concurring:
I agree with the majority that the petition for reinstatement should be denied. I also agree that an analysis of the third and fourth Roundtree factors “counsel against petitioner’s reinstatement.” See In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985). I write separately to echo the view expressed by one member of the Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) who opposed reinstatement solely because of the nature of the criminal offenses committed. That member was of the view that reinstatement “would be detrimental to the integrity of the Bar, and detrimental to the administration of justice, *1386and subversive to the public interest.”1 I agree.
Petitioner was disbarred in 1988 on the basis of four 1982 federal convictions arising out of his role in a conspiracy to solicit a bribe from criminal defendants in exchange for lenient treatment by a United States District Court judge. Because the offenses involved moral turpitude per se, petitioner’s disbarment, at the time it was imposed in 1983, was deemed permanent pursuant to this court’s interpretation of D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1995),2 in In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C.1980) (en banc). Kerr, however, was overruled by the en banc court in In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626 (D.C.1992), where we held that “all attorneys disbarred upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude shall no longer be deemed disbarred for life under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) and that such attorneys, like all others who have been disbarred, shall be entitled to petition for rein-statement_” Id. at 641.
Thus, although petitioner’s disbarment was permanent when it was imposed, the holding in McBride would appear to permit an attorney, who has been disbarred for committing an offense involving moral turpitude per se, to be eligible for reinstatement after the passage of five years. See D.C.Bar R. XI § 16(a) (1995) (“disbarred attorney not otherwise ineligible for reinstatement may not apply for reinstatement until the expiration of at least five years from the effective date of disbarment”). This reinstatement petition is the first, of what no doubt will be many, by an attorney convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude per se to reach the Board (and this court) since McBride was decided. In its report, the Board acknowledges that it is somewhat at sea concerning the standards that should be applied, observing that:
McBride raises extremely difficult judgments on which the Board will need guidance from the Court. To put our dilemma simply, is McBride a crack in a door that formerly was closed completely, a door wide open, or something in between? This case is an extremely difficult first post-McBride case to face the Board and the Court, because Petitioner’s criminal conduct was so offensive, and his conduct since disbarment has been such a striking mix of the commendable and the unacceptable.
Report of the Board at 14-15. In my view we should respond to the Board’s inquiry by holding that McBride opened the door only slightly, allowing for reinstatement only where the disbarring offense, as in McBride, sprung from conduct that was relatively minor when compared to other offenses involving moral turpitude per se such as those committed by petitioner.
In reaching this conclusion, I find it helpful to review the circumstances leading to McBride’s disbarment as set forth in our en banc opinion:
On August 31, 1988, respondent Willard C. McBride pleaded guilty in federal court to the misdemeanor of aiding and abetting a client, Mrs. Shahid, in violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(4) and (b)(3) (the knowing possession of false identification document with intent to use document “to defraud the United States”). McBride, a member of the District of Columbia Bar since 1954 and a 28-year honored veteran of the Department of Justice, had retired in 1983 to become a solo practitioner. According to McBride’s brief, his practice consisted of many pro bono referrals from his church, including a request that he help Mrs. Sha-hid and her two young children, immigrants from Pakistan, change their immi*1387gration status from visitor to resident alien. With McBride’s assistance, Mrs. Shahid’s petition to change her immigration status was conditionally granted. But as she made preparations to fly to Pakistan to appear personally at the United States Consulate there, she grew fearful that some snag in the process would prevent her from returning to the United States and would require her to stay in Pakistan where her physically abusive ex-husband resides. She panicked and pleaded with McBride to help her obtain an American passport to use to reenter the United States in case her new immigration status was not approved. McBride helped Mrs. Shahid provide the passport office with two identification documents that belonged to a third person. McBride accompanied her to that office and remained with her as she applied for and picked up the passport. McBride received no financial or any other benefit from his actions, all of which occurred within four days. On the other hand, he has never disputed that he knew his conduct was dishonest and designed to secure for Mrs. Shahid a passport to which she was not entitled.
McBride, 602 A.2d at 628 (footnotes omitted). As indicated, this recitation was derived, in large part, from McBride’s own version of events as set forth in the brief filed in this court. Nonetheless, even viewed with its favorable gloss, McBride’s conduct, which obviously calls for punishment and censure, is considerably less serious than this petitioner’s conduct or the conduct of attorneys who have been disbarred based on convictions for such offenses as perjury or subornation of perjury, bribery of a public official, jury tampering or other like offenses involving moral turpitude per se. In contrast, McBride was convicted of a misdemeanor which we held could not be “deemed a conviction involving moral turpitude per se,” id. at 629.3 Thus the permanent disbarment requirement was abolished in a case involving an offense which, although serious, was not one that involved moral turpitude in the sense that it “incorporates a revulsion of society toward conduct deeply offending the general moral sense of right and wrong.” Id. at 632-33.
Although I do not read McBride as purporting to eliminate the permanent disbarment requirement for some offenses but not others, it does not specifically preclude such a distinction. One possible bright-line identifying an offense requiring permanent disbarment, could be drawn to include only those offenses that involve moral turpitude per se. To me that would be consistent with the governing statute but the McBride court has apparently concluded otherwise.4 Id. at 638-41. In any event, such a mechanistic approach has been criticized by both judges of this court and members of the Board, id. at 635-36, and may be no less unwieldy than the procedures applicable before McBride was decided.
We do not need to rely upon that line of reasoning, however, if, in applying the Roundtree factors, greater emphasis is placed on the nature of the offense triggering disbarment. Roundtree requires the weighing of five separate factors when considering reinstatement petitions: (1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice law. 503 A.2d at 1217. In my view, the first factor, i.e., “the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined,” should be the overriding consideration, which in some cases, even where a petitioner has satisfied the other four factors, would require denial of the reinstatement petition.
*1388By emphasizing the “nature and circumstances of the misconduct” we would give real meaning to the governing rule which provides that to gain reinstatement an attorney must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the resumption of the practice of law by the attorney will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.
D.C.Bar R. XI § 16(d)(2). In imposing this burden on a disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement, we are acknowledging that in some cases the criminal conduct is so offensive, so contrary to the norms of society, and so destructive of the system of justice, that a conviction should result in disbarment, if not for life, then for such a significant period of time that there is no danger that reinstatement would result in diminished respect for members of the bars, the legal profession, and the system of justice by the public at large. Without doubt, this is such a case.
In support of that conclusion, I think it important to emphasize that this petitioner was convicted for his role as a middle-man, between two defendants (the “Romanos”) in a criminal case and the federal judge who presided over their trial, in a scheme to obtain benefits for the Romanos from the trial judge in return for money. The Roma-nos had been convicted of twenty-one counts of racketeering and related charges. After the trial, the judge ordered the forfeiture of $1.2 million worth of their racketeering-related property pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a). The evidence at petitioner’s trial revealed that petitioner told an informant, who was thought to have ties to the Roma-nos, that the trial judge was willing to set aside some or all of the forfeiture and to provide other consideration in the form of some unspecified reduction in sentences. The price was to be $150,000 and $25,000 was paid to petitioner as a down-payment with the remainder payable after the forfeiture was set aside. The judge then issued an order setting aside the forfeiture in part, returning some $845,000 to the Romanos. Petitioner was arrested three days later when he attempted to collect the remaining $125,000 of the bribe. See United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1319-23 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905, 103 S.Ct. 1875, 76 L.Ed.2d 807 (1983).
The Board and the majority would reject petitioner’s reinstatement petition based upon his subsequent conduct and its assessment of his present character. I would deny reinstatement solely on the basis of the offenses of conviction, because any attorney who has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have engaged in the conduct set forth above, should not be reinstated because reinstatement would be “detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar,” detrimental “to the administration of justice,” and “subversive to the public interest.”
. Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (concurring opinion of Member McKay at 3) ("Report of the Board”).
. D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) provides:
When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.
. The underlying conduct could, of course, involve moral turpitude depending upon the circumstances. To that end, the McBride court remanded the case to the Board to conduct a full hearing on whether McBride's conduct involved moral turpitude. Id. at 635.
. Because McBride was argued before I joined the court, I did not participate in the decision even though the opinion was issued after my arrival on the court.