concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Majority’s sufficiency review and join the Majority to the extent that it affirms the verdict of guilt. I disagree, however, with the Majority’s'interpretation of Rule 352 and respectfully dissent.
The Majority would vacate the sentence of death and remand for a new sentencing hearing for the following reasons: first, the information about the appellant’s past felony convictions already existed; second, that information was easily available to the prosecutor, upon the exercise of reasonable diligence; third, the purpose of the rule is to give the defendant notice, as soon as possible, of the aggravating circumstance the Commonwealth will pursue; and fourth, the appellant was prejudiced.
The Majority establishes an affirmative duty on the part of prosecutors to discover all existing aggravating circumstances prior to arraignment. I think this reading unnecessarily expands Rule 352. The plain language of the Rule allows the Prosecutor to give notice of an aggravating circumstance after arraignment — when the prosecutor “becomes aware” of its existence. The purpose of this rule, as set out in the Comment following the Rule, is to- afford the defendant sufficient time to prepare for the sentencing phase. Not, as the Majority suggests, to give notice as soon as possible. In this matter *85the defendant had two months to prepare for the sentencing phase of his trial. The notice afforded Williams gave him sufficient time to prepare for that part of the trial.
Furthermore, the Majority writes that “the prejudice which occurs from this type of notice during jury selection is rather self-evident.” Majority Opinion p. 80 n. 18. The Majority states that notifying the defense of a third aggravating circumstance during jury selection causes the defense to switch its attention from the task at hand, and to focus on the sentencing phase. I disagree. The defense was already aware that the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty and was selecting a jury with that in mind. The addition of a third aggravating factor did not prejudice the defense. The defense had two months between the time of notice and the sentencing phase. That two months constituted sufficient time for the defense to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial. Had the defense felt that the addition of a third aggravating circumstance prejudiced its case, the defense could have moved for a continuance.
Accordingly, I dissent from the Majority and. would affirm the sentence of death.
CASTILLE, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.