I concur in the majority’s conclusion that petitioner is ineligible for worktime credits under Penal Code section 2933. (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 49 (1987).) I dissent, however, from its application of equitable estoppel against the government.
The majority recognizes “[ejstoppel will not ordinarily lie against a governmental agency if the result will be the frustration of a strong public policy. [Citations.]” (Bib’le v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1980) 26 Cal.3d 548, 553 [162 Cal.Rptr. 426, 606 P.2d 733].) It then proceeds to ignore that test, never discussing the public policy interest at stake. The majority assumes the only cost to the state is “the inconvenience of a useless hearing.” (Ante, p. 1230.) Not so. There is a strong public policy distinguishing prisoners sentenced to an indeterminate term from those serving determinate terms.
The Legislature’s action enacting the Determinate Sentencing Law in 1977 “marked a change in the policy of imprisonment from rehabilitation to punishment. [Citations.]” (In re Monigold (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 485, 490 [188 Cal.Rptr. 698].) Indeed, most prisoners now serve set terms, and their postconviction behavior has little if any effect on their release date. (See In reStanworth (1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, 187 [187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654P.2d 1311].) Despite this shift in policy and adoption of determinate sentences for most crimes, the Legislature retained indeterminate sentences for the most heinous offenses, such as murder, petitioner’s crime here.
Petitioner can be held for life, although he can be paroled when the Board of Prison Terms deems it appropriate. (Pen. Code, § 3041.) The parole decision is a discretionary one. The Legislature reserved the right to hold the most serious offenders for life despite recognition that punishment was more important than rehabilitation for most offenses. The retention of indeterminate sentences for the most serious offenders does not run contrary to that legislative purpose. It simply recognizes that more serious offenders perhaps ought to be punished for life. Rehabilitation in prison is only a secondary goal, affording parole to those life prisoners who demonstrate they have learned from their punishment.
The indeterminate hold on the more serious offenders fulfills an important public policy to punish them more severely and not promise release after a determinate term. It recognizes the need to force the more serious offenders to demonstrate their suitability to reenter mainstream society. Determinate prisoners will be released regardless, in a uniform system which places a “value” on the crime equal to the term of punishment *1234imposed. The Legislature has exempted the most serious offenders from this value system and enacted a policy of imprisonment for life absent demonstrable rehabilitation.
Awarding automatic worktime credits to reduce an indeterminate prisoner’s term contradicts the very purpose of an indeterminate sentence. An indeterminate prisoner must demonstrate his suitability for release and should not be able to “buy” tokens which guarantee it. Moreover, “while the concept of a uniform system of conduct [and/or worktime] credits is a logical corollary of a determinate sentencing scheme, that concept makes no sense when there is no fixed term from which conduct credit can be subtracted.” (People v. Reynolds (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 141, 147 [171 Cal.Rptr. 461]; see also People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 234 [157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92].)
Estoppel is inappropriate when one balances petitioner’s claimed injury against the strong public policy behind indeterminate terms. All able-bodied prisoners are required to work (Pen. Code, § 2700) and petitioner apparently always has. He complains about more restrictive privileges mandated by the worktime credit program, which the Attorney General disputes. The claimed restrictions are hardly momentous, and certainly not punitive. (See McQuillion v. Rushen (N.D.Cal. 1986) 639 F.Supp. 420, 423.)
Similarly, the change in petitioner’s parole suitability hearing and minimum eligible parole date do not justify abrogating the public policy behind indeterminate sentences. As explained vain re Jackson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 464 [216 Cal.Rptr. 760, 703 P.2d 100], “[a]t the initial parole suitability hearing, which occurs one year before an inmate’s minimum eligible parole date ([Pen. Code,] § 3041), 90 percent of inmates are found unsuitable for parole release. At the second and subsequent parole suitability hearings, approximately 85 percent are found unsuitable. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 473.)
I recognize there is always a chance petitioner might have been in the minority, but that chance is remote and does not outweigh the public policy interest at stake. I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority’s view we should give greater weight to petitioner’s individual morale. The public policy interest is paramount. I conclude estoppel should not be applied against the government here because “the result [would] be the frustration of a strong public policy. [Citations.]” (Bible v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 553.)
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 13, 1989, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Scoville, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 16, 1989.