concurring and dissenting.
Appellant, aged 17, was indicted on charges of rape,1 statutory rape2 and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.3 The statutory rape charge was nol prossed; however, appellant was convicted by a jury of the remaining offenses. Appellant now raises several allegations of error. I agree that the lineup was not suggestive and that the lower court did not err in refusing two of appellant’s requested points for charge. I dissent from part I and concur in the result of part III of the majority’s opinion and would affirm the lower court’s judgment of sentence.
Appellant first contends that the lower court erred in certifying him to stand trial as an adult. The majority in part I agrees and would remand this case for a second certification hearing based on its conclusion that “[ajbsent an opinion or statement setting forth the reasons for certification, it is impossible for this court to afford any type of meaningful review of the issues raised by appellant.” (Majority opinion at 195). I believe that the lower court sufficiently complied with the requirements of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and that a meaningful appellate review is possible on the current state of the record.
In Kent v. United States, supra, petitioner was certified to stand trial as an adult under the Juvenile Court Act for the District of Columbia. The provision authorizing certification read as follows:
“If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of *209an adult, . . . the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult . . . .”4 (emphasis added).
The lower court ordered Kent to stand trial as an adult without holding a hearing or conferring with any of the parties. As the Supreme Court noted, the statutory provision set forth above established the circumstances under which a juvenile could be ordered to stand trial as an adult, but it failed to enunciate any criteria governing a juvenile court judge’s decision to waive jurisdiction. In this setting the Court held that due process required, inter alia, a statement of reasons sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of a “full investigation” had been met and that the question had received sufficient consideration. Because the permissible scope of discretion was not delineated by the terms of the statute, a statement setting forth the criteria employed by the transferring judge was a necessary prerequisite to any meaningful appellate review.
Our Juvenile Act,5 in contrast to the District of Columbia Act and our prior Juvenile Court Law,6 sets forth the substantive criteria to be applied by a judge in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to criminal court. Moreover, *210the requirements, which include both objective and subjective findings, are quite specific.7 It seems obvious that there is substantially less need for a statement of reasons under our statute than under the provision reviewed in Kent. In formulating its ruling, the Supreme Court specifically pointed out that the statement need not be formal or provide conventional findings of fact so long as it sets forth “the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” Kent v. United States, supra, 383 U.S. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057. In the instant case, the lower court has complied with this requirement.8
Section 28(a) contains four subsections.9 The first three establish procedural guidelines which are clearly not at issue in this case. Subsection (4) requires the following:
(1) That there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent act10 alleged;
*211(2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities;
(3) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or the mentally ill;
(4) that there are reasonable grounds to believe either that the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more than three years if committed as an adult.
An examination of the above indicates that there are four elements which must be present before a certification may be ordered. In my view, the lower court unquestionably made sufficient findings of fact on the first two elements, there was no evidence on the record from which the court could have made a decision other than that required for the third element, and an examination of the Crimes Code establishes compliance with the fourth element. Each of these elements are discussed seriatim below.
In the instant case, a certification hearing was held on July 3, 1974 and July 9, 1974. A twelve year old girl and her ten year old companion positively identified appellant as the assailant who, on June 10, 1974, accosted the girl and sexually molested her. At the close of the July 3 portion of the hearing, the juvenile court judge found as a fact that a prima facie case had been established. (NT Certification Hearing at 19). This finding was clearly supported by the record.
At the close of the certification proceedings on July 9, the lower court found that “the Juvenile Court system is not an adequate set-up to handle this defendant and his behavior.” (NT Certification Hearing at 26). I find that this statement is, at the very least, equivalent to a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities. Juvenile Act *212§ 28(a)(4)(i); Commonwealth v. Greiner, 236 Pa.Super. 289, 344 A.2d 915 (1975).11
Section 28(a)(4)(i) further provides that a judge may consider the defendant’s age, mental capacity, maturity, previous record and probation or institutional reports in making the above finding. The record indicates that the judge did consider these factors.
The certification hearing was continued until July 9 for the express purpose of providing sufficient time for the completion of certain psychiatric and sociological reports which were, in fact, completed and reviewed by the court prior to making its decision. These reports indicated in part as follows: Although appellant tested within the upper limits of the borderline range of intelligence his academic skills were limited and his mental discipline was poor. He was aggressive and hostile. In the opinion of the psychologist, appellant was unable to channel anger and tended to demand immediate gratification of his needs with little concern for the rights of others.
The record also demonstrates that the court considered appellant’s prior criminal history. An extensive discussion of this subject immediately preceded the lower court’s certification decision. Appellant had previously been adjudicated delinquent for robbery related offenses on March 25, 1973, and rape related offenses on March 12,1971. A second robbery charge was adjusted on November 13, 1972.12 In *213light of the above, I would hold that the lower court made a sufficient finding to satisfy section 28(a)(4)(i) and that the finding was amply supported by the record.
Section 28(a)(4)(ii) requires reasonable grounds to believe that the child was not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or the mentally ill. Under the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,13 a person is subject to involuntary commitment if he suffers from a mental disability. See Mental Health Act, art. IV, §§ 406 - 408 (50 P.S. §§ 4406-4408). “ ‘Mental disability’ means any mental illness, mental impairment, mental retardation, or mental deficiency, which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care as provided in this act. It shall include conditions and terms heretofore defined as ‘insanity,’ ‘unsoundness of mind,’ ‘lunacy,’ ‘mental disease,’ ‘mental disorder,’ ‘feeble minded,’ ‘moron,’ ‘idiot,’ and ‘imbecile’ . . . .” Mental Health Act § 102 (Mental Disability) (50 P.S. § 4102 (Mental Disability)). The pre-certification psychological reports indicate that appellant tested within the upper borderline range of intelligence14 and, therefore, at the lower end of the “average range.” Although this description also means that appellant functions at the upper level of borderline mental retardation, it does not provide any basis for a belief that appellant suffered from a mental disability of the type required under the Mental Health Act in order to subject him to involuntary commitment. I would, therefore, find no error in the certification proceedings on the basis of section 28(a)(4)(h) of the Juvenile Act.
*214Finally, section 28(a)(4) of the Juvenile Act requires reasonable grounds to believe that the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more than three years if committed by an adult. The potential sentences for the crimes which were charged in the instant case were as follows: Rape, a first degree felony — twenty years; statutory rape, a second degree felony — ten years; and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, a first degree felony — twenty years. This requirement was obviously met in the instant case.
In light of the above, I find that appellant was properly certified to stand trial as an adult. The lower court committed no error of law or gross abuse of discretion, Commonwealth v. Greiner, supra, and the lower court’s findings are sufficiently complete for this court to afford appellant a meaningful review in compliance with due process as mandated by the Supreme Court and our Juvenile Act. I do not believe that anything will be achieved by further proceedings in the lower court15 because the record is complete. Therefore, I would hold that the certification in the instant case was proper.
In part III of its opinion, the majority holds that the Commonwealth failed to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 and, therefore, invokes the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). While I agree that the admission of the pre-arraignment lineup was not reversible error, I would hold that Commonwealth v. Futch, supra, is inapplicable because the lineup in this case was counseled. Assuming an unnecessary delay, there was no nexus between the evidence obtained and the delay. Compare Com*215monwealth v. Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974);16 Commonwealth v. Futch, supra; with Commonwealth v. Weaver, 231 Pa.Super. 220, 331 A.2d 852 (1974); Commonwealth v. Corbett, 228 Pa.Super. 292, 323 A.2d 836 (1974).
In reaching its decision, the majority engages in a lengthy analysis of the relationship between Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 and the Juvenile Act. I agree that the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply in this type of case until a petition is filed in accordance with the Juvenile Act. But see Anderson Appeal, 227 Pa.Super. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973), wherein this court applied the Juvenile Act even though a petition had not been filed. I disagree, therefore, with any intimation that, absent the filing of a petition, the Commonwealth could have demonstrated the use of proper procedures by showing that the jail was a detention or shelter care facility designated by the court or that appellant was not detained with adults. (See Majority opinion at 199). The Juvenile Act had not become applicable in the instant situation. I express no opinion at this time on the effect of filing a petition under the Juvenile Act after the defendant has been arrested and detained for a reasonable time without a preliminary arraignment. See generally Anderson Appeal, supra.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence of the lower court.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123.
. D.C. Code § 11-914 (1961); see also D.C. Code § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 1 (11 P.S. § 50-101 (Supp. 1976-77)) et seq., (hereinafter cited as Juvenile Act).
. The Act of June 2, 1933, P.L. 1433, § 18 (11 P.S. § 260), repealed, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 40 (11 P.S. § 50-337), provided, inter alia, that a member of the minor judiciary could certify certain criminal cases to the district attorney for prosecution if, in his opinion, the interests of the state required such a prosecution. In Freeman Appeal, 212 Pa.Super. 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968), this court held that Kent v. United States, supra, applied to our statute. As the supreme court held in Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975), section 28(a) of the Juvenile Act contains a codification of the requirements of Kent v. United States, supra. See also Comment, Proposed Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 75 Dickinson L.Rev. 235 (1970).
. Section 28(a) of the Juvenile Act provides that a case may be transferred to criminal court if:
(1) The child was fourteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct; and
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with this act; and
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before the hearing; and
(4) The court finds that there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent act alleged, and the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (i) the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, in determining this the court may consider age, mental capacity, maturity, previous record, and probation or institutional reports; and (ii) the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, and (iii) the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more than three years if committed by an adult.”
. I agree, however, that the better practice would be for the lower court to make a somewhat more detailed statement of reasons.
. See note 7, supra.
. A delinquent act includes an act designated a crime under the law of this state. See section 2(2) of the Juvenile Act (11 P.S. § 50-102(2)).
. In Commonwealth v. Greiner, 236 Pa.Super. 289, 344 A.2d 915 (1975), this court held that the lower court did provide a sufficient statement of findings to comply with Kent v. United States, supra. In effect, the lower court judge in Greiner merely read the statute on the record.
. Appellant was also arrested for a third robbery on March 6, 1973. This charge has never been adjudicated. Appellant contends that this charge had been withdrawn and the lower court erroneously considered it in making its certification decision. Assuming that the lower court did consider the arrest, I would hold any error harmless because of other overwhelming evidence of reasonable grounds to believe that appellant was not subject to treatment or rehabilitation under the Juvenile Act. Moreover, appellant never objected to the *213introduction of this arrest at the hearing. Therefore, the matter is waived.
. Act of October 20, 1966, Special Session No. 3, P.L. 96, § 101 (50 P.S. § 4101) et seq. (hereinafter cited as Mental Health Act).
. Appellant’s test scores were as follows: WAIS Verbal IQ — 80; WAIS Performance IQ — 81; WAIS Total IQ — 79. The reporting psychologist also noted that higher potential was indicated by sound verbal reasoning skills.
. Moreover, if the original certification proceedings were so defective as to require a remand for full certification proceedings, it would seem that the proper remedy in a case of this type would be to quash the indictment because the court of common pleas, criminal division, was without jurisdiction to try the case. See Kent v. United States, supra; Freeman Appeal, supra.
. In Commonwealth v. Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974), the supreme court held that although police officers are not required to cease all investigation at the time of a warrantless arrest, they must comply with former Rule 118, now Rule 130, prior to any investigatory procedure conducted for the purpose of gathering further evidence against the accused if that procedure is dependent upon the waiver of a constitutional right. Appellant, in this case, was provided with counsel prior to the lineup, as was his right, Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974), and therefore has no grounds for complaint.