Under the facts of this case, had the only violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq., hereafter the Act) been City of Los Angeles’s (City) failure to inform Officer Hanna that any statement made during the internal affairs investigation could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution (see § 3303, subd. (g); Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 829 [221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329]), I would agree with the dissenting opinion that, under the rationale of Williams v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 47 Cal.3d 195, 201 [252 Cal.Rptr. 817, 763 P.2d 480], suppression of Officer Hanna’s statements is an inappropriate remedy.
However, unlike Williams, this case involves much more than a Lybarger violation.1 In addition to failing to admonish Officer Hanna pursuant to Lybarger, City also violated section 3303 of the Government Code by denying Officer Hanna the presence of a representative of his choice (subd. (h)), access to the tape recording of the first interrogation prior to the second interrogation (subd. (f)), and copies of Ms. Sullivan’s complaint and the police officers’ investigation reports (subd. (f)).
In light of these violations, which may have affected Officer Hanna’s defense to the charges brought against him, I cannot conclude that the trial court’s order suppressing Officer Hanna’s statements constituted an abuse of discretion. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142-143 [185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874].)2
This court’s unpublished opinion in Hanna v. City of Los Angeles (Mar. 23, 1987) B016427 eliminated the Lybarger violation as a basis for a remedy.
The dissenting opinion’s interpretation of Williams fails to suitably take into account the Supreme Court’s specific statement that suppression may be an appropriate remedy for statutory violations of the Act. (47 Cal.3d at p. 203, fn. 4.)