I respectfully dissent. I see no real distinction between the instant matter and Williams v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 47 Cal.3d 195 [252 Cal.Rptr. 817, 763 P.2d 480]. In holding that exclusion of the Williams statement was not a proper remedy but refusing to rule broadly that the exclusionary rule does not apply in police disciplinary proceedings, the California Supreme Court stated: “That Williams was not properly advised by the investigators constituted only a denial of the additional statutory protection conferred by the [Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act]. [Citation.] We thus have no cause to consider whether the exclusion*381ary rule should apply to bar consideration at a police disciplinary hearing of evidence obtained by unconstitutional methods.” (Williams, supra, at p. 202.) The court further stated: “[W]e are not concerned here with the applicability of the exclusionary rule, but only with the appropriateness of a ban on the use of a particular piece of evidence [the officer’s statement]. We are again urged by the City to rule broadly; specifically, that evidence may never be excluded from consideration as a remedy for a violation of the act. We decline this invitation as well.” (Ibid.)
While the court may have declined to enunciate a broad exclusionary rule, it made it clear that exclusion of an officer’s statement (as opposed to other evidence) is not appropriate in the absence of violations more egregious than those encountered by Hanna where, as here, the violation of the officer’s rights had no effect on the outcome. To paraphrase Williams, it cannot be said of Hanna, who chose to give a statement, that there is any possibility his case could have ended differently even had he been given the full benefit of all his statutory rights. Hanna’s statement should not have been excluded.
The admissibility of Hanna’s statement eliminates the basis relied on by the majority in upholding the award of attorney’s fees.
I would hold that the exclusion of Hanna’s statement and the consequent, award of attorney’s fees were abuses of the trial court’s discretion.