dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the circuit court rendered judgment for the defendant based on the statute of limitations affirmative defense. I also agree we cannot give retroactive application to amendments of the legislation in question. I do not agree that the statute-of-limitations defense was inapplicable to the suit brought by the Department. Thus, I am in disagreement, not only with the majority, but also with the decision in Schwartz.
Section 12(b) of the Minimum Wage Law is not without some ambiguity. It speaks of the “Director” recovering sums “on behalf of an employee” from “legal action” necessary to do so. This can be interpreted as indicating that the Department brings such action as the employee has. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1012(b).) Under such circumstances, the action would be subject to defenses which the employer would have against the employee indicating a time limitation. The decision in Amigleo gives support to the theory that the statute is ambiguous.
In construing statutes, courts presume that legislative bodies do not intend absurdity. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374; People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 473 N.E.2d 1300.) The majority’s interpretation of section 12 of the Minimum Wage Law nullifies the protection defendant has from the limitation period set forth in section 12(a) by concluding that the limitation disappears if suit is then brought for the benefit of the employee by the Department. Such an interpretation makes no sense. No purpose has been suggested for shutting off suits by the employee after three years but permitting suits on behalf of the employee forever.
I find nothing in the legislative history which requires the interpretation placed on the legislation by the majority. The history is entirely consistent with a continued understanding that the three-year limitation period was applicable to actions on behalf of the employee if it was applicable to actions by the employee. In County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076, and City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 457, 451 N.E.2d 874, the supreme court has set forth a rule that a statute of limitations will not bar governmental action involving “public rights” unless the statute clearly so provides. (County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 152, 485 N.E.2d at 1080; City of Shelbyville, 96 Ill. 2d at 461-62, 451 N.E.2d at 876-77.) The Schwartz court deems the action brought by the Department here is on behalf of public rights because of the public interest in seeing to proper administration of labor laws. I cannot agree. However much public policy may be enhanced by enabling individuals to obtain that to which they are justly entitled, I deem the right here being enforced to be a private right.
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Logan County.