a ground for revocation. The clear meaning of Minn.St. 609.14 precludes this court from affirming the revocation order on this ground.
The majority holds, however, that the defendant received sufficient notice that his failure to cooperate in treatment would be asserted as a ground for revocation. This holding not only is contrary to the clear statutory requirement that written notice be given, but it also encourages the use of such unprofessional procedures as appear in this case. I would, therefore, hold that the notice given to the defendant was insufficient but since the record does not establish that the defendant was prejudiced by the state’s failure to give proper notice I would not reverse on this ground alone.