dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because the lay person testimony in this case regarding the condition of the rape victim’s hymen was merely testimony of the existence of a readily observable physical condition, I believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court.
At the outset, the Majority acknowledges our limited standard of review. A trial court’s rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence are controlled by the discretion of the trial court. This court will reverse only for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.1 Commonwealth v. Foy, 531 Pa. 322, *16325, 612 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1992). Based upon this deferential standard, I cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed testimony regarding Ms. Harvey’s observations of the condition of the victim’s hymen and when it sustained Appellant’s numerous objections to Ms. Harvey’s testimony regarding the cause of such condition.
While the Majority recognizes the general rulé that a lay person may testify as to distinct facts observed by him concerning the apparent physical condition or appearance of another, in my view, it fails to properly apply this precept to the case sub judice. The Majority submits that Ms. Harvey’s testimony was improperly introduced to draw the inference that the victim’s hymen had been split as a result of penetration. In support of its position, the Majority notes, Ms. Harvey testified when asked to describe what she- meant by the term “split” that, “It showed that penetration had been made—“It showed that someone had forced—and “not a normal—it was a penetration that had been made.” Thus, it is clear to me that the Majority really takes exception to Ms. Harvey’s testimony with respect to the cause of the condition of the victim’s hymen.
Yet with each statement regarding causation, Appellant’s trial counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. (N.T. 1/4/96, pp. 78-79). If Ms. Harvey were permitted to testify as to causation, such testimony would be objectionable as improper opinion testimony. However, the trial court never agreed to allow Ms. Harvey to testify concerning the cause of the condition of the victim’s hymen, pretrial or at trial. As noted above, the trial court sustained all objections to the testimony which strayed into the realm of the cause of the condition of the hymen. Appellant failed to request either curative instructions or a mistrial with respect to this causation testimony. As Appellant did not preserve its claim *17relative to the causation testimony, it is improper for the Majority to rely upon this testimony as a basis for reversal. Thus, there can be no error with respect to this causation testimony.2
The portion of Ms. Harvey’s testimony that was admitted into evidence simply consisted of her statements that the victim’s hymen was split or opened (“opened,” “open,” and “a large opening.”). (N.T. 1/4/93, pp. 78-79). This testimony was merely fact testimony concerning a readily observable physical condition about which a lay person may testify. See Travellers Insurance Co. v. Heppenstall Co., 360 Pa. 433, 440, 61 A.2d 809, 813 (1948); accord Commonwealth v. Xiong, 428 Pa.Super. 136, 147-48, 630 A.2d 446, 452 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 609, 641 A.2d 309 (1994)(“no hymen” notation on medical report was a factual assertion rather than a diagnosis or opinion).
Yet, the Majority contends that even this testimony was improperly admitted into evidence. The Majority believes that without expert medical testimony, the jury was left without guidance as to what inferences could be drawn from such a description of the victim’s hymen, i.e., whether the condition was indicative of sexual assault or other causes. However, as indicated above, an expert is not needed for the admission of an observation of a physical condition. While Ms. Harvey’s testimony may not have been as clear, descriptive, or complete as desired, that does not mean that it was inadmissible. Rather, it was admissible as fact testimony, subject to cross-examination and/or the testimony of others, which would, as in other cases, furnish the best means of testing its value.
*18Finally, the Majority notes various shortcomings of Ms. Harvey’s testimony. Yet, each of these inadequacies goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility. Specifically, Ms. Harvey’s failure to observe the victim’s hymen prior to the sexual assault, which would impact her ability to compare the condition of the hymen before and after the assault, and the lack of any medical training or expertise on the part of Ms. Harvey to testify as to the normalcy or abnormality of the hymen, all go to the weight and credibility to be given to the aunt’s testimony, not to its admissibility. The Majority fails to consider this distinction. Appellant’s trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Ms. Harvey on these very shortcomings and argued these shortcomings in his closing statement. (N.T. 1/4/93, pp. 86-87; N.T. 1/5/93, pp. 172-73).
I believe that the Majority gives the jury too little credit. We should be hesitant to prohibit such fact testimony from being considered by a jury because of perceived adverse inferences or inadequacies. Rather than deeming such testimony to be inadmissible, it should be admitted and subject to cross-examination—which, as Wigmore suggests, is the greatest engine for the discovery of truth known to our legal system. I believe that in this case, the jury was properly given the opportunity to consider the testimony regarding the condition of the victim’s hymen and to determine the weight to be given to it.
For these reasons, I dissent and would affirm the decision of the Superior Court.
. "[A]n abuse of discretion occurs not merely when the trial court reaches a decision contrary to the decision that the appellate court would have reached. Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs ‘when the *16course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.’ " Morrison v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122, 134-35, 646 A.2d 565, 571-72 (1994) (citations omitted).
. The Majority’s approach with respect to Ms. Harvey’s causation testimony has the effect of giving trial counsel two bites at the apple. If an objection is sustained by the trial court, trial counsel may wait for the jury's verdict. If his client is subsequently convicted, trial counsel can appeal and claim that the court failed to give cautionary instructions or grant a mistrial, even if trial counsel never asked for such relief. This approach is contrary to reason, fairness, and judicial economy.