I respectfully dissent; my dissent is directed to the published portion of the opinion only. However, my view of the entire case requires a homogenized discussion of the separate issues. I do concur, as will be discerned from the following discussion, with the balance of the majority opinion on the issues there addressed.
The majority and I differ on the meaning and effect of five recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with Beeman1 -type error (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1148 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]; *657People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 59-65 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 410-416 [247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184]; People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 486-488 [247 Cal.Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218]; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 503-504 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]). The effect of the majority opinion would effectively circumvent the clear import of People v. Anderson in overruling the decision of Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], and to ignore the clear and unambiguous statement that the use of former CALJIC No. 3.01 which contains the Beeman-type error is to be treated as Chapman error.2 (People v. Dyer, supra, at pp. 59-65.)
In addressing the issues specifically raised by the defendant in this dissent, I will illustrate what I believe to be an attempt by the majority opinion, particularly in its published portion, to obfuscate the clear meaning of the cited Supreme Court decisions, supra, and their application to a case such as this, in which the absence of an instruction on specific intent to kill in the felony-murder circumstance by an aider and abettor is asserted as reversible error.
I
Defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by failing to sua sponte give CALJIC No. 5.17 which defines an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend,3 and that as a consequence, the second degree murder conviction (Clark) must be reversed. I disagree.
“ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].)
The Supreme Court in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 682-683 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1], held that the unreasonable belief rule should *658be considered a general principle for purposes of jury instruction, and in cases not yet tried, the court should give the instruction sua sponte if the other requirements for such an instruction are met. “[T]he duty to give instructions, sua sponte, . . . arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)
Under the facts of this case, the court should have given CALJIC No. 5.17 and erred in failing to do so. However, the error was harmless, because “the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) The jury was adequately instructed that an honest but unreasonable belief in self-defense can negate malice by the court’s reading of CALJIC Nos. 8.40 (1979 re-rev.)4 (voluntary manslaughter—defined) and 8.50 (1980 rev.). CALJIC No. 8.50 provides: “The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that murder requires malice while manslaughter does not. [fl] When the act causing the death, though unlawful, is done [in the heat of passion or is excited by a sudden quarrel such as amounts to adequate provocation] [in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury] the offense is manslaughter. In such a case, even if an intent to kill exists, the law is that malice, which is an essential element of murder, is absent, [fl] To establish that a killing is murder and not manslaughter, the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of murder and that the act which caused the death was not done in the [heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel] [in the honest, even though unreasonable, belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury].” Under the circumstances, the jury obviously found that defendant did not act pursuant to an honest, but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend, and found him guilty of murder in the second degree.
II
Defendant argues the court committed reversible error by utilizing former CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01, and 8.27. He cites to People v. Beeman, supra, *65935 Cal.3d 547, and contends he was denied due process because the jury was not informed that to find him guilty as an aider and abettor they must find that he specifically intended to encourage or facilitate the criminal act. He also argues the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must find intent to kill in order to find him guilty of felony murder.
He grounds his contentions on Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, which has recently been overruled by People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104. Anderson holds “intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance [§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)]; but when the defendant is an aider and abettor rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved.” (Pp. 1138-1139.) Accordingly, I conclude that to the extent the jury found defendant to have been the actual killer of Archie Mannix, it was not required, before finding true the felony-murder special circumstance, that defendant intended to kill Mannix.5 To the extent the jury found defendant to have been an aider and abettor rather than the actual killer, however, I believe the jury, contrary to defendant’s assertion, was properly instructed that it had to find defendant intended to kill, as follows: “If defendant Kenneth Duane Roy was not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree before you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstance of that first degree murder to be true as to the defendant Kenneth Duane Roy.” This instruction is in the language of section 190.2, subdivision (b), which Anderson found unambiguous on the point: “Section 190.2(b) . . . declares that the felony-murder aider and abetter is eligible for the death penalty [or for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole] if intent to kill is proved. . . . [G]iven a realistic reading the statutory requirement that the aider and abetter intentionally aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist any acts in the commission of first degree murder—even when applied to felony murder—is not ambiguous: the aider and abetter must intentionally aid in a killing.” (43 Cal.3d at p. 1145, italics in original.) I would find no error in the special circumstance instructions given in this case.
Moreover, since People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539 [205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826], and People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, the California Supreme Court, in a series of cases involving use of former CALJIC No. 3.01, as modified, in accordance with People v. Yarber (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 895 [153 Cal.Rptr. 875], has held that Beeman-type error is *660to be treated as Chapman error. (See People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 59-65; People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 410-416; People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 486-488; People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 503-504.) The Chapman test is whether we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. Here, defendant argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury based on CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 3.00, and 8.27, claiming the error withheld the intent to kill issue from the jury and thus required setting aside its findings and convictions of second degree murder against Clark and first degree murder against Mannix.
Defendant claims he had no intent to kill either Clark or Mannix; that he was defending himself against Clark. The jury obviously rejected that defense and convicted him of second degree murder. Implicit in the jury’s verdict is a finding that defendant had the intent to kill. The jury also resolved the intent issue adversely to defendant on the first degree murder conviction of Mannix. In addition to the instructions on the intent to kill, the court also read the instruction on aiding and abetting. Although the latter instruction contained the Beeman flaw, it informed the jury that defendant’s state of mind was relevant to the aiding an abetting question. Former CALJIC No. 3.01 provides, “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime. . . .” (Italics added.) The issue raised encompasses Beeman-type error, that is, whether on the whole record the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not reasonably possible the jury would have not found intent by the defendant to kill Mannix either as the actual killer or as an aider and abettor. Applying the Chapman standard, I would conclude the evidence in this instance compels the conclusion that the instructional errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Concerning the murder of Archie Mannix for which defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, the defense was denial, putting the People to their proof. A stab wound to the heart and drowning were concurrent causes of Mannix’s death. The jury verdict that, as to the murder of Mannix, the defendant was armed with but did not personally use a knife necessarily implies that, if the jury believed the defendant was the actual killer, he killed Mannix by drowning. If the jury believed defendant was not the actual killer, the verdict implies he aided and abetted his partner, McHargue, in the stabbing and/or the drowning. In either event, the evidence shows overwhelmingly defendant’s intent to cause Mannix’s death.
Additionally, Sidney Hall was an inmate with defendant at Butte County jail. Hall testified that defendant admitted killing Clark (the other murder *661victim) after Clark had hit him over the head with a stick. McHargue and Mannix were fighting. McHargue was “getting the worst end of it,” so defendant went to his aid. Defendant told Hall “that Mannix had to die because he was a witness, and that he was stabbed and drowned—held under the water.” Defendant also told Hall that a woman drove by and stopped. McHargue went to talk to her, but defendant “was too far away and he didn’t think she could identify him at all.” Defendant later denied to Hall any involvement in Mannix’s killing.6
The woman who drove by and stopped was Marie Smart. She was driving by the scene and observed a truck in a ditch and two silhouettes. She stopped, with her car’s headlights, which were on high beam, shining directly onto the truck. To the left side of the truck she observed two men standing. She asked if they needed any help, and they both approached the car. One of the men, later identified as McHargue, went to Smart’s car window and told her they had already summoned help. (Smart was unable to identify defendant as the second man, who had approached to about two feet from the car but did not come to the window.) As she turned her car around to leave, Smart noticed a man lying on the ground, to the left side of the truck and at the location she first observed McHargue and the other man standing. The man lying on the ground was shirtless and appeared to he hurt, moving his hands up toward his stomach and back down again. As Smart was leaving the scene, McHargue and the other man returned to their original positions, standing over the apparently disabled man on the ground and doing nothing. When Mannix’s body was discovered by authorities, his torso was bare.7
Dr. Pierce Rooney, a forensic pathologist, testified that Mannix had suffered a nonfatal stab wound to his abdomen. Mannix had also suffered a mortal stab wound to his heart and considerable drowning, each of which was a cause of Mannix’s death. Death from the type of stab wound to the heart suffered by Mannix would, in the ordinary case, occur within a few minutes if not instantaneously.
Defendant and McHargue were eventually detained for questioning. Defendant did not respond when informed that Clark and Mannix had been *662discovered, dead. Defendant initially denied being with them when the truck ran into the ditch. But when informed that his story did not jibe with McHargue’s, defendant admitted he and McHargue were with Clark and Mannix when the truck ran into the ditch. Defendant admitted stabbing Clark after Clark had allegedly struck defendant. Defendant denied any knowledge about what happened to Mannix, stating only that when he (defendant) turned around after stabbing Clark, Mannix was already in the ditch.8 Defendant said he and McHargue then walked back to town. After giving his statement, defendant was arrested. Among the items found in defendant’s possession were a watch with dried blood and dirt on it and a key ring with six keys, both of which items were identified as Mannix’s. Defendant also had a wallet containing $170.53. One week before the homicide, Mannix was observed with a large sum of money in his wallet, including tens and hundreds. Mannix’s wallet and scattered documents, but no money, were found near his body.
Applying the Chapman test, the recited evidence from the record demonstrates to me, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Beeman error could not have affected the verdict. (See People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 64-65; see also People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 775-776 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].)
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 22, 1989, and the petitions of appellant and respondent for review by the Supreme Court were denied May 4, 1989.
People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318],
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].
CALJIC No. 5.17 (5th ed. 1988) provides: “A person, who kills another person in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice aforethought and cannot be found guilty of murder. This would be so even though a reasonable person in the same situation seeing and knowing the same facts would not have had the same belief. Such an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter.”
CALJIC No. 8.40 provides: “The crime of voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought when there is an intent to kill. [][] There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, [or] [in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury]. [][] In order to prove the commission of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, each of the following elements must be proved: []|] 1. That a human being was killed, [fl] 2. That the killing was unlawful, and [fl] 3. That the killing was done with the intent to kill.”
Similarly, the multiple-murder special circumstance finding is not infirm. (See People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1149 [overruling People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302 (208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669), to the extent it holds intent to kill is an element of the multiple-murder special circumstance].)
William Hudspeth, another inmate at the jail with defendant, also testified for the People. He testified that defendant admitted his and McHargue’s plan to rob and kill both Clark and Mannix. He also admitted to Hudspeth that he had stabbed Mannix. Hudspeth’s testimony should be disregarded, however, because the jury obviously disbelieved it. The verdict of second degree murder as to Clark, as well as the acquittal of the charge of robbery as to Clark, reflects the jury’s belief that there was no “plan” to rob and kill him. Further, the finding that, as to Mannix, defendant did not personally use a knife reflects the jury’s belief that defendant was not the person who actually inflicted the knife wounds.
Smart’s testimony, coming as it did from a disinterested witness, must have been most damaging. Indeed, during deliberation, hers was the only testimony the jury requested to be read back.
Defendant also told Dr. Globus, the defense psychiatrist, that he was aware Mannix had ended up dead in the ditch, but defendant denied actually killing him.