This case arises out of the alleged lead poisoning of the plaintiff, Stanley Ankiewicz, Jr., a minor under the age of six. The complaint asserted three counts against the defendants, landlords of the apartment occupied by the plaintiff and his parents, alleging (1) negligence, (2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and (3) violation of the lead poisoning prevention law. G. L. c. Ill, §§ 190-199A (1988 ed.). This is an appeal from judgments of the Superior Court dismissing the defendants’ third-party claim for contribution against the mother of the minor plaintiff, and allowing the plaintiff to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint in accordance with Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). We granted the defendants’ application for direct appellate review.
The defendants filed a third-party complaint against the plaintiffs mother for contribution, alleging that she negligently allowed her child to ingest lead-based paint found in the apartment. In February of 1985, a Superior Court judge granted the mother’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground of parent-child immunity. In 1988, however, while this action was still pending, this court abolished the doctrine of parental immunity for negligently caused injuries to minor children. Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762 (1988).
The defendants then moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of the third-party complaint in light of Stamboulis. Another Superior Court judge allowed that motion, and de*794nied the mother’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint — effectively reinstating the landlords’ claim for contribution — with respect to the plaintiff’s negligence and breach of warranty claims. The judge dismissed the landlords’ claim for contribution on the statutory cause of action, however, ruling that the Massachusetts contribution statute, which applies only to liability “in tort,” G. L. c. 231B, § 1 (a) (1988 ed.), does not apply to causes of action arising under G. L. c. Ill, §§ 190-199A. He reasoned that “it would be straining to construe a claim under [the lead poisoning prevention act] as sounding in tort, because it is founded on an act of the legislature and not on the common law decisions that constitute the basis of tort law,” and that allowing contribution against parents would subvert the policies underlying the act. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. On reconsideration, the judge reinstated the landlords’ claim for contribution with respect to the negligence and breach of warranty counts, but he dismissed the contribution claim as to the statutory cause of action. This led to the child’s seeking to dismiss the negligence and breach of warranty claims. With those claims dismissed, but leaving the statutory claim, the plaintiff’s mother would not be required to contribute to an award to the child (assuming no reversal on appeal of the judge’s ruling relative to the statutory claim).
The landlords’ claim of error arising from the dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence and breach of warranty claims is based on the following provisions of Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (2): “If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court” (emphasis added).
Since the defendants’ claim for contribution is against the minor plaintiff’s mother, it is not a counterclaim but a third-party claim. Compare Mass. R. Civ. P. 13, as amended, 385 Mass. 1215 (1982), with Mass. R. Civ. P. 14 (a), as a*795mended, 385 Mass. 1216 (1982). The dismissal of the plaintiffs claim is within the judge’s discretion. The allowance of the plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal is therefore subject to review here under an abuse of discretion standard. See Flynn v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 59, 65-66 (1984). No such abuse of discretion has been shown.
II. Because we rule that the lead paint prevention act imposes tort liability on landlords who violate its provisions, we conclude that the plaintiffs claim -under the lead poisoning prevention act is within the scope of our contribution statute, G. L. c. 231B, § 1 (a).
The judge ruled that statutory causes of action created by the Legislature out of whole cloth categorically do not sound in tort. In Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 100 (1982), however, this court ruled that the key variable in defining whether claims sound in tort is “the substantive quality of the claims.” See also Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 375 Mass. 644, 649 (1978) (“The term ‘liable in tort,’ as used in § 1 (a) to create and define the statutory right of contribution, is broad in scope . . .”).
While there is probably no universally accepted definition of the concept of torts, certain elements exist common to all torts which can aid us in delineating the concept. “A tort is a civil wrong (as distinguished from a crime), other than a breach of contract, for which ... the law . . . provides a remedy.” J.R. Nolan & L.J. Sartorio, Tort Law § 1 (2d ed. 1989). All torts share the elements of duty, breach of that duty, and damages arising from that breach. The cause of action created by the statute in question contains all those elements, and it is clearly tort-like in nature.
We therefore conclude that the substantive nature of the plaintiffs claim under the lead paint act is a tort claim, within the ambit of the contribution statute.
In addition we note that, although the statute imposes strict liability on a property owner for injuries sustained by children under six years of age who ingest lead-based paint that the owner fails to remove as the statute requires, *796Bencosme v. Kokoras, 400 Mass. 40, 41 (1987), it explicitly provides that such a property owner is not exclusively liable. G. L. c. Ill, § 199 (“The remedy provided by this section is not exclusive and supplements any existing statutory or common law cause of action”). A rule of exclusive owner liability would not only run counter to this specific statutory provision, but would also unfairly force owners to shoulder the entire burden of liability, with no right of contribution against other parties potentially at fault, such as negligent building inspectors, lead-based paint manufacturers, and paint removal contractors. Cf. Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., 404 Mass. 689, 705 (1989) (housing authority may be found liable for failure to inspect for lead-based paint). We therefore decline to interpret the statute contrary to its plain language as imposing liability on landlords exclusively.
The mother and amici curiae also argue that this court should prevent contribution actions against parents of lead-poisoned children for policy reasons. They argue that, if contribution against parents is permitted, the effectiveness of the act as an incentive for property owners to remove lead paint from residential properties will diminish as suits by parents become less frequent and less costly to landlords. In addition, they note that in most cases contribution by the parents would have the practical effect of reducing the child’s recovery because the family is generally a single economic unit.
We recognize that lead poisoning among children remains an enduring and serious public health danger. These policy arguments, however, should be addressed to the Legislature. We see no bases in the text or legislative history of the lead poisoning prevention law for the exclusion of contribution actions against parents for negligent supervision.
We therefore reverse the dismissal of the defendants’ third-party complaint for contribution against the plaintiffs mother and affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs tort and breach of warranty counts.
So ordered.