DANA, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. When determining a party’s gross income for purposes of computing child support payments the trial court “may include the difference between the amount a party is earning and that party’s earning capacity when the party voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient evidence is introduced concerning a party’s current earning capacity.” 19 M.R.S.A. § 311(5)(D) (Supp.1994) (emphasis added). Consideration of earning capacity as opposed to present income is not mandatory and we should not disturb a court’s decision whether to consider earning capacity absent an abuse of discretion. Rich v. Narofsky, 624 A.2d 937, 939 (Me.1993). Moreover, we accord “unusual deference” to a court’s findings in an order modifying the amount of child support and “will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Tardif v. Cutchin, 617 A.2d 1032, 1033 (Me.1992) (quoting Finn v. Finn, 517 A.2d 317, 318 (Me.1986)).
Unlike determinations of parental rights and responsibilities, determinations of child support payments are not based solely on the standard of the “best interests of the child.” Compare 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320 (Supp. 1994) with 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(5) (Supp.1994).
Following dissolution of marriage, the custodial parent and children cannot be allowed to freeze the other parent in his employment or otherwise preclude him from seeking economic improvement for himself and his family. So long as his employment, educational or investment decisions are undertaken in good faith and not deliberately designed to avoid responsibility for those dependent on him, he should be permitted to attempt to enhance his economic fortunes without penalty.
Coons v. Wilder, 93 Ill.App.3d 127,48 Ill.Dec. 512, 518, 416 N.E.2d 785, 791 (1981).
The trial court carefully considered the motivations behind Harvey’s decision to leave his full-time job in order to pursue a college education while maintaining three part-time jobs. The court reached a conclusion that the decision was one based on good faith and not one motivated by a desire to avoid child support payments. There is substantial evidence to support this finding. Moreover, there is no indication that the court did not consider the best interests of the children when it adjusted Harvey’s monthly payments to an amount significantly greater than that suggested by the child support payment guidelines.
I find the trial court’s action to be within its considerable discretion, and I would affirm the judgment.