dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority for two reasons. First, the doctrine of equitable conversion is applicable. Second, the testator’s state of mind as it relates to his intent to sell the farm is a question of fact; summary judgment should not have been granted. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court granted summary judgment based upon these findings:
2. That there is no evidence of any intent by decedent before his death to sell the real estate described in plaintiffs[’] complaint on land contract.
3. That to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion would ignore and defeat Testator’s testamentary intent.
4. That under the circumstances of this case no equitable conversion under I.C. 29-1-13-6 occurred.
Record, p. 104.
I.
Applicability of the Equitable Conversion Statute
The equitable conversion statute states in pertinent part:
* * * any real property sold by the decedent on written contract, the purchase price of which shall not have been paid in full prior to the death of the decedent, shall be deemed personal assets in the hands of his personal representative and be distributed and accounted for as such
IC 29-1-13-6. Citing In re Estate of Richard (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1012, transfer denied, the majority finds the statute inapplicable here.
In Richard, the Fourth District found the statute to be inapplicable to a sale of land by the guardian of the decedent. In reaching that conclusion, the Court found that to apply the statute would conflict with IC 29-1-18-44, which provided that the specific devisee of land sold by a guardian of the testator would take the value or proceeds of the land, at his option, at the death of the testator. This statute was enacted in order to prevent ademptions when the testator has no power to correct the situation by making a new will. Richard, supra at 1014.
It is clear that the Richard court was simply applying general rules of statutory *133construction. Statutes are to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence. 26 I.L.E. Statutes, § 128 (1960). Statutes which relate to the same subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together, although they contain no reference to each other. Citizens Action Coalition v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 610, 617, cert. den. 476 U.S. 1137, 106 S.Ct. 2239, 90 L.Ed.2d 687. Acts which appear inconsistent are not to be so construed if it is possible to construe them otherwise. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Indiana (1958), 237 Ind. 544, 147 N.E.2d 547.
Significantly, there is no statute corresponding to IC 29-1-18-44 with respect to powers of attorney in the probate code. Also significant is the fact that IC 29-1-18-44 has been repealed, and there is no similar provision in the current Probate Code.
The Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act provides:
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal and his successors in interest as if the principal were competent and not disabled.
IC 30-2-11-2. Thus, the same rule of construction which led to the result in Richard would require that the durable power of attorney statute, which treats the act of the attorney-in-fact as the act of the principal, be construed consistently with the equitable conversion statute. This requires application of the equitable conversion statute to the present situation.
Richard may be further distinguished on the basis that the policy underlying the inapplicability to guardianships does not support inapplicability to agency relationships. Guardianships are court appointed and require court intervention in order to sell real estate. Attorneys-in-fact are appointed by the principal himself and may sell real estate without court intervention. The distinction seems to be based on the fact that the attorney-in-fact is an agent of his principal, is in a good place to know the wishes of the principal, and his powers are limited by the scope of his durable power of attorney. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 12, 14, and 14F and comments (1958).
Finally, the majority’s implicit conclusion that the statute permits a trial judge to decide on perceived equitable grounds whether it is to be applied is clearly in error. The majority apparently bases this conclusion on the moniker “equitable conversion” 1 and the fact that the statute is similar to the common law doctrine of equitable conversion. In fact, the majority cites cases decided under the common law doctrine in support of its decision.
However, the statute differs significantly from the common law doctrine in at least one respect. IC 29-1-13-6 provides that real property sold by the decedent shall be deemed personal assets. When the word “shall” is used in a statute, it is presumed to be used in its imperative or mandatory sense. State ex. rel. Hatcher v. Lake Superior Court (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 737, 740. Thus, the legislature has not favored the courts with the discretion to choose whether the statute is to apply when real property has been sold but not paid for prior to the death of the decedent. The cases cited by the majority indicating that the testator’s intent is the controlling factor were decided before the 1953 statute was enacted, and the principle for which they are cited is not supported by the language of the statute.
II.
Remaining Issues of Fact
Even if the intent of the testator were a valid reason to ignore the statute, the co-executors correctly point out that there remains a question of fact precluding summary judgment. The majority finds no *134question of fact with respect to the intent of Cleo Funk. Interestingly, the majority notes that “[sjummary judgment must be denied if the resolution thereof hinges upon a state of mind ...” Op. at 129. However, the majority asserts that under proper circumstances, the construction of a will, including a determination of the testator’s intent, may be disposed of by way of summary judgment. Op. at 131. The majority finds this to be a proper circumstance because the “obvious” intent of Cleo was to leave the family farm to the children. Op. at 132.
This conclusion stretches the bounds of reason in light of the fact that the “obvious” intent to make a specific devise is extracted from a general residuary clause. The majority concedes that there was no specific mention of the family farm in the will. Op. at 128. Nonetheless, the majority finds:
[T]he use of the residuary clause was merely a “short cut” method of devising ' the family farm to the children. By way of this short cut, Cleo’s attorneys were able to manifest Cleo’s testamentary intent of devising the farm to the children without going to the trouble of setting out the long, complex legal description of the Funk family farm in the will.
Op. at 131. I am unable to join the majority in drawing such an inference from the residuary clause. Clearly, it was possible for the decedent to have acquired other real property before his death. Thus, the residuary clause was not tailored exclusively for the farm. At least one contrary inference may be drawn from the omission of the farm from the will — -the decedent intended to sell it before his death, in order to convert it to personalty.
I agree that the intention of the testator is to be ascertained, if possible, and carried into effect in the construction of every will. However, this intention is to be collected from what is contained in the will. The Majority has gone outside the will to obtain what it considers an equitable rather than a testamentary distribution of the farm. This is obviously true since the will is silent as to the farm — a residuary clause is not a specific devise.
This is why summary judgment is so often inappropriate where the legal issues involve a determination of intent. I find no clear expression of Cleo Funk’s intent with respect to the family farm on the face of the will.
I would reverse the partial summary judgment entered by the trial court and remand for a trial on the merits.
. The term "equitable conversion” does not appear anywhere in the statute.