dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
There are three dispositive issues of law presented in this appeal:
I. - Whether Indiana Code section 34-20-8-2, which permits asbestos-related causes of action to be filed within two years of the date they accrue without regard to Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1 ten-year products liability statute of repose, applies to Black's claims against the defendants herein;
II. - Whether the ten-year products liability statute of repose in Indiana Code section 34-20-8-1 violates Article I, Section 12 or Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution; and
Whether Indiana Code section 34-20-3-2 violates Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution. III.
I would affirm the trial court on these questions of law, thereby mooting the specific factual issues related to exposure unique to each plaintiff in these cases.
I agree with the majority's citation of the operative facts and its broad outline of the applicable standards of review. I must disagree, however, with the majority's rendering of the relevant statutory language, characterization of recent caselaw on point as dicta, and reliance on Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 382 (Ind.1989), a case that predates the statutory language at issue herein.
I. Application of Indiana Code Section 34-20-3-2
The instant causes of action for wrongful death and loss of consortium were filed within two years of the date of Willie Black's death. However, his death occurred more than ten years after the defendants' last delivery of asbestos-containing products to the sites where he was exposed to them. In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the trial court found that Black's claims were barred by the ten-year product liability statute of repose codified at Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1 because the defendants were not miners of commercial asbestos.
Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1 provides that a products liability action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer, unless the cause of action accrues at least eight years, but before ten years, after the initial delivery of the product, in which case the cause of action may be commenced within a new two-year statute of limitation.
However, Indiana Code section 34-20-3-2 excepts certain asbestos-related actions from section one's ten-year statute of repose and defines accrual as the date when the injured person knows that he/she has an asbestos-related disease or injury. Specifically, section two provides that a product liability action based on property damage resulting from asbestos or person*158al injury, disability, disease, or death resulting from exposure to asbestos must be commenced within two years after the injured person knows that he/she has an asbestos-related disease, without regard to the ten-year statute of repose. Under seetion two,
(d) This ... [exception] ... applies only to product liability actions against:
(1) persons who mined and sold commercial asbestos; and
(2) funds that have, as a result of bankruptcy proceedings or to avoid bankruptcy - proceedings, been created for the payment of asbestos related disease claims or asbestos related property damage claims.
Ind.Code § 34-20-3-2(d).
Black contends that section two's exception to the statute of repose should be interpreted to allow suits against persons who mined and persons who sold commercial asbestos. The defendants respond that the exception applies only to persons who satisfy both criteria: "persons who mined and sold" commercial asbestos. Id.
A. The Language of the Statute
When considering a statute, this court is guided by well-established rules of statutory construction. Public Employees' Retirement Fund v. Shepherd, 733 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). When a statute is unambiguous, we need not look beyond its plain language to determine the meaning, and we do not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. Indeed, "we are not free to construe a statute which is unambiguous, and our ability to effect perceived legislative purposes is necessarily limited to the language of the statute." Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Ind.1993). This is true even though a "statute as written may not, in the estimation of some, be good public policy." Rieddle v. Buckner, 629 N.E.2d 860, 865 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (Sullivan, J., concurring); see also Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996).
In determining whether a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate to look at the grammatical structure of language in the statute. Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 517 (Ind.1997) (citing Evansville v. Zirkelbach, 662 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied). Subsection (d)(1) states that the exception to section one's ten-year statute of repose applies "only to product liability actions against ... persons who mined and sold commercial asbestos." (emphasis added).
The two verbs "mined" and "sold" are conjoined by the eoordinating conjunction "and." The use of "and" alone is enough to, and does, conjoin the verbs "mined" and "sold" into a single verb element within the statute's complex noun phrase. The conjoined verbs "mined and sold" modify "persons" through the relative pronoun "who," which specifies the action related to, and thereby helps to define, the "persons" that are the subject of the complex noun phrase. See Randolph Quirk & Sidney Greenbaum, A Concise Grammar of Contemporary English 378 (1978). In light of its language and grammatical structure, I conclude that section two is unambiguous.
In contrast, the majority alters the statutory language at issue by inserting the phrase "persons who" before the statute's existing language, "sold commercial asbestos." Only when words are considered to have been palpably omitted should the court add those words into the statute. United States Steel Corp. v. NIPSCO, 486 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (Ind.App.1985). I cannot reach that conclusion here. The ma*159jority's grammatical interpretation is not the product of divination of "clearly contrary legislative intent" so as to properly fall within the extremely limited sanction of Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 526, 418 N.E.2d 207, 211 (1981).
B. Recent Decisional Low
The majority dismisses the facts and rationales of two recent opinions of this court: Novicki v. Rapid-American Corp., 707 N.E.2d 322 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Noppert, 705 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). In Noppert, the plaintiff brought a product liability action against his employer, alleging that exposure to asbestos components during installation of products sold by his employer caused him to contract mesothe-lioma almost thirty years later. The Nop-perts argued that their claims were not barred by the product liability statute of repose because Noppert's injury was an asbestos-related injury - governed - by Indiana Code section 33-1-1.5-5.5 (now re-codified at Ind.Code § 34-20-3-2). Id. at 1067-68. We disagreed, finding that Sears was not a miner of asbestos and stating that the statutory exeeption to the statute of repose for asbestos-related claims applies only when the defendants are "miners and sellers of commercial asbestos." Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). We stated:
while courts in Indiana have on occasion construed an "and" in a statute to be an "or," we find that there is no ambiguity in this statute requiring such an interpretation.
Id.; see also Novicki, 707 N.E.2d at 324 (holding that Indiana Code section 34-1-1.5-5.5, "[alecording to its express terms, . applies only to cases in which the defendant both mined and sold commercial asbestos").
The majority chooses to label the conclusions reached in Noppert and Novicki "die-ta." Maj. at 152. On the contrary, I find them instructive and, especially in Noppert, essential to the resolution of the case, rather than dicta _ Judge McKinney reached the same conclusion in Spriggs v. Armstrong World Industries, No. IP 91-651, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19874 (S.D.Ind. May 7, 1999).
For all of these reasons, I would hold that under Noppert and Novicki the language of the statute is unambiguous and applies only to persons who "mined and sold" commercial asbestos.
C. Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc.
The majority also relies on Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 382 (Ind.1989), which addressed the following certified question concerning the predecessor statute to the current general product liability two-year statute of limitations and ten-year statute of repose: "Whether a plaintiff may bring suit within two years after discovering a disease and its cause, notwithstanding that the discovery was made more than ten years after the last exposure to the product that caused the disease." Id. at 384.
Justice Pivarnik, joined by Justices Gi-van and DeBruler, answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the statute of repose was "inapplicable to cases involving protracted exposure to an inherently dangerous foreign substance which is visited into the body." Id. at 385. Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson dissented in separate opinions. Both decried what Justice Dickson called the majority's "judicial revision" of the ten-year product liability statute of repose. Id. at 389 (Dickson, J., dissenting).
The majority believes that the holding of Covalt should apply to the instant claims. However, while the certified question in Covalt was pending, the General Assembly *160enacted Indiana Code section 33-1-1.5-5.5 (section two's predecessor), which specifically addresses asbestos-related claims. The Covalt decision did not analyze or address the effect of this section on Co-valt's claim against an asbestos mining company. Indeed, the majority in Covalt acknowledged that this section was not determinative of the case, which was filed prior to the statute's effective date,. Id. at 383 n. 1. Moreover, the Covalt decision was limited, by its own terms, "to the precise factual pattern presented," i.e., an action against an asbestos mining company filed prior to the enactment of section two. Id. at 387.
I believe Covalt does not control because it was "orphaned" by the unique facts and statute it considered. - Rather, Indiana Code section 34-20-3-2(d), which clearly and specifically addresses asbestos-related injuries, currently provides the only exception to section one's statute of repose.
D. Undesirable Results
I fully recognize that the plain meaning of section two may produce results deemed undesirable or anomalous by the majority. For example, subsection (d)(2) allows actions initiated outside of section one's ten-year statute of repose to proceed against "funds that have, as a result of bankruptcy proceedings or to avoid bankruptcy proceedings, been created for the payment of asbestos-related disease claims or asbestos-related property damage claims." This exception apparently applies regardless of whether the funds were created by proceedings involving a miner or a seller who was not a miner. Although this "fund exception" is perhaps unusual, in making this exception the General Assembly could have reasonably chosen to restrict the types of ongoing businesses that could be lable for asbestos-related claims, while loosening restrictions to allow recovery against any business dissolving in bank-ruptey or avoiding bankruptcy by creating a fund to satisfy asbestos-related claims.
The statute also distinguishes between miners who sell commercial asbestos and those who sell the product but do not mine it. The majority holds that "an interpretation of the statute that permits or denies recovery based solely on the nature of the entity that introduced the asbestos into the marketplace cannot stand." Maj. at 154. To the contrary, such a distinction could well be based on the General Assembly's determination that, because it is so difficult, if not impossible, to establish which mine's fibers are contained in any commercial asbestos product, only miners who also sold the product should be subject to the exception. Such a policy decision would also reduce, if not obviate, the need to consider application of the more drastic concept of market share liability within comparative fault law. In this context, it is important to remember that only the General Assembly has the clear constitutional authority to make such policy determinations. See McIntosh v. Melroe, 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.2000).
I acknowledge that other, arguably undesirable or anomalous results may also occur under the plain language of the statute. Neither the majority nor I can rightfully claim to fully know what the General Assembly "clearly" intended when it drafted, considered and enacted the statutory language at issue. However, I must reiterate that when a statute is unambiguous, "we may not ignore the clear language of a statute, regardless of our view as to its wisdom." Robinson v. Monroe County, 663 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The legislature has wide latitude in determining public policy, and we may not substitute our own policy judgment for that of the legislature. Boehm, 675 at 321. "To the contrary, it is the duty of the *161courts to interpret a statute as they find it, without reference to whether its provisions are wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or inappropriate, or well or ill conceived." 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 267 (1974). The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
II. Constitutionality of Indiana Code 34-20-3-1
Onee Indiana Code section 34-20-8-2 is upheld as written, its constitutionality must be considered. Black contends that application of the ten-year statute of repose violates her rights under Article I, Sections 12 and 28 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, Black argues that the statute of repose operates to bar claims such as hers before the injuries are known, and that plaintiffs who discover their injuries within the statute of repose are given privileges that those who do not discover their claims in time are not.
A. Article I, Section 12
Our supreme court has recently considered the constitutionality of the general ten-year statute of repose for products liability actions. In McIntosh v. Melroe, 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.2000), the plaintiff was injured in an accident involving a skid steer loader more than ten years after the loader was delivered to the initial user. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer based on the statute of repose, and the court of appeals affirmed. Melntosh sought transfer, arguing that the statute of repose violated his constitutional rights under Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
In upholding the statute's constitutionality under Section 12, the supreme court highlighted the General Assembly's authority to identify, modify, and abrogate legally cognizable claims for relief, stating "we have long held that the General Assembly has the authority to modify the common law and that there is no "fundamental right' to bring a particular cause of action to remedy an asserted wrong." Id. at 976-77. The court concluded that the plaintiff in McIntosh was not entitled to a remedy under Section 12 because "the General Assembly has determined that injuries occurring ten years after the product was delivered to a user are not legally cognizable claims for relief" Id. at 978. Further, the court concluded that the statute of repose is a rational means of achieving a legitimate legislative goal, as required by Section 12 jurisprudence. Id. at 980.
Black relies in no small degree on our supreme court's decision in Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind.1999), to support her argument that the statute of repose violates her rights under Article I, Section 12. However, Martin is distinguishable because it dealt with the constitutionality of the two-year statute of limitations in the medical malpractice act as applied to a plaintiff who did not discover the malpractice until after the statute of limitations had run. The Martin court found that application of the statute of limitations cut off the plaintiffs acerued cause of action before it could reasonably be brought and that this was an "unreasonable and unconstitutional impairment of an existing and recognized remedy." McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 978 (citing Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1284-85).
In contrast, the product liability statute of repose has the effect of extinguishing a potential cause of action before it accrues. Id. This is the fundamental and easily confused difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. A statute of limitations requires that an action be brought within a shorter, specific time period after a cause of action has *162accrued, while a statute of repose bars an action after a much longer specific time period by preventing accrual of the action thereafter. For all of these reasons, and pursuant to McIntosh, the statute of repose does not violate Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
B. Article I, Section 28
Mclntosh also provides the answer to Black's claim that the statute of repose violates Article I, Section 28. Under Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 79-80 (Ind.1994), a two-prong test is applied to Section 28 challenges. "First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applied and equally available to all persons similarly situated." Id. at 80. As McIntosh made clear, the "distinetions" in the product liability act are not based on classes of persons, but on the age of the product that allegedly injured the claimant 729 N.E.2d at 981. "Everyone may potentially recover for an injury from a product not yet ten years old, and everyone injured from an older product is barred." Id. at 981. This distinction is rationally related to serving the legislative goals behind the statute of repose and is a "permissible balancing of the competing interests involved." Id. For all of these reasons, the statute of repose does not violate Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution.
III. Constitutionality of Section Two
Black also argues that the asbestos-related exception provided in Indiana Code section 34-20-8-2 violates Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, she contends that the exception grants privileges to persons injured by miners and sellers of commercial asbestos that are not granted to persons injured by sellers who are not miners. This argument is without merit. All potential asbestos plaintiffs' injuries are the result of the initial sale of asbestos from a miner and a seller, and all plaintiffs may take advantage of the exception found in section two to sue miners and sellers of commercial asbestos.
Black, and amici, also seem to argue that section two unconstitutionally distinguishes between classes of defendants. Black may not challenge section two's constitutionality on this ground because she does not belong to the class allegedly discriminated against. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Indiana Gamma Gamma of Alpha Tau Omega, Inc., 181 Ind.App. 664, 394 N.E.2d 187, 197 (1979).
For the foregoing reasons, Black's claim that section two violates Article I, Section 28 must fail.
Conclusion
For all of these reasons, I would hold that the section two exception to the general ten-year product lability statute of repose applies only to claims against miners and sellers of commercial asbestos. Therefore, Black's claims against the instant defendants, who are not miners and sellers of commercial asbestos, are barred by the ten-year statute of repose in Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1. I would further hold that this statute does not violate Article I, Section 12 or Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution. Finally, I would conclude the Indiana Code section 34-20-3-2(d) exception to the ten-year statute of repose does not violate Black's rights under Article I, Section 28. Accordingly, I believe the trial court correctly determined that Black's claims are barred by section one's ten-year statute of repose.