concurring.
The record shows that, in response to a 9-1-1 call reporting a shooting, Erie Jones, a police officer in Atlanta, Texas, arrived at appellant’s home and found her at the door to the house in an agitated state and still on the telephone with the 911 operator. For security, Jones handcuffed appellant and seated her in the back seat of his patrol car. He then made the first entry into the house and saw a pistol laying on a kitchen counter and appellant’s husband lying on the living-room floor in front of a fireplace. Emergency medical personnel arrived shortly thereafter and, with Jones, made a second entry into the home. Somewhat later, sheriffs deputies arrived and made a third entry to process the crime scene. There is no dispute that this entry and search were conducted without a warrant.
During the third entry, investigators took photographs of the inside of the home and seized the pistol from the kitchen counter and a spent shell casing that was discovered between a chair and the wall in the living room. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been obtained at the scene without a warrant. The objection was based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution, and “the correlative provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” The trial court overruled that motion, saying that the majority of the challenged evidence was “nothing more than what Officer Jones could have testified to as having been his personal observation of things in plain sight....” The trial court also noted that appellant, while the search on the third entry was in progress, asked Copeland if there was anything in the house that he wanted her to *448show him. It then opined that appellant’s question constituted a consent to search.1
Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review. This Court granted ground one, which asserts that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of an illegal general search of her home.
The Pre-trial Motion to Suppress
Several months before the trial on the merits began, appellant filed a written Motion to Suppress Statements of Defendant and Evidence. That motion sought to suppress the statements that appellant had made to any law-enforcement officer and any evidence confiscated by a law-enforcement officer, including evidence that flowed from the search, including testimony from the medical examiner and the trace-evidence examiner.2 The motion generally alleged that her statements and the evidence seized at the scene were results of an illegal search of appellant in violation of her constitutional and statutory rights. The docket sheet contains a notation: “Pretrial suppression issue to be carried to the time of trial.”
Just before the state began presenting its case, appellant re-urged her suppression motion, objecting to the admission of any physical evidence that was obtained during the third entry into the house. The trial court noted the docket-sheet entry about the pretrial suppression issue being carried until the time of trial and decided that it would allow the state to introduce the evidence that appellant had objected to, carry the objection, and hear more argument when court recessed. After the jury was excused for the day, the trial court considered the suppression issue.
Appellant and the state stipulated that the search of appellant’s residence during the third entry was done without a warrant and that no warrant was ever obtained for the search. Appellant argued for suppression of all of the evidence, including observations, diagrams, and photographs of the scene, that was obtained after Jones and the paramedics left the house after the second entry. After hearing argument from both parties and then reviewing case law overnight, the trial court denied the motion.
Appellant acknowledges that “[t]he Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Appellant argues that, after the protective sweep by Jones and the paramedics’ determination that her husband was dead, the third entry into the home without a warrant was improper and that *449the fruits of that improper entry and search should have been suppressed.
The state, citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), argues that the “emergency aid doctrine” and the prompt “protective sweep” exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement permit police to seize evidence that was in plain view during the course of these legitimate activities. It asserts that “[i]n this case, the evidence collected at the scene was clearly admissible because it was in the plain view of a law enforcement officer during the course of his legitimate emergency activities, i.e. searching for the victim and securing the safety of the area.” The state also asserts that the shell casing was within the plain view of Jones during the permissible emergency search and protective sweep.3
The First and Second Entries
It is undisputed that the police made multiple entries into appellant’s home. The first entry, by Jones alone, was a permissible cursory search to secure the premises. The second, by Jones accompanied by emergency medical personnel, was to facilitate the administration of medical treatment to the injured victim, and Jones testified that he did not do any investigation at that time, but “[j]ust made sure there was nobody else there[.]” The parties agree that the first two entries were proper.
The Third Entry
The court of appeals noted that, to the extent that deputies searched the home’s interior during the third entry, “there is no viable exception to the constitutional requirement that a search warrant be obtained[,]” thus the failure to suppress some of the disputed evidence so obtained was error. Johnson, 161 S.W.3d at 185. It concluded that the seized evidence, except the shell casing, had been in plain view during the previous emergency sweeps and was thus lawfully seized during the third entry. Id. at 186. The court of appeals also concluded that the search during the third entry was broader than the scope allowed by the plain-view exception and that the seizure of the shell casing and its fruits, testimony referring to the shell casing and the portion of the diagram showing where the shell casing was discovered, should have been suppressed in response to appellant’s objections. Id.
Appellant takes issue only with the conclusion of the court of appeals that the evidence that was seized during the third entry, other than the shell casing, was in plain view during permissible entries and therefore was properly seized.
Analysis
Mincey teaches us that there is no “murder-scene exception” to the warrant *450requirement. “In sum, we hold that the ‘murder scene exception’ created by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-that the warrantless search of Min-cey’s apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395, 98 S.Ct. 2408.
Brown v. Texas, 856 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), teaches us that if a crime “is reported to the police by an individual who owns or controls the premises to which the police are summoned, and that individual either states or suggests that it was committed by a third person, he or she implicitly consents to a search of the premises reasonably related to the routine investigation of the offense and the identification of the perpetrator. As long as the individual is not a suspect in the case or does nothing to revoke his consent, the police may search the premises for these purposes, and evidence obtained thereby is admissible.” Id. at 182. (Emphasis added.) That is clearly not the case here. Appellant had repeatedly confessed to shooting her husband. There was never the slightest suggestion that anyone else was involved.
It is entirely reasonable to find implied consent to search in the Brown circumstances, but not when there is a confession by the person who is in control of the premises. Physical evidence can be ephemeral; if not collected quickly, it may disappear. It is fair to assume that an owner who points to a third person as the perpetrator desires to have that person caught and is therefore more than willing to let the police search the premises for evidence. It is also fair to assume that such a premise may well not be true if the owner is a suspect and the search might reveal incriminating evidence.
Unless the existing circumstances support a finding that an exception to the warrant requirement is present, police must have a warrant before they may search without consent. In this case, there was no explicit consent. Under Brown, we may not assume implied consent in the circumstances present in this case. Appellant’s offer to show the officers things in the house was made well after the search began without her consent and followed questions from her about why all those people were in her house; her offer cannot be used to justify a search that was already under way. There being no consent and no warrant, the third entry was improper.
Jones could have properly picked up the pistol on either his first or second entry, as the gun was in plain view on the kitchen counter and appellant had told him that she had shot her husband. But he did not. Jones and emergency medical technicians could have testified as to what each had personally observed during the two proper entries, but they were not called as witnesses; the state instead relied on Copeland’s testimony about the photographs that were taken during the third entry. Under Mincey and Brown, the third entry was impermissible, and the trial court erred in admitting the physical evidence collected during that entry. The error is of constitutional dimension, but is not structural. The Court should, therefore, review the error under to Tex. Rule App. PROC. 44.2(a) and consider whether the error requires reversal. While I believe that the third entry was improper, I do not believe that the error was harmful.
The Gun
The gun, a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol, was offered and admitted as State’s Exhibit 13. Its admission was improper as evidence seized during an unauthorized *451search. However, appellant told Jones that she had used a .380. Jones testified that he had seen the gun on the kitchen counter during his first entry and had identified it as a .380, and the medical examiner testified that the victim died from a gunshot wound in the back and that he had removed a .380 slug from the victim’s thorax. Such other evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the gun itself did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. For the same reasons, the erroneous admission of State’s Exhibit 11, a photograph of a gun on a kitchen counter beside the stove, was harmless error.
The Photographs
Appellant also objected to State’s Exhibits 2-8, 10, 12, 19, and 25. These photographs may be divided into two groups. The first group consists of five photographs of parts of the master bedroom.
Exhibit 6 a night stand in the bedroom, purporting to show an empty handgun case
Exhibit 10 the bedspread, with an unidentified, dry stain
Exhibit 12 the door jamb in the bedroom, damaged at some unknown time Exhibit 19 a view of the master bedroom
Exhibit 25 a view of the master bedroom
The shooting occurred in the living room. There is no evidence of a struggle, in the living room or elsewhere. No connection between the photographs of the bedroom and the murder was shown. These photographs did not make any relevant fact more or less likely and were thus irrelevant. The trial court erred in admitting them, but I believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous admission of these photographs did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.
The second group consists of six photographs of the living room, the site of the shooting.
Exhibit 2-5 the victim as he was found by responding officers
Exhibit 7 a wider view of living room; the back lower two-thirds of the victim is visible
Exhibit 8 a large armchair with a red stain on the back cushion
Exhibits 2 and 3 depict the victim from the front, semi-prone on the floor, with no injury visible. Exhibits 4, 5, and 7 depict the victim from the rear and show a large, dark-red stain on his T-shirt, in the center of his back, and a dark-red streak on the carpet. None of the six photographs is particularly gory or bloody.
Appellant repeatedly admitted that she had shot her husband.4 She so testified at trial. The issue before the jury was whether the shooting was justified as an act of self-defense. That issue was fully litigated through the testimony of appellant, the medical examiner, and various witnesses for each side who testified about the behavior of both appellant and the victim and the nature of their relationship.5 The photographs in the second group did not reveal any fact or circumstance not included in permissible testimony by one *452or more witnesses, nor were they probative of the critical issue, self-defense. They were admitted in error, but, beyond reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court.
. It is undisputed that, at the time appellant asked her question, the search was already underway. Although lack of consent was argued in appellant’s brief to this Court, the court of appeals did not address the issue. “Consent” obtained after the fact cannot justify failure to obtain a warrant. Consent must also be clearly expressed. Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(consent must be positive and unequivocal). Appellant’s question did not constitute consent to the search that was already in progress.
. At trial, appellant affirmatively stated she had “no objection” as to the autopsy report, the autopsy photograph, the ballistics report, and the trace-evidence report on the victim’s clothing. The ballistic and trace-evidence reports each make reference to the pistol. Appellant initially objected to a diagram of appellant’s home prepared by officers involved in the third entry, but later offered the diagram as defense exhibit 2.
. The state also argues that, while appellant had previously objected to the admission of any evidence that was obtained during the sheriffs department’s investigation of the scene, appellant "specifically stated that she had 'no objection’ to the admission of: the autopsy report, the [autopsy] photo, or the ballistics report,” and, therefore, waived her right to complain on appeal about the admission of that evidence at trial.
While stating "no objection” to the admission of the ballistics firearms report may waive any complaint about the admission of the report into evidence, it does not waive properly preserved complaints about the admission of particular pieces of evidence that are mentioned in the report. The court of appeals noted that appellant may have waived her objection as to the shell casing when her counsel affirmatively said "no objection” to the admission of the state's exhibit that contained references to the shell casing, but it also noted that the state did not raise such a claim. Johnson, supra, 161 S.W.3d at 186, n. 6.
. At different times, she told the emergency operator, Officer Jones, and Lt. Copeland that she had shot her husband.
. It was generally conceded that both appellant and her husband were alcoholics. As would be expected, witnesses for the state testified that they had never seen the victim be violent toward anyone. Some of appellant’s witnesses testified as to damage to appellant’s home that was inflicted by the victim when he was angry; other witnesses, including a law-enforcement officer, testified as to prior assaults on appellant by the victim.