dissenting.
While the author of the majority Opinion has, in his usual fashion, provided a perceptive analysis and persuasive expression of view, I am compelled to this dissent, because, simply put, I cannot agree that the “ordinary meaning” of the release precludes appellants from suing appellee for medical malpractice. Scrutiny of the factual and procedural chronology serves to illuminate the analysis and assembly of rationale for this dissent:
January 5,1987 Russell Brown suffers injury when the stool upon which he was sitting collapsed.
March 22, 1988 Appellants commence a products liability action against the manufacturer and retailer of the stool. April 14, 1989 Appellee, Jay B. Herman, M.D., surgically implants a penile prosthesis in Russell Brown.
July 27, 1990 Appellants commence a medical malpractice action against Jay B. Herman, M.D., the suit which is the subject of this appeal.
January 29,1992 Appellants settle, discontinue, and end the products liability action by execution of the release which is the focus of this appeal.
The release which is the focus of our study and which terminated the products liability claims and suit recites:
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,00.00) to us in hand paid by Admiral Industries, Montgomery Ward & Company and Scottsdale Insurance Company, ... we, Russell Brown and Roselyn Brown ... discharge the said Admiral Industries, Montgomery Ward & Company and Scottsdale Insurance Company (Releasees) AND ANY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS, INSURERS, FIRMS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS which are or might be claimed to be liable to us, '... from any and all actions, causes of actions, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature on account of any and all known or unknown injuries, losses and damages ... sustained or received on or about the 5th day of January, 1987, when ... I, Russell Brown, fell from a *316chair/stool, ... on account of which suit was brought at No. G.D. 8-04918 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, it being understood and agreed that the acceptance of said sum is in full accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim and that the payment of said sum is not an admission of liability by the above named Releasees, (emphasis supplied)
The majority quite correctly states that Pennsylvania law requires that the release be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. For my part, the ordinary meaning of the aforementioned release to any layperson, be he or she a butcher, baker, or candlestick maker, would not encompass a release for the injuries caused by a surgical misprocedure performed by Jay B. Herman, M.D., at Shadyside Hospital on April 14, 1989, some 27 months after the collapse of the faulty stool, especially where a separate and distinct lawsuit seeking damages for the asserted medical malpractice had been filed on July 27, 1990, 18 months prior to the execution of the instant release on January 29,1992.
It must be acknowledged that appellate case law concerning the meaning of the terms of releases is the subject of firm differences even among the wise and venerable jurists of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the majority certainly provides sound and valid authority for its conclusion. Nonetheless, I find the harmony of ordinary meaning in the rendition of this Court in Republic Insurance Company v. Paul Davis Systems, Inc., 431 Pa.Super. 30, 635 A.2d 1056 (1993), appeal granted, 540 Pa. 602, 655 A.2d 990 (1995), as our eminent colleague, Judge James R. Cavanaugh, in reliance on Sparler v. Fireman’s Insurance Co., 360 Pa.Super. 597, 521 A.2d 433 (1987), appeal denied, 518 Pa. 613, 540 A.2d 535 (1988) and Farrell v. Lechmanik, Inc., 417 Pa.Super. 172, 611 A.2d 1322 (1992), opined for a unanimous panel:
In Pennsylvania, the effect of a release is determined by its language which must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. Since the present release unambiguously releases “all persons” from “all actions”, it would initially appear that the trial court was obviously correct in conclud*317ing that the release was an effective bar to Republic’s action.... [D]espite the general terms of a release, it is not effective to bar a suit for a different cause of action (contract-tort) when it was given for a separate cause of action (tort-wrongful discharge)____ [Although the terms of a general release may be broadly interpreted even to include unnamed parties, it may only serve to release those persons who might reasonably be considered to be within the ambit of responsibility under the asserted and released cause of action. The release given here was for a discrete contract claim (homeowner’s insurance) whereas the court enforced it as to a tort claim.
Republic Insurance Company v. Paul Davis Systems, Inc., supra at 31-32, 635 A.2d at 1057-58.
Thus it is that I would vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case for the trial of the malpractice claims of appellants against Jay B. Herman, M.D.