dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-5, the Civil Protec*512tion Order Act, was enacted by the General Assembly to provide the umbrella of protection that the trial court extended here.
Here, there is evidence in the record that Tons has in the past violently disciplined his son Travis, including punching him in the head with his fist and throwing him down a flight of stairs. Additionally, there was evidence of violence during the marriage between Barbara Bley and Tons. One may reasonably infer that Tons' threat to beat Travis "black and blue" implicitly extended to anyone who might interfere with that mission, including Barbara and her current husband, Brian Bley. I believe, as with any factual determination by a trial court, that we should defer to the court's conclusion here that not just Travis, but also Barbara and Brian, should fall under the seope of the protective order it issued.
I also note that under Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(b)(1), (4), and (6), a protective order may be ordered to apply not only with respect to the person petitioning for the order, but also with respect to "each designated family or household member." I believe this is tacit recognition by the General Assembly that when a respondent has threatened a petitioner with harm, other persons living with the petitioner who may not have been directly threatened are nevertheless at risk of harm by the respondent. I also conclude that the statute permits a protective order to be issued for the benefit of persons living with a threatened person, even if the respondent did not directly threaten those other persons.
With respect to the order prohibiting Tons from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon, I believe it is improper to rely on Garmene v. LeMasters, 743 N.E.2d 782 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), as demonstrating there was insufficient evidence to issue such an order in this case. In Garmene, we construed and applied the predecessor to the current protective order act, which did not allow restrictions on the possession of firearms and deadly weapons unless a court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent posed a significant threat of inflicting serious bodily injury to the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's household or family. Id. at 786 (citing Ind.Code § 34-26-2-12, now repealed).
The protective order statutory scheme is now completely different. There is no longer any requirement that a person seeking a protective order prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a significant threat of serious bodily injury before a respondent can be ordered not to possess firearms. Currently, Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(c)(4) provides that a court may, after notice and a hearing, "[pjrohibit a respondent from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or a deadly weapon specified by the court. . .." Additionally, Section 34-26-5-9(f) provides:
A finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this seetion means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household. Upon a showing of domestic or family violence by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence. The relief may include an order directing a respondent to surrender to a law enforcement officer or agency all firearms, ammunition, and deadly weapons:
(1) in the control, ownership, or possession of a respondent; or
(2) in the control or possession of another person on behalf of a respondent; *513for the duration of the order for protection unless another date is ordered by the court.
In my view, under the current scheme all that is needed to support an order prohibiting the possession of firearms or deadly weapons is a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent poses a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or member of the petitioner's household, which is identical to what is needed to order the issuance of a protective order in the first place. There need be no separate evidence and finding specifically relating to firearms and weapons and a substantial threat of serious bodily injury. In this particular case, I am convinced in any event that given Tons' previously demonstrated violent tendencies, the trial court may reasonably have concluded that prohibiting Tons from possessing firearms or dangerous weapons was necessary to diminish the threat of violence to Travis, Barbara, and Brian.
I would affirm the trial court's order in its entirety.