dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. In my view, the police did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and their actions constituted a seizure, rather than a mere encounter.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that police officers may detain a person to investigate suspicious circumstances on less than probable cause. In order to do so, however, the officer must observe unusual and suspicious conduct, which leads the officer to reasonably believe that criminal activity is afoot. Id.
On the facts presented to the trial court, I cannot conclude that there is any unusual and suspicious conduct present here which would justify a Terry stop. In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980), the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a suppression order, holding that the DEA agent's stop of Reid was valid because: (1) Reid had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, which the agent testified was a source city for cocaine; (2) Reid arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement activity is diminished; (3) Reid and his companion appeared to the agent to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together; and (4) Reid had no luggage other than a shoulder bag. The Supreme Court, in reversing, concluded that as a matter of law the agent could not have reasonably suspected criminal activity on these circumstances. The Court found that nearly all the circumstances *441relied on by the lower court “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures” if the Court were to find the stop valid. Id. at 441,100 S.Ct. at 2754. I believe the same is true in the present case.
Furthermore, I cannot agree that the actions of the police established only a “mere encounter” rather than a “seizure.” In Fourth Amendment terms, even a brief detention short of traditional arrest constitutes a seizure of the person and must be reasonable. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Terry defines a seizure as a police officer accosting an individual and restraining that individual’s freedom to walk away. The restraint need not be by physical force but may also be by show of authority, for example the threatening presence of several officers or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request is required. Id.; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). The question is whether, in view of all of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Id.
In the instant case, the officers’ actions went far beyond the mere encounter described in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Officers Shoup and Kaminski flanked appellant, one on each side of her, as she walked through the airport, requested identification and information, and refused to leave appellant’s side even after she had produced identification and refused the officers’ request to consent to a search. Had this been a “mere encounter,” appellant’s production of identification and her refusal to consent to a search would have terminated the officers’ right to proceed further. Id. Instead, the officers continued to follow appellant through the airport, one on either side of her, and continued to interrogate her. Whenever appellant sought to leave, the officers simply continued to accompany her. Appellant was not even permitted to use the bathroom in privacy, Officer Shoup having recruited *442two female security guards to accompany and observe appellant as she used the toilet. In view of all of these circumstances, I cannot conclude that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave.
In my view, appellant was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at least as early as when she first refused to consent to a search and the officers did not allow her to continue through the airport unimpeded and unaccompanied. At this time, the officers did not have sufficient specific and articulable facts to support a suspicion of criminal activity. I would, therefore, reverse the order denying suppression, vacate the judgment of sentence and grant appellant a new trial.